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This dissertation is a critical analysis of the way in which individuality is socially 
constructed and of the pattern in which the majority of the population is socially 
integrated, mobilized, and immobilized during the process of systemic reproduction. 
Assessing that the political project contained in the U.S. National Security strategy 
models coercion in service of individual self-assertion as it seeks to open societie  and 
favors an expansion towards a new frontier, this study examines the pedagogical 
experience embedded in such a war scenario, the various discourses of security, and the 
implications of the confiscation of our moral responsibility, extrapolating its 
consequences into curriculum theory. The main problem explored is to what extent the 
state should be allowed, as state, to intervene in the process of interpretation through
which each of us is supposed to build an identity. The educational, ethical, and political 
questions related to this shaping process are: What kind of personal identities can thi
kind of blueprint generate? What kind of impact does this social engineering experiment 
have on our experience as autonomous individuals? And finally, is there any possibility 
of unhinging questioning or dialogical space?  
Bricolage is used to explore the issues at hand, de-center our thoughts, and de-
center the way we think. By juxtaposing multiples frames of inquiry and understanding of 
the social, cultural, political, psychological, and educational domains attention is drawn 
toward processes, relationships, and interconnections among phenomena using 
hermeneutics, semiotics, media analysis, historical and literary analysis, technological 
  
and theoretical analysis, psychoanalysis, vignettes, and currere as an invitatio  to connect 
the pieces of a multidimensional puzzle in a pedagogical effort to redescribe reality and 
confront the linearity of objectivity.  
The understanding of curriculum as a process of social construction results here in 
the validation of the use of the study of limits as an effective strategy to et at the 
unmarked criteria that work to dismiss as irrelevant or valorize as relevant a p r icular 
mode of thought, field of study, or insistence upon the real. It also works as a powerful 
methodology to challenge our ability to represent and self-represent and as a generator of 
democratic treats for an educated citizenry. This study concludes with a consideration of 
how unhinging questioning belongs to Education and Schools of Education, how they 
legitimate particular beliefs while delegitimizing others, and a call for educators to 
facilitate a democratic, self-limiting, and morally responsive experience of schooling.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A Hermeneutical Crossroad 
 Eighteen years ago, during the winter of 1992, Frederick Herzog, professor of 
Systematic Theology at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, hosted an encounter 
and a series of dialogue sessions between the faculty of the Duke Divinity School and the 
Comunidad Bíblico Teológica Wesceslao Bahamonde, also a Methodist related seminary 
in Lima, Peru, with which I was associated in a rather unofficial way. I was not part of 
the faculty but attended it, upon Fred’s insistence, as a church liaison.  They were the 
continuation of a North-South dialogue that had started over a year before in Lima, when 
Dean Russell Ritchie and Professors Mary McClintock-Fulkerson, William Turner, and 
Ted Campbell, with the auspices of Methodist Bishops C. P. Minnick of the North 
Carolina Conference and Marco Ochoa of the Methodist Church in Peru, made their long 
journey to Lima despite the recommendations of the Department of State not to do it.  At 
that time Peru had already been fighting over a period of more than ten years a dedly 
War on Terror against the Partido Comunista del Perú Sendero Luminoso, where the 
abuse of a State of Emergency regime had been the organic response of the Peruvian state 
to the turmoil and civil unrest caused by a ruthless and politically subversive violence 
generated by Sendero Luminoso since 1980. 
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Interestingly, the faculty at Duke was, at that time, trying to discern its theological 
agenda for the 21st century and Fred considered important for the Divinity School to hear 
the voices of the other coming from the periphery. A periphery -disturbed and unhinging- 
upon which he had been systematically reflecting. As I recall it now, through dialogue 
and a theology that was embedded in mutual accountability, following the Wesleyan 
tradition, Fred hoped that the faculty could become somehow affected in ways that 
inspired an alternative theological response to an all overriding globalization discourse 
that was permeating the academy. And so were we, overridden, but from the opposite 
perspective. Trapped in the middle of a violent crossfire, we were trying to figure out 
how to act hope. We explained over and over that our reality could no longer be read 
through the dichotomy of left and right, and described how the aftertaste of the cold war 
had already been displaced by another, an unyielding, unmerciful and more sinisterone, a 
battle between fanaticism and modernity. Our concerns were, of course, how to get rid of 
an out of date and certainly anachronic gasp of a pre-1989 world and the pernicious 
activity of the School of the Americas spreading the U.S. National Security doctrine 
throughout the continent; but most importantly, how to generate and deliver new 
understandings of our own selves and inscribe them in a new scenario where violent 
responses were not part of the picture. The dialogue continued over the next few years, 
became somehow organic through student and faculty exchanges, but, I am afraid, key 
parts of it were lost in the translation, until it eventually faded after Fred’s su den death 
following a heated Faculty meeting and the censorship and closing of the Methodist 
Seminary, ironically, by the Methodist Church in Peru. 
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Time has passed, inexorable, but now that memories of terrorism in Peru and how 
it was organically and privately assumed come alive in the new context of a U.S. led 
global War on Terror, I am wondering how I am supposed to read -or continue read- that 
encounter, the ironies it generated, and the ways it failed (or not). More specifically, how 
to think about the similitude of disparate spatial and temporal registers of history in 
which a highly localized terrorism –self avowed as the last Maoist guerrilla war- comes 
face to face with a new and growing international terrorist network -which for es us to 
think about the world and how we act in it in a different way-. For now, here, I just want 
to think about it as a hermeneutical crossroad, but I shall return to this point later. 
Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique (2003), though, in Terror and the Privatized 
State: A Peruvian Parable, provide a comprehensive as well as challenging historical 
understanding, which constitutes a glimpse of what this juncture could mean: 
 
 
For many people in the world, the terrorist acts of September 11, although 
shocking for their magnitude, did not constitute a paradigm shattering event. 
Many Peruvians, Colombians, Guatemalans, and Argentineans, for example, 
reacted to the disaster with a muted sense of irony. ‘At last,’ they reflected, 
‘Americans will understand what we’ve been through.’ Seen from their 
perspective, fear and uncertainty were nothing new. Moreover, all of the 
antidemocratic measures invoked to fight this terrorism –such as suspension of 
habeas corpus, special military tribunals, sanctioned racial profiling, heightened 
surveillance, homeland security, military checkpoints, unrestricted wiretapping, 
and censorship- were hauntingly familiar to Latin Americans. While U.S. liberals 
react with alarm to such dramatic changes in their country’s democratic culture 
and constitutional regime, many Latin Americans credit the United States with 
fostering similar measures in their own countries. (p 151) 
 
 
Poole and Rénique (2003) argue, and I think they do it convincingly, that from a 
regional perspective, it is not difficult to see that the U.S. began experimenting wi h such 
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procedures on another September 11, thirty eight years ago, when in a C.I.A. covert 
action the U.S. sponsored a coup that brought an end to the democratically elected 
government of Salvador Allende in Chile, and ushered an era of neoliberal governance in 
Latin America. With the serene perspective of historical distance, their asse tion reminds 
me now of what Bauman (1995) says about society: it is “a massive cover-up operation,” 
(p. 14) that pretends to put some order, he says. A convenient order. It also reminds me of 
what Britzman (2006) thinks about what brews underground: “One of the most 
perplexing problems for a pedagogy that engages the work of social repair conce ns the 
status of the external world in our inner world, not from the vantage of attitudinal change 
or new epistemologies standpoint theories but from the ways the inner world can even be 
imagined” (p. 46). It is true that the Chileans themselves acted against Allende in 1973, 
but as David P. Forsythe (1992) assesses in Democracy, War, and Covert Action: 
 
The Nixon team had made it clear that anti-Allende violence had U.S. support and 
that a new military government would be quickly rewarded with diplomatic 
recognition and foreign assistance. Despite Kissinger’s protestations of innocence, 
one cannot meet clandestinely with military officials and urge them to use force 
against an elected President, then credibly disclaim any responsibility for the 
subsequent violent coup, even though it was carried out by others (…) Covert 
violent action to overthrow a government may assume a leading or supporting 
form. When it takes the latter, it is still intervention. (p. 390) 
 
Since that time, Poole and Rénique (2003) conclude, the wars in Argentina, Central 
America, Colombia, and Peru had served as virtual laboratories for U.S. regional 
experimentation with the idea of market development through “permanent states of 
exception” (p. 152).    Drawing from this historical perspective and trying to build a 
parallel with the current nation building efforts in the Middle East, I wonder to what 
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extent it is legitimate for a state to intervene in the process of interpre ation through 
which each of us is supposed to build an identity. There are a few educational, ethical, 
and political questions connected to this very particular concern. What kind of personal 
identities can this kind of blueprint generate? What kind of impact does this social 
engineering experiment have on our experience as autonomous individuals? And finally, 
is there any possibility of unhinging questioning or dialogical space? 
 
The Social Location 
Allow me now to make a disclosure before I go back to Herzog, the theologian, 
and to the notion of hermeneutical crossroad. I do not pretend to do theology here. At 
least, not an orthodox one. But who knows what goes underground! I embrace the 
postmodern trend that believes that a text, and text here may be understood in a broad 
sense, can be theologically read. Modern schooling, says Slattery (1995) has enshrined 
the written word as a historical artifact to be memorized, comprehended, and regurgitated 
on a standardized test. In contrast to this dominant view, “postmodernity views the text as 
a phenomenological encounter between the word and the reader” (p. 77). In this sense, I 
can say, Herzog (1974) had a strong sense of irony. He always refused to live within the 
boundaries of contemporaneity. In a practical and systematic critique to his peers he 
usually encouraged his students, both in Durham and in Lima, to develop a critical 
understanding of their own performance in the world. His analysis, which resonated very 
much with the understandings of Latin American Theology of Liberation at that time, and 
Paulo Freire’s (1985) domesticating and liberating modes of education, always started
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“with the pain and the hurt of suffering humans on the borders of life.” (p. 319). It is 
precisely the endurance to the resistance that Herzog (1974) experienced, documented, 
and I witnessed to his notion of borders of life -squared up by the fact that the poor, the 
outcast, do not appear at the laying of the hermeneutical foundations of Systematic 
Theology- and the paradigm shift that it implied –switching the focus from the larg , 
endogamous group of educated people to the oppressed as the starting point of theology- 
that caused a lasting impression on me. I think that hermeneutical crossroad that he 
created opened hopeful possibilities for contrastive analysis, change in focus, and shifts 
in paradigm.  
Herzog (1988) continued to develop his notion of b rders of life and masterfully 
explained it in his book God-Walk, Liberation Shaping Dogmatics n a very simple and 
yet radical way: 
 
The preacher starts with theology and then works it into examples of real-life 
situations. It is the other way around. Christian thought needs to grow out of real 
life. Ministers as well as lay persons need to reflect on real-life situations as they 
focus sharply on social location. It is never a matter of just single-issue dilemmas. 
We have to start where we are located in terms of the total situation. That may be 
a cotton mill. But the challenge expands right away from the difficulties of the 
cotton mill to world peace, for example. (p. 126) [The emphasis is mine] 
 
Herzog (1988) embodied the deepest meaning of Easter, as Freire (1985) would 
say. He was first a teacher, then a theologian, and always whole. During our multiple 
encounters I was profoundly impressed with his consistent and empathetic effor to put 
limits to the self and walk with, describe, and redescribe those on the borders of life to 
the point where, precisely during the walk, description, and redescription, thoughts 
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transgressed orthodox boundaries and dared to reach the orthodox unthinkable. In his 
own words: 
Formerly, with Freud, we thought that consciousness was a wide-ranging 
dimension of our lives with subconsciousness as a relatively small area of a 
strange ‘underworld.’ Now psychologists assume that this underworld morass is 
the major part of our psychic life and consciousness only a thin veneer on top of 
it. Our underworld occupies us most of the time. That is why we are so much 
asleep, not really alert to reality. Repentance is basically this waking up from 
sleep, the awakening of conscience, seeing the full picture –if only for moments at 
time. We usually don’t grasp how things hang together in our lives. Open your 
eyes that you may see –that is what repentance means. (p. 191) 
 
To return to the opening question, then, one way to think about the similitude of 
these two disparate spatial and temporal registers of history is to ask: To what extent the 
state should be allowed, as state, to intervene in the process of interpretation through
which each of us is supposed to build an identity? The educational, ethical, and political 
questions related to this shaping process are: What kind of personal identities can thi
kind of blueprint generate? What kind of impact does this social engineering experiment 
have on our experience as autonomous individuals? And finally, is there any possibility 
of unhinging questioning or dialogical space? To describe this hermeneutical crossroad as 
a social location I draw from Kwame Anthony Appiah’s (2005) The Ethics of Identity: 
 
As you’d expect, public schools already maintain a gingerly reticence aboutthe 
more salient identity claims. In the United States, public school students will be 
instructed in arithmetic and science and history, but teachers will not promulgate 
views about God’s existence or Christ’s benevolence; and given the thinness of 
our ‘civic religion,’ this suits most people just fine. Many identity groups that 
make thicker claims are resigned at odds with the official curriculum. Where t y 
are not, the concern for the child’s prospective autonomy does nave a bite. The 
proposal we’ve discussed has as a consequence that if intolerance of other 
identities is built into an identity, or if learning the views of others except as 
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shameful error is one of their norms, we will be seeking, in public education, to 
reshape those identities so as to exclude this feature. (p. 211) 
  
Interestingly, at a macro level, the National Security strategy of the United States 
of America has inscribed education within the frame of National Security doctrine. 
Education has openly become one of nine foreign policy strategies designed to expand 
what President George W. Bush (2002) described as a “circle of development” (p. 23) in 
a promising vision delivered to the world almost one year after the terrorist attacks in 
New York and Washington D.C. in 2001. Within that vision, literacy and learning were 
considered the “foundation of democracy” (p.23). An analysis of two of the main official 
documents that regulate national security policy making, The National Security Strategy 
of the United States, Washington, The White House, September 2002; and The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, The White House, March 
2006 reveals, nevertheless, from the perspective of critical pedagogy, not only that 
literacy and learning have been foreshorten to unpretentious functions played within a 
neutral structure, but confirms that education has been seamlessly articulated to  larger 
political agenda: “to open societies” (p. 21). The implications and challenges that this 
vision carries, though, have not been sufficiently discussed in pedagogical terms. What 
does it mean to open societies? I draw from Zygmunt Bauman’s (1995) philosophical 
focus about the confiscation of our individual moral responsibility in Life in Fragments to 
both address the question and advance the pedagogical process:  
 
The overall effect of all this is another case of the by-now familiar tendency to 
expropriate the individual’s moral responsibility. It is now the community, or 
rather the self-proclaimed wardens of its purity, who draw the boundaries of 
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moral obligations, divide good and evil, and for better or worse dictate the 
definition of moral conduct. The paramount concern of their moral legislation is 
to keep the ‘us’ and ‘them’ watertight; not so much the promotion of moral 
standards, as the installation of double standards (…) –one for ‘us’, another 
reserved for the treatment of “them.” (p. 277) 
 
I propose that the political project contained in the U.S. National Security 
Strategy models coercion in service of individual self-assertion as it favors expansion of 
the market towards a new frontier. Justified as a moral imperative by President Bush 
(2002) in the first document on National Security issued after September 11, it has clearly 
anchored its educational rationale in a particular interpretation of history at the end of the 
cold war:  “The militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and 
delivered misery have been defeated and discredited;” as it stoutly ascertains that there is 
only one “sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy and free 
enterprise.” (p. 1) 
 
The Method 
I follow Herzog (1988), Appiah (2005), and Bauman (1995) both philosophically 
and methodologically. But they are not the only ones. I also engage in what Joe 
Kincheloe (2005) calls bricolage. As I explore the issues at hand, I embed myself in a 
complex and multilogical form of inquiry of the social, cultural, political, psychological, 
and educational domains; identifying webs of relationships instead of isolated things-in-
themselves.  In this process, I purposefully draw attention toward processes, 
relationships, and interconnections among phenomena using hermeneutics, semiotics, 
media analysis, historical and textual analysis, technological and theoretical analysis, 
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psychoanalysis, vignettes, and currere to connect the pieces of a multidimensional puzzle 
in a pedagogical effort to redescribe reality and confront the linearity of objectivity. 
In this sense my writing is an experimental journey as well. First, I do not 
necessarily think in English. When I switched from a Spanish dominant to an English 
dominant environment my brain slipped into a survival mode. That was my little state of 
emergency. I stopped thinking words and started thinking images. I have always been 
more comfortable writing than speaking. But this sort of transhumance experience (I am 
no backpacker, I do bring heavy luggage) has made it obvious to me that meaning itself 
does not only reside in the rhythm of syncopated words, sentences, and paragraphs but 
also in their collapse. Joan Didion (2005) in The Year of Magical Thinking describes a 
similar experience: 
 
The way I write is who I am, or have become, yet this is a case in which I w s
had instead of words and their rhythms a cutting room, equipped with an Avid, a 
digital editing system on which I could touch a key and collapse the sequence of 
time, show you simultaneously all the frames of memory that come to me now, let 
you pick the takes, the marginally different expressions, the variant readings of 
the same lines. This is a case in which I need more than words to find the 
meaning. This is a case in which I need whatever it is I think or believe to be 
penetrable, if only for myself. (p. 8) 
 
My experimental journey begins with the depiction of a real soldier, Medic 
Joseph Patrick Dwyer, a veteran of the war in Afghanistan.  Why? Because if I am going 
to claim verisimilitude and credibility there is no other starting point but reality itself. 
Though, while this depiction does not pretend to be representative of all soldiers, I must 
make another disclosure: it isn’t randomly chosen either. It was, indeed, one of those rare 
circumstances when, unexpectedly, the personal intersects the historical: we, the soldier 
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and I, happened to live in the same community. But we were at odds: I did not support 
the war, he embodied it. Nevertheless, I did not select this singular story according t  that 
circumstance. I am not interested in building a construct on top of an oppositional 
dichotomy. I selected it according to an ingenuous and rather unsophisticated principle: I 
could certainly not start thinking about education, identity, and national security apar  
from people like him, people, in one way or another, displaced to the bord rs of life. I 
bring Patrick Slattery (1995) in to explain like he does in Curriculum Development in the 
Postmodern Era, that “it is important to make curriculum theory accessible and 
inspirational for educators and students throughout the field.” (p. 11) But in focusing in 
the soldier’s story I have found Slattery’s (1995) methodology even more important:  
 
In effect, the curriculum will seek to understand history contextually rather than 
delineate a coherent metanarrative of selective events and artifacts. Just as the 
curriculum is affected by social conditions and values, so too can curriculum help 
to reshape or preserve those conditions and values. The relationship between 
society and the curriculum is reciprocal. (p. 36) 
 
Additionally, I have found Slattery’s (1995) examination of the history of 
curriculum development in the context of his own educational autobiography very 
appealing in order to establish a participatory perspective and also a contrast, hopefully 
empathetic, between one’s perspective and that of others. This narrative is, then, 
consequently, a pedagogical attempt to de-center our thought. Here I have found Deborah 
Britzman’s (2006) considerations on creativity and compliance in Novel Education, 
Psychoanalytic Studies of Learning and Not Learning very helpful: 
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Psychoanalysis should not be promoting knowledge as a consolation prize for 
injustice. I take this to mean that however elegant our explanations may be on 
designs and structures of our inner world, however much we invest in the 
therapeutic action of understanding, indeed, of ‘finding neurosis,’ and working 
through it, knowledge of these processes cannot be a substitute for transforming 
injustice in the real world. On the other hand, identifying this limit cannot be the 
end of the story because thinking with others is the only means for the self to 
transform itself. It, too, is a mode of freedom, a means for mourning, a possibility 
beyond oppressive love, the grounds for symbolization, and an expression of 
singularity.” (p.58) 
 
But the story of Medic Joseph Patrick Dwyer is not the only one depicted here. 
Otherness as embodied by Matina Dwyer, his wife; Ewan Macdougall, a grand str tegy 
student; Warren Zinn, a photographer; Ali Sattar, a war injured boy, Mark Zuckerberg, an 
entrepreneur; Steven Dale Green, a soldier pushing the limits join in as well in -it is my 
intention-, surprisingly unforeseen ways. Otherness is also portrayed through characters 
embodying fiery affects in literature and films. Dominic Matei, a professor of Linguistics 
in search security; Ofelia, an orphan in search of identity; Mercedes, a woman in search 
of both, and Capitán Vidal, an embodiment of evil distributing them at leisure contribute 
to add texture. It is a deliberate juxtaposition of narratives, real and fictional, alongside 
with more formal comments and depictions of reality. My writing is, then, also, for that 
reason, a pedagogical attempt to de-center the way we think, with the aim of opening 
possibilities for a liberating pedagogical experience free from modern dichotomies. Here 
I honor my own Freirean traditions, but I also follow Britzman (2006) when she explains 
how representing learning creates a “fictitious space”, not because learning is unreal but 
because learning leans on affect and desire which, in turn, spellbinds our representation: 
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Representing conflicts in learning is akin to writing a novel because the conc rn is 
with constructing a psychology of emotional reality; there we really do persnify 
knowledge and make of its objects noisy creatures. From the theatrics of language 
we create metaphors of likeness; from emotional reality, composite words that 
refer us to wishes, and regrets, and to phantasies of being. Through the freedom of 
imagination and in dreams, we can conceptualize what is not seen yet still exerts 
the force of absence. Through the unconscious we are affected by what 
consciousness cannot imagine. These events and the ways in which they 
conjugate perception with desire capture experiences of our being affected before 
knowing in advance meaning’s migrations. (p. 5) 
 
 My writing is an experimental journey in an additional sense.  It is like a walk 
where I know the destination but cannot anticipate the implications of, or the 
complications for each single step. Here I am inscribing my writing in whatHoward Zinn 
(2007) calls the optimism of uncertainty: 
 
Revolutionary change does not come as one cataclysmic moment (beware of such 
moments!) but as an endless succession of surprises, moving zigzag toward a 
more decent society. We don’t have to engage in grand heroic actions to 
participate in the process of change. Small acts, when multiplied by millions of 
people, can quietly become a power no government can suppress, a power that 
can transform the world. (…) And if we do act, in however small a way, we don’t 
have to wait for some grand utopian future. The future is an infinite succession of 
presents, and to live now as we think human beings should live, in defiance of all 
that is bad around us, is itself a marvelous victory” (p. 270) 
 
For that reason, I must warn you that I do not necessarily make here a linear argument or 
advance a set of propositions toward a conclusion devised to bind your consent by the 
force of its logic. In all seriousness, I make a playful and optimist argument in the sense 
we talk about the argument of a performance. I venture for affect and understanding more 
than agreement. I position myself between an already and a not yet, but hopefully… At 
the end, everything will come to a full circle but, neither I nor you will be in the same 
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place. By juxtaposing apparently disparate frames, I sincerely hope to crea e an 
opportunity for your critical and creative response thinking about what a thought cannot 
think. It may not work (like at Duke). But that is, in all honesty, the curricular issueat 
hand: does it work?  How to chronicle what a thought cannot think? And not whether it is 
right or wrong. Here I follow what Britzman (1998) so interestingly calls the study of 
limits: 
 
The study of limits is, in a sense, a problem of where thought stops, a problem of 
thinkability. It begins with the question, ‘what makes something thinkable?’ as 
opposed to explaining how someone thinks. The strategy attempts to get at the 
unmarked criteria that work to dismiss as irrelevant or valorize as relevant a 
particular mode of thought, field of study, or insistence upon the real. (p. 216) 
 
Finally, a performance that works, let’s say, requires the same discipline of ts author as 
that of an argument that prevails, but it requires something else, substantially different, 
from the audience. It asks for trust, or, like in a peace negotiation process, at last a
provisional suspension of disbelief. In this sense, I must say, my experiment may fall 
outside the range of more familiar and orthodox curriculum scholarship, but as a 
philosophical approach to curricular studies and as a cultural study itself, it is, I believe, a 
legitimate inquiry into the historical, personal, and political relationships embedded in 
Education. My writing is, in this sense, done more t ward than from an understanding. So 
instead of arguing that criticality and all its implications are relevant to Education, as I 
walk and write, I am just being an educator that performs its relevance or fails to do so. I 
have engaged myself in the pedagogical experience of studying my own limits, and I 
gladly invite you to join in. 
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The Multiple Frames 
I begin this journey in Chapter II with what I want to call the vignettes of life of 
four individuals who having so much in common yet responded in significantly different 
ways to September 11 and the call for war that followed. These vignettes are, of course, 
transient, fragmentary, and incomplete sketches made based on what was mediated and 
belongs to the public domain. They are a sort of snapshots that, together with their 
negatives, capture something about their identities understood as, like Appiah (2006) 
suggests, “interpretive responses” to the circumstances of life. I place them first because I 
want to put an emphasis on people and what they decide to do or do not do. They have 
their individual, complete value which I honor quite apart from any interpretation I might 
practice or suggest on their performance as citizens. It is in this chapter that I introduce 
what Bauman (1995) calls a tendency to adiaphorization, which means: 
 
[T]o declare that most things which members of organizations are expected to do 
when in service are exempt from moral evaluation –are, so to speak, ethically 
indifferent, neither good or bad; only correct or incorrect. This does not mean 
contesting commonly held moral opinions- but to declare, bluntly, that categories 
of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are neither here nor there when it comes to implementation of 
organizational duties.  The sole standards by which such duties can be judged are 
those of procedural correctness; if they pass this muster, there is no other test left 
to which they could conceivably be put. (p. 261) 
 
 This is a key concept because it helps to understand the overall effect of 
“insensitivization” to cruelty which Bauman (1995) attributes to both an unprecedently 
huge volume of exposure to the images of human suffering and to the increasing distance 
between the perpetrators of cruelty and their victims. I also raise the question about how 
memory is historically constructed and the political, psychological, and mental h alth 
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connotations when moral sentiments are forced to go on exile. I tentatively explore the 
process of identification and the ego’s capacity to think over instinctual conflict and 
develop its ethical responsibility as embodied by Matina Dwyer. I inscribe the notion of 
“plausible deniability” within that construct and, following Britzman (2006), ascertain 
that the unconscious knows no time, no negation, and tolerates contradiction: 
 
Regardless of whether one conceptualizes the self as seeking pleasure or as 
seeking relations, its most unknown motivation is the unconscious. Here is ‘the 
logic of emotions’ in all its glory. (…) The unconscious may be described 
metaphysically as the development of development. To understand the work of 
symbolization from this vantage and its importance for becoming a subject with 
agency is to speculate on the ways in which the human comes to give up wishful 
and omnipotent thinking, mourns losses, tolerates new representations, respects 
the difference between internal and external reality, and grasps, indeed, makes 
pleasure from the actuality of others as separate from the self. (p 48) 
 
 Finally this is where I situate curriculum as a process of social construction to 
defy a simplistic definition too often reduced to a script that simply tells teachers what to 
do and when. By situating it as a social construct I redirect its focus to examine the 
intersections of history, politics, identity, ethics, and curriculum. It is at once political 
theory, curriculum theory, and sociology. I propose that, if we are to understand 
Education, we must recognize that curriculum often sets the parameters of pedagogical 
practice and of possibility. In this context, following Slattery’s (1995) recommendations, 
I introduce Illich’s (2002) concepts of pedagogical warfare and rituals to redirect the 
curriculum debate to the understanding of curriculum in various contexts, establish a 
metaphoric relation between the language of war and the language of Education, and 
reflect in the modern capacity to pursue incongruous goals: 
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The dissonance which characterizes many of the young today is not so much 
cognitive as a matter of attitudes –a feeling about what a tolerable society cannot 
be like. What is surprising about this dissonance is the ability of a very large 
number of people to tolerate it. (p. 51) 
 
Chapter III, in many ways, is an afterword. It begins with another vignette, bu  
this one was captured in the film Youth Without Youth directed by Francis Ford Coppola 
(2007), based on Mircea Eliade’s (1988) novel with the same title.  Here I follow Richard 
Rorty’s (1989) assessment of the role that literature, ethnography, and journalism h ve in 
moral debate: 
 
[P]ain is nonlinguistic: It is what we human beings have that tie us to the 
nonlanguage-using beasts. So victims of cruelty, people who are suffering, do not 
have much in the way of language. That is why there is no such things as the 
‘voice of the oppressed’ or the ‘language of the victims.’ The language that 
victims once used is not working anymore, and they are suffering too much to put 
new words together. So the job of putting their situation into language is going to 
have to be done for them by somebody else. The liberal novelist, poet, or 
journalist is good at that. The liberal theorist is usually not. (p. 94) 
 
This chapter creates one of those fictitious spaces described by Britzman (2006) 
in the previous chapter in order to scrutinize and contrast a film which both explores the 
role of fear in our confrontation with Otherness and describes our ambivalence about 
might, force, and coercion with the reading of two National Security Strategy documents 
published by The White House in 2002 and 2006 which, as a matter of fact, are, well, 
about the same. Here I investigate what Rorty (1989) understands as “contingency of 
selfhood”: 
 
By seeing every human being as consciously or unconsciously acting out an 
idiosyncratic fantasy, we can see the distinctively human, as opposed to animal, 
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portion of each human life as the use for symbolic purposes of every particular 
person, object, situation, event, and word encountered in later life. This process 
amounts to redescribing them, thereby saying of them all, ‘Thus I willed it’” (p. 
36) 
 
Within this framework, in order to problematize our search of security, I inscribe 
a philosophical digression between Truth and truthfulness, the notion of fear as a cultural
codifier and decodifier of values, the modern pretention and illusion to be ahead of time, 
and the notion of “frontier civilization” all of them as embodied by Coppola’s (2007) 
Dominic Matei.  In a hermeneutical contrastive parallel I explore the concepts of threat, 
threat inflation, individual self-assertion, terror, and terrorism and their prescriptive 
relevance.  My reflection is then correlated to the concepts of “sedimentation of 
democratic values” drawn from Cornell West (2004), “superpower syndrome” as defined 
by Robert Jay Lifton (2003), and “cynical realism” developed by Michael Lerner (2007) 
in order to describe the ability to self-represent in dominant North American culture. 
Finally I connect this thread of thought with Zinn’s (2007) notion of “educated citizenry” 
and its critical role to counter Bauman’s (1995) concept of “ordering activity.” As a 
corollary I embed President Obama’s (2009) discourse about the “new era of 
responsibility” within the texture created by the combination of these concepts to finally 
describe the weakness of traditional language to capture new realities, and most 
importantly, establish the pedagogical dissonance expressed by concepts such a
“corporate warriors” developed by Peter Singer (2003), “man-caused disasters” 
introduced by Secretary Janet Napolitano (2009) and the no longer fictional realities of 
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems. I follow Matt McDonald (2002) to understand the quandary 
implied in the concept of security: 
 
Security is not chosen by policy makers to apply to all issues coming within its 
definition. One definition of security never captures an actor’s approach to 
security in totality, nor does the conception of security employed by an actor 
remain static. Rather, security discourses choose as much as are chosen. They 
frame actors in profound ways, constraining the choices of actors through the 
powerful sociological influence of issues such as history, culture and identity as 
well as conceptions of interests. Even given this framing of actors, however, 
security conceptions are in a state of constant flux, being continuously constructed 
by the application of security in particular contexts, through interaction with other
actors, through the changing normative contexts in which actors find themselves 
and through ever-changing conceptions of the self, related to both internal and 
external factors. (p. 295) 
 
Chapter IV is like a large footnote to the afterword, an additional comment to our 
ability to represent and self represent. Here I use another set of vignettes of life captured 
in another film, Guillermo del Toro’s (2006) Pan’s Labyrinth, as hospitable text to 
structure an understanding of our search of identity. The fictional characters of this film 
address or embody Hanna Arendt’s banality of evil, but also the encounter with the 
Other, and the encounter with our own Otherness. This chapter unfolds the concept of 
hermeneutical crossroad and foresees the possibility of it becoming a site of 
hermeneutical conflict. I continue exploring the tensions between the conscious and the
unconscious and, drawing from Britzman’s (2006) notion of “intrigues of meaning,” I 
make a connection to the concept of the aesthetic sublime. Rorty’s (1989) notion of 
“moral progress,” his concepts of “contingency and solidarity,”  and del Toro’s (2006) 
notion of “restraining mood” are intertwined here and inscribed within Zinn’s (2007) 
notion of history as a “redeeming transgression.” Here is where I assess the contribution 
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of popular culture as historically and philosophically relevant as it allows fr an 
expansion of the sense of “us” and as it embeds the language of possibility. Finall, I 
introduce the notion of an abluent self moving in a certain space of questions and 
ascertain again the role of criticality in Education as a hermeneutical j ncture which 
makes future hopeful and possible. In so doing I follow Zinn (2004) in his autobiography 
You Can’t Be Neutral on a Moving Train: 
 
To be hopeful in bad times is not just foolishly romantic. It is based on the fact 
that human history is a history not only of cruelty, but also of compassion, 
sacrifice, courage, kindness. What we choose to emphasize in this complex 
history will determine our lives. If we see only the worst, it destroys our capacity 
to do something. If we remember those times and places--and there are so many--
where people have behaved magnificently, this gives us the energy to act, and at 
least the possibility of sending this spinning top of the world in a different 
direction. 
 
Chapter V starts with my own vignette. This a historical and aesthetical account 
of how I feel connected to the previous vignettes and the identities they developed in 
response to their own capacities and circumstances. The purpose of this chapter is to give 
autobiographical meaning to the notion of state of emergency and embed it in the 
hermeneutical crossroad described throughout the previous chapters. It is in this con ext 
that I introduce the notions of “ironic reversal” and “chronicle of surprise” to describe 
what I understand as a pedagogical experience and the role that unhinging questioning 
plays in it. I appeal to the Freirean concept of “conscientization” and use aesth tic 
deliberation to suggest the need to redescribe the concept of security and creatively 
inscribe threats in non violent scenarios. For this account I continue to follow Slattery 
(1995): 
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The postmodern vision of reading instruction is rooted in another understanding 
of education from the Latin words educere, ‘to draw or lead forth,’ and ruminere, 
‘to think things over.’ Reading is a phenomenological and bodily activity that 
comes from deep within the human person. It is a mystical experience of the 
passions of the human spirit. Authentic reading instruction allows students to 
explore the nooks and crannies of their psyche and look forward to the journey 
within. Like the ruminants (…), students should also ruminate and masticate 
books and stories. They must leisurely graze in quiet corners, on active 
playgrounds, and in open fields and then return to the formal places of schooling 
to create their own books, write their own stories, and explore their own 
imaginative life stories. (p. 165) 
 
Here I also explore the dynamics of Facebook understood as a privatized 
dimension of meaning and the role that security and insecurity play in the control of 
signs, symbols, language, and images. I use Mark Zuckerberg’s vignette of life to 
describe his subversive repositioning in the market and, in an extrapolation, introduce 
Britzman’s (1999) notion of “reading practices” to identify the gaps between signifiers 
and signified, think critically through ideological structures that use coercion in service of 
self-assertion and, finally, explain how to chronicle what a thought cannot think. 
The final chapter is, methodologically, a new beginning. The first five chapters 
were a kaleidoscopic display of images, five simultaneous frames of understanding of 
how Education connects to the processes of construction of identity and security. The 
sixth chapter is an effort to read them all together, a sort of bridge to metaphorically 
facilitate what Bauman (1995) identifies as a much needed communicative process: 
 
The dismantling of the collective, institutionalized and centralized frames of 
identity-building, whether accomplished by design or by default, whether 
welcomed or bewailed, has had this effect, that (…) the site from which an 
intervention on behalf of common interests capable of overriding localized 
animosities could be undertaken, previously held by the state, is seen as non 
existent or empty. What is needed is a communicative process about what it is 
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that various social groups… have in common under current social practices, and 
to find out whether they have to commonly regulate the impacts of these 
practices. This need, however, is seeking anchorage in vain, because of (…) the 
emptiness of political space. The void is filled by neo-tribal would be 
communities, and if it is not filled by them, then it stays wide open, densely 
populated by the individuals lost in the hubbub of conflicting noises, with a lot of 
opportunity for violence and little, perhaps none, for argument. (p.161) 
 
While this final chapter is an historical account of how to, in words of Illich 
(2002), “break a spell and build a new cosmos,” it is also a spirited effort to describe how 
language can keep us prisoners of dangerous ways to see the world. Here I use the script
written by Sidonie-Grabrielle Collette (1917) for the Ravel’s (1925) opera L’Enfant et les 
Sortileges, to make a parallel interpretation of reality. To begin closing the circle, I return 
to Bauman (1995): 
 
Society, we might say, is a massive and continuous cover-up operation. And yet 
the best escape ever succeeds in coming up with is a thin film of order that is 
continuously pierced, torn apart and folded up by the Chaos over which it 
stretches: that Chaos is constantly invading alleged immanence –the given, the 
familiar, the apparently domesticated. (p. 14) 
 
In this chapter I look at the vignettes in motion, how they evolve in their own context ad 
also in contrast to an alternative one. I also explore Zinn’s take on the descriptive power 
of images after September 11 and echo his wondering about their truncated possibilitie  
during the war in Afghanistan. Immediately after that I connect Bauman’s (1995) concept 
of adiaphorization to the nostalgia embedded in Singer’s (2009) concept of “virtueless 
war.”  This is also where I look at President Obama’s (2009) discourse on security, 
identify his hermeneutical gaps, and start to explore, following Amin Maaluf (2000), an 
unchartered territory: the recognition of our multiple allegiances as a way to achieve 
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solidarity. Finally, Following Kincheloe (1993), I conclude with a consideration of how 
unhinging questioning belongs to Education and Schools of Education: “On a daily basis 
teachers choose to include some forms of knowledge while excluding others from the 
curriculum, they legitimate particular beliefs while delegitimizing others” (p. 39). And, 
finally share a moment of vision: the time calls for a teacher able and willing to help 
students to reinterpret their own lives and uncover new talents as a result of an encou t r 
with a democratic and self-limiting experience of schooling, where thinking about 
thinking and exploring the inner world of psychological experience inform an empathic 
sense of pedagogy, bringing the borders of life back to the center.   
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CHAPTER II 
PEDAGOGICAL WARFARE 
 
“At Peace Now” 
That was the sublime headline for the front page of The Pilot, my hometown local 
newspaper on Wednesday, July 2, 2008, heeded by “Soldier Made Famous by Photo 
Dies in Pinehurst,” a rather discrete subtitle that sounded like a whisper in a town that 
takes pride in its dignified and manicured celebrations. A noticeably downsized version 
of the Army Times copyrighted picture of medic Joseph Patrick Dwyer carrying an 
injured Iraqi boy, authored by photographer Warren Zinn, was strategically placed on the 
upper right side to illustrate the story. Dwyer, originally from New York, had signed up 
“to fight for his country” immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
according to the source. “He felt like it was something he had to do,” said Matina Dwyer, 
his wife, to senior writers Matthew Moriarty and John Chappell. I immediately 
remembered the image from the time it was widely showcased by the national medi  to 
build up public support for the war in Iraq in 2003. It is a great picture indeed. One of 
those that make history: Dwyer, in full battle gear, runs as he holds a barefoot half naked 
young boy, who looks at the camera while holding his stomach with his right hand, and 
his right knee with his left hand; revealing pain through a half open mouth, and horror 
through a tense facial expression and wide opened eyes.  Dwyer does not look at the 
camera. Breathing through his mouth, he reveals exhaustion. A slight inclination forward 
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denotes hurried but careful movement and direction. He seems to be focused on the 
ground, ready for the next step. The 45° angle formed by the lines suggested by his body 
and his eyesight, though, reveals that he is ready for the next step only. The firmness of 
his right arm holding the boy informs of resolution, and the delicate touch of his left hand 
on the boy’s hurting leg informs of compassion. The fact that he is married is highlig ted 
by the projection of a line suggested by his wedding ring finger, which intersects, righ  in 
the middle, the projection of another line suggested, in the opposite direction, by the 
automatic rifle that heavily hangs from his right shoulder, creating, thus, a visual balance 
for his paradoxical commitments. Dwyer stands tall. But that harsh vertical line is 
softened by a diagonal suggested by the way the frightened boy lays on his arms, with his 
head at a higher level than his feet. It conveys the idea of power and mercy. 
Dwyer’s image became an icon right at the beginning of the war and the picture, 
unsurprisingly, acquired a life of its own, separated from the life of the man. Two 
summers ago, though, the picture was not the focus of the news. Neither was the man. It 
was the soldier made famous by the picture. In a perverse way, the picture outliv d the 
man. The picture was well, alive, and, ironically, still in the larger picture. How to report 
that a decorated hero has committed suicide? How to spell out the political investment on 
his image? How to explain his disenfranchisement? What meaning does a story like this 
have and how does it become history? How is our collective memory constructed? Why 
was the town crier whispering?  
Rationalizing the pain of the man, the press in general reported the fatal event as 
another case of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and, without further discussion, 
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quietly justified it and moved on to cover the next crisis.  Warren Zinn, the photographer, 
did something else. He immediately returned to the place of the original photo shooting 
but, this time, with a CNN crew. Zinn was looking for the kid “to make sure he was alive 
and to show what happens to the people after the U.S. comes to places like this.” 
According to Christian Lowe (2003) from the Marine Corps Time, Zinn said that that 
image was very important to him because it was one of the first ones he had ever tak n 
“that showed raw human emotion.” When he found the boy, he gave him a copy of the 
famous picture. CNN, in its turn, reported that the boy was in fact alive, and through this 
made for the media recollection, not only reproduced the meaning of the picture, but 
reinforced it creating the picture of the boy holding the picture of the soldier holding the 
same boy, in a flagrantly vicious manipulation of hermeneutics. 
Why flagrant? Why vicious? Because I am under the powerful impression that i
front of us a very important element has been surreptitiously removed, limiting the scope 
of meaning of the picture, and reducing the possibilities to understand the larger situation 
from which it had been excised. Zygmunt Bauman (1995), in his book Life in Fragments, 
very appealingly explains the ways and means to separate deeds and morals in modern 
society, and suggests that the principal tool for that severance --as I argue it is the case in 
this case-, is what he calls adiaphorization:  
 
Making certain actions, or certain objects of action, morally neutral or irrelevant –
exempt from the category of phenomena suitable for moral evaluation. The effect 
of adiaphorization is achieved by excluding some categories of people from the 
realm of moral subjects, or through covering up the link between partial action 
and the ultimate effect of co-ordinated moves, or through enthroning procedural 
discipline and personal loyalty in the role of all-overriding criterion of moral 
performance. (p. 149) 
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Within this framework of understanding bodily weakness, for example, or insufficient 
ability to submit and to fit, like in the specific case of Joseph Patrick Dwyer, the man, are 
exclusively seen as symptoms of ill health, and as such medicalized or articulated as 
cases for psychiatric treatment. As a socially constructed description of a human 
condition, then, PTSD only responds to the declared main general purpose of the war, the 
war in Iraq in this case: to free people and save lives. This paradox of “creative 
destruction” (p. 152), says Bauman, explains and justifies the suffering of a few as a low 
prize to be paid for the happiness of the many. 
Ali Sattar, the Iraqi boy, was alive indeed. According to the same Army Ti es 
report only one of the two holes on the walls of his home, produced by the indiscriminate 
U.S. bombing of their neighborhood, was visibly repaired. The repaired and un-repaired 
holes, together with a big scar along his leg and a pronounced and still painful limp were 
most likely, constant reminders of something that somehow  had already been 
internalized but, obviously, insufficiently understood, because neither he nor his father,
according to the same source, seemed to be able to comprehend Zinn’s visit. Not even at 
face value. Their lives went on and continue to go on in a different frame, which CNN 
could not co-opt for its coverage. 
Back in town, I have to say, I was saddened by the tragedy of a man that lived in 
my community. But as the story unfolded, I was sorry for his wife too. She was not at 
home when it happened. Reportedly, she had left the family home taking their daughter 
some time before the incident occurred. But I was appalled by the pressure put on her o 
explain what had happened, as if she had any explaining to do. “He was just never the 
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same when he came back; because of all the things he saw”, said Matina Dwyer to 
Michael Moriarty (2008). What he saw she did not specify. “He never regretted going 
over there, doing what he did,” she said very clearly for the record. What he did she did 
not specify either. She expressed frustration for the insufficient avenues and resources to 
help returning soldiers, as well as hope that her husband’s death would bring attention to 
this issue. And, finally, in the stern tone of those who hurt, heightened by the eloquence 
that only an awareness of both her husband’s human ordeal, and her own vulnerable 
condition as a military widow talking to an audience which included the military can 
afford, she passed along the following message: “He couldn’t actually come home. He 
was still there in his mind” (p. 11). Is this the voice of her ego defending itself against an 
anxiety for the loss of love, and her symbolization –“he couldn’t come home”, ergo it 
must have not happened- a lighter way to carry the conflict with the world of others –the 
military world from which she depends-, thus identifying with her aggressor? Or is there 
an implicit criticism in her choice of words saying that, since “he was still there in his 
mind”, and something reproachable happened, then it must have happened over there –
before his mind devoured and spiritually vacant body returned to her- and not here, where 
she was expected to deal with it all by herself; entering into the metaphorical and 
interpretative world of plausible deniability, as they call it in Washington? 
I really do not know and I must admit that it upsets me. But what upsets me is not 
being unable to know whether it is fear of loss or threat to loose what informs her saying. 
That would just be a very selfish and intellectually vane pursuit. Maybe it is both, or, for 
that matter, perhaps, none of the above, as I have also heard they often say in 
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Washington, and I really missed the point! What upsets me is, precisely, that whatever it 
is, however it may be described, I know it is wrong. And that knowledge, as any other 
knowledge, should never work as a substitute for transforming unjust situations in our 
midst. Awareness calls for a response: she still lives in my community and I really do not 
know what to do.  
That unintended summer awareness and the deep feeling of empathy it generated 
remind me now of the unintended qualities of learning that Alice Balint so well describ  
and Deborah Britzman (2006) in Novel Education quotes:  
 
Learning and its symbolization (…) is composed of a radical and original 
uncertainty and a promise. Not knowing but still needing to respond can make one 
nervous (…) mistakes and misunderstandings are not the outside of education but 
rather are constitutive of its very possibility (p. 43).  
 
Britzman (2006) convincingly argues, from a psychoanalytical perspective, that 
understanding our own acts as beyond and even in contradiction to our consciousness is 
part of an educational process about us and about us in relation to others. Through it “we 
are entering the space of thinking about thinking, an exploration, however uncertain, of 
how one feels in the world of others and what this intimate knowledge may mean.” That 
exploration, she suggests, is like a commentary to our ability to self-represent. If you 
agree with her, as I do, then you may want to look at it in the same way you look at 
democracy as a political process, “it allows people to speak, give voice to their concerns, 
be as difficult as they can be, and be heard” (p. 59). 
I situate curriculum as a process of social construction in an effort to theorize h w 
the U.S. National Security doctrine informs curriculum, and discern how this scenario 
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becomes a pedagogical warfare. Following Patrick Slattery’s (2006) recommendations in 
Curriculum Development in the Postmodern Era, I decided to embed my initial reflection 
in a real life situation, one that could not only honor the tension between ideas and 
emotions that configure and sustain our condition as human beings in all its complexity, 
but one that could also allow the personal and more subjective inform a process of 
construction of meaning that welcomes but is certainly not limited to an autobiographical 
tone, in order to emphasize the belief that knowledge is created “in a context that 
necessarily reflects human interests, values, and actions” (p. 36).  I propose to understand 
curriculum as a hermeneutical process and to differentiate it from its commodified 
version, one that can be passed along to others just like the famous photo of a soldier 
holding a boy, as a linear fact that pretends to be free of pretensions. A way to achieve 
this, explains Slattery (2006) is appealing to a “holistic perspective that allows for the 
emergence of compassion, optimal learning environments, nonviolent conflict resolution, 
just relationships, and ecological sustainability.” (p. 171). Kincheloe (2005) has 
developed a similar notion in what he calls bricolage:  
 
The system of knowledge production, with its epistemological blinders 
that developed and expanded across the centuries, shackled human agency 
to the gospel of so-called natural law and scientific procedures. In the name of 
an ethnocentric notion of scientific progress, it attempted to keep individuals 
ignorant of their potentials and confused cultural difference with deficiency. 
This procedure-bound science did not do a very good job of addressing questions 
involving what it means to be human, what it might mean to live in a 
good and just society, and the worthiness of those who live in cultures and 
locales different from the West. This is why bricoleurs ascribe such importance 
to the critical and hermeneutic traditions and their concern with such 
human questions. Drawing on these traditions, combining them with forms 
of paradigmatic and textual analyses, bricoleurs struggle to connect the 
research act to the emotion and heart of lived human experience. (p. 348) 
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While the development of social control in order to build a cohesive American 
community continues to have many proponents, Slattery (2006) insists that schooling 
must transcend linear structures and dissolve the artificial boundary between the outside 
community and the classroom. “Postmodern teaching celebrates the interconnected ess 
of knowledge, learning experiences, international communities, the natural world, and 
life itself,” he concludes (p. 175). In the hopeful spirit of social justice, I argue that 
curriculum can be understood also as the attribute of unhinging questioning. This is the 
ability to make questions that include the perspective of the Other, and a practical effort 
to respond to them as we understand the experience from the point of view of the self in 
contrast to the perception of the experience of self in relation to others. Here I follow 
Slattery (2006):  
 
Crises in Education and society are reflected in the debate about the role of 
schools in advancing social issues, democratic themes, and utopian values. Should 
education, as Dewey asked, be a function of society, or should society be a 
function of education? In other words, should schools participate in the process of 
reproducing the knowledge, interests, and values of the dominant society, or 
should schools advance democracy while promoting an emancipatory approach to 
knowledge and learning so as to re-create a just and compassionate society? (p. 
195) 
 
The Official Story 
In his book Surprise, Security and the American Experience, Yale History 
Professor John Lewis Gaddis (2004) knowledgeably inscribes the U.S. grand strategy on 
National Security within the larger context of American history. It is a very good attempt 
to understand the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the context of the process of 
American political and economical expansionism, and an also good attempt to speculate 
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about its consequences in terms of security and defense. Whether you agree with his 
conclusion or not is a different story. I mention this book because it is in itself a very 
powerful example of curriculum as a social construction. At the beginning, Gaddis (2004)
makes an interesting and very honest disclosure of the limits of his endeavor: the events 
are too recent. For that reason, he admits, the accuracy of his historical writing is 
diminished by both its own shortness of perspective and access to rather fewer resources. 
It is, in his own words, “a premature effort to treat as history an event that remains 
inescapably part of our present” (p. 4). For the same reasons, though, Gaddis (2004) says 
that his writing acquires relevance: however imperfect the exercise may be, he argues, 
“an incomplete map is better than no map at all” (p. 5). Later on, in an autobiographical 
mood, he quotes Ewan Macdougall, one of his undergraduate students at Yale, probably 
the same age as Joseph Patrick Dwyer, saying one evening shortly after the terrorist 
attacks, and, probably about the same time as when Dwyer decided that fighting the war 
was something he had to do: 
 
I love this country. I love this place. I love what we are doing here tonight. I love 
it so much that I’m prepared to defend our right to do it, which is why I’m joining 
the Marines. It’s people like me who make it possible for people like you to be 
here doing what you’re doing” (p. 116). 
 
To which a consenting Gaddis (2004) interestingly added: “Our ability as a 
democracy to question all values depends upon our faith in and our determination to 
defend certain values” [the emphasis is his]; because, he argues, “they are the bedrock 
beliefs that make it possible for us to be here and for so many others to wish to be” [the 
emphasis is mine]. For Gaddis (2004), even if they are “social constructions”, it is more 
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important that “it’s our society that constructed them” [again, the emphasis is his]; and 
“ that [here, the emphasis is mine] is what makes them worth fighting for, as so many 
others have done before us” (p. 116). The language of his methodological disclosure, 
despite its scientific aim, cannot unveil what comes veiled by default, and cannot but 
continue to hide both the split into good and bad of his reasoning, and the gap between 
the self and the other that informs his writing. Split and gap are automatically transferred 
to all other dichotomies of analytical relations: you and I, us and them. And, yet, he 
claims that “Americans have the opportunity once again to do so much designing [in the 
world]” (p. 113). By deciding to reduce his account to an immediate relation of cause and 
effect, its self assessed sense of relevance, in fact, not only forecloses any possibility for 
empathy to generate any significant knowledge; but , most importantly, his semantic 
structure indicates that it is not just a current conjuncture but, as a matter of fact, the 
confirmation of a historical pattern, where the confirmation of a historical pattern is not 
as relevant as the as-a-matter-of-fact tone with which it is assessed. 
Gaddis (2004) concludes his historical account in the same autobiographical tone, 
quoting Schuyler Schouten, another undergraduate student of his at Yale when he asked 
“in the dark and fearful days that followed September 11th,”  if it “would be OK now for 
us to be patriotic?” To which Gaddis (2004) straightforwardly responded: “Yes, I think it 
would” (p. 118), assuming the whole situation as something that needed to be explained 
rather than interpreted. Semantic, here, is working like a dark room, it allows you to say
and not say; suggest and suggest not; explain, veil, and imply in such a convincing way 
that it is hard to imagine that what is being said, described, or redescribed could be 
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otherwise. That is, precisely, the power of semantic, and, for that matter, of the semantic 
of power.  
The understanding of curriculum as a process of social construction, then, should 
help us to systematically identify the assumptions that form and inform our reflection, 
even subconsciously. In this sense, I could argue for example that Zinn, the photographer, 
and Gaddis, the historiographer, have something in common: while they connect logic 
and emotion to deliberately  reduce the boundaries of imagination in the larger picture
they secure themselves in an ideological lockdown to cope with the fears they happen to 
share; instead of making that same connection to stretch those boundaries and negotiate 
alternative meanings allowing their perception to be openly affected, gain more 
understanding and move on. 
In order to counterbalance the tendency of simply building on top of assumptions, 
a more comprehensive as well as challenging vision for curriculum and curriculm 
development is needed. The curricular question here should not inquire about specific 
contents about what happened, but, as Kwame Anthony Appiah (2005) points out in The 
Ethics of Identity: “the real debates (…) are about in what narratives we will embed them; 
they are about which of the many true stories we will tell” (p. 207). Patrick Slattery 
(2006) has articulated what he calls a kaleidoscopic vision in that respect: “Curriculum 
development in the postmodern era –he says- will challenge the traditional approach of 
modern logical positivism to the study of history as a linear timeline of events, (…) It 
will encourage autobiographical reflection, narrative inquiry, revisionist interpretation, 
and contextual understanding” (p. 36). It is precisely within this kaleidoscopic framework 
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that I explore the possibility of reading the two National Security Strategy documents 
published by The White House in 2002 and 2006, documents that contain and explain the 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America as an authentic expression of 
modern logical positivism and as conveyors of a curriculum designed as a linear 
projection to the future of a desired history, expressed both through a grand vision, and a 
continually updated matching timeline of events that logs concrete accomplishments and 
challenges within a preconfigured grand strategy towards that vision.  
 
The Green Zone 
March marks the seventh anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. On March 
19, 2003, the United States began dropping bombs on Baghdad as thousands of U.S. 
forces poured across Iraq’s borders, Medic Joseph Patrick Dwyer included. Seven years 
later, the occupation continues. In that time, according to Honor The Fallen, a website 
created to keep an updated register of those who died in Operations Iraqi Freedom and 
Enduring Freedom, and maintained in a conjunct effort by the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and Marine Times, the number of American soldiers who have been killed is 5,382 up to 
March 19, 2010. Many thousands more have been wounded. Dwyer does not appear in 
this record. According to www.democracynow.org, as many as 650,000 Iraqis have been 
killed, with the number of wounded unknown. Meanwhile, Iraq is suffering the worst 
refugee crisis in the world today. According to the United Nations, more than 4.2 million 
Iraqis have fled the country, many of them to neighboring Jordan and Syria. Another 1.9 
million are internally displaced.  
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Seven years after the invasion, the U.S. occupation of Iraq continues. On February 
16, 2010, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, General Raymond T. Odierno, told the 
Washington based Institute for the Study of War during a public conversation held at the 
Army and Navy Club, as posted in their website, that: 
“We have a relationship with the Government of Iraq that gives us an opportunity 
to develop a democratic Iraq that has a long-term partnership with the United 
States and I don't know if we'll have that opportunity again. (…) So I think it's 
important that we understand we (…) have to take advantage of that opportunity.” 
(www.understandingwar.org/webcast 0315/2010) 
 
He also said that the U.S. is preparing contingency plans to delay the withdrawal 
of all combat forces in Iraq if violence or political instability increases in the aftermath of 
this month’s parliamentary elections. Under President Obama’s current administration, 
the U.S. has vowed to cut the number of troops in Iraq in half, to 50,000, by August. A 
full withdrawal is formally scheduled to occur by the end of 2011.  
To introduce a level of dissonance to official discourse, allow me now to turn to 
the borders of life and bring a perspective completely ignored by the U.S. media: an Iraqi 
woman living in Baghdad; Yanar Mohammed, president of the Organization of Women’s 
Freedom in Iraq. This is an excerpt of the telephone interview she recently gave to 
journalist Amy Goodman (2010):  
The situation now, after the end of seven years of invasion, is at a point where we 
have many questions at hand. The first one is we are waiting now every day for 
the final result of the elections. And there is some competition between the Prime 
Minister’s list and Iyad Allawi’s and other groups. But mainly they are mostly the 
same groups that had started off in the first place.  
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The other side of the issue, which not many people are talking about, is the 
economic agenda in Iraq, the privatization, the heavy privatization, that’s 
happened in Iraq in the last two years, where tens of thousands of workers have 
been laid off, with no work to go to, with no social insurance to support them, 
while in the same time there is an economic agenda of supporting foreign 
investment in a way where there is protection for foreign investment, but there is 
no labor law, no unemployment insurance for people. And in the same time, we 
are being surprised by the Ministry of Finance telling the Iraqis that we need to 
have a loan from the World Bank, which will put the Iraq policies under such 
pressure, and it is a surprise to everybody because the revenues of oil are so high 
that we do not really need a loan from the World Bank. So, economically, it’s a 
rollercoaster here in Iraq—privatization, no security for the working class, much 
investment for multinational countries, and, in the same time, a democracy which 
has brought forward groups which are transformations of the first political forces 
that started off with militias, but now they are politicians and they are sitting n 
the Green Zone. (…) 
There is a quota for ethnicities, according to ethnic groups, some for Christians, 
some for other religions, for Assyrians. And this was a message to the Iraqis that 
representations are upon religions, upon sectarian lines and upon ethnicities, and 
not upon political affiliations. So it’s finally, after eight years, the Bush’s agenda 
of representing the Iraqis upon very backward representations has become a 
reality. And it’s a very bad form of democracy that we have to live in Iraq. The 
ethnicities have grouped us all upon ethnic lines, and it only—such a situation 
needs only a little bit of sparkling to start a civil war anytime, could happen 
anytime.  (www.democracynow.org 03/19/2010) 
 
The scenario that Yanar Mohammed describes is certainly strange and gre tly at 
odds with what General Odierno has said about opportunities, sounding more like the 
opportunities that Gaddis (2004) was talking about. Is that what the Green Zone 
represents? Is that what the Green Zone is brewing underground? Is the Green Zon  a  
accurate picture of an effort to open a society? Not only she clearly describes the 
institutionalization of a sectarian and conflictive conception of the world, but the hig  
levels of poverty of the population, especially amongst women, and notably amid the 
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widows and orphans of war who do not have an economic system or social program to 
support them. Further more:  
The Constitution has established a state of inequality for women. There is an 
article in the Constitution, Article number 41, which has cancelled, almost 
cancelled for good, the civil rights, the minimal civil rights which women had 
under Saddam, under what was called the personal status law. And it is these civil 
rights that are being substituted with Islamic sharia and other religious laws that 
are of minorities in Iraq.  
We just want to have some relative security to us to organize our ranks for the 
coming times. And we are optimistic that if the American—if the U.S. Army 
leaves us, we may be able to have the dynamics of the people and to make the 
wheels go the other way around to the way that will help us have—claim our 
resources again, our oil again, and our lives again. [Emphasis is mine] 
(www.democracynow.org 03/19/2010) 
 
Her reference to “security to us” and the longing for what she calls a “dynamics 
of people” as conditions for democratic development, reminds me of the Peruvian War on 
Terror and the frustration that came with the circumstance of being trapped in a violent 
crossfire, but in a larger scale. I address them in the Chapter 4. For now, I will just say 
that the series of world events from Berlin to New York during the transition to thenew 
millennium seems to represent not only a detour from what Kant originally described as 
the “cosmopolitan condition” of “perpetual peace” at the end of the eighteenth century, 
but a real shortcut to a competing alternative destination that challenges law a an 
appropriate medium to reach the declared goals of achieving peace and international 
security through international organizations and the constitutionalization of international 
laws. Kant argued in 1795 that “the natural evolution of world politics and economics 
would drive mankind inexorably toward peace by means of a widening of the pacific 
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union of liberal republican states.” This would occur through two mechanisms. One, 
societies would be driven into forming liberal republics from the pressures of external 
and internal war. And two, republics would create commercial ties of mutual advantage 
that would cause them to be pacific towards each other. Eventually, once the entire world 
consisted of such pacific, liberal regimes, mankind would attain perpetual peace.  
Habermas (2006) explains, though, in The Divided West that the network of 
global society that was indeed working towards a more normative expression of what it
means to loose autonomy, gain interdependence, and be part of a post national, and post 
modern constellation of political entities has been severed. The end of the bipolarworld 
order and the emergence of the U.S. as a pre-eminent world power seem to raise the
question that virtually underscores most of the dichotomies drawn for this dissertat on: 
“is the juridification of international relations going to be superseded by a mor lization of 
international politics grounded in the ethos of a superpower?” (p. 35) 
In September of 2002, George Bush announced a new security doctrine in which 
he reserved a self-defined discretionary right to launch pre-emptive strikes. I still 
remember his State of the Union address in January of 2003, when he solemnly declared 
that if the Security Council did not ultimately agree to military action against Iraq, he 
would, if necessary, act contrary to the prohibitions on the use of violence of the U.N. 
Charter. Habermas (2006) believes that these two actions together represent “indicators 
of a rupture with a legal tradition that no previous American government had ever 
explicitly questioned before.” (p. 182) 
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From the Political Science theoretical grounds, Michael Doyle (1996) argues in 
Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affaires that while liberalism has created 
international peace amongst liberal states, it has failed to successfully guide the foreign 
policy of liberal states towards non-liberal states. What does this failure mean in the 
context of the new developments in Afghanistan and Iraq? I think Doyle’s (1996) notion 
of “imprudent vehemence” is applicable to full extent: 
“Confusion, drift, costly crusades, spasmodic imperialism are the contrastig 
record of liberal foreign policy outside the liberal world. A failure to negotiate 
with the powerful and a failure to create stable clients among the weak are its
legacies” (p. 31) 
 
This failure is caused by the fact that “the very constitutional restraint, shared 
commercial interests, and international concern for individual rights that promotes peace 
among liberal societies” can exacerbate conflicts in relations between lib ral and non-
liberal regimes. This is because according to liberal principles, non-liberal regimes –
which do not respect the individual rights of their citizens-, are illegitimate. This leads to 
“an extreme lack of public respect and trust” on the part of liberal regimes towards non-
liberal states. In addition liberal regimes assume that non-liberal regimes “do not respect 
the political independence and territorial integrity of other states.” This lack of trust, he 
explains, leads to less than optimal rational, realist behavior. 
No country lives strictly according to its political ideology and few liberal st tes 
are as hegemonically liberal as the U.S. But Doyle (1996) ascertains that even in the U.S. 
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certain interests and domestic actors derive their sense of legitimacy from sources other 
than liberalism: 
The state’s national security bureaucracy reflects an approach to politics among
nations that focuses on other states, particularly threatening states. Its policies, 
correspondently, tend to fall into the Realist, national interest frame of reference. 
(…) But in the United States, and in other liberal states to a lesser degree, public 
policy derives its legitimacy from its concordance with liberal principles. Policies 
not rooted in liberal principles generally fail to sustain long term public support.” 
(p.49) 
 
In this sense Markus Fischer (2000) in The Liberal Peace calls for a distinction 
between the need to promote democracy for the sake of peace, and the need to promote 
democracy for the sake of liberalism, suggesting that there is a conflation that needs to be 
deconstructed. Fischer describes an asymmetric relation between democracy and 
liberalism: liberalism implies democratic institutions to a large degree, whereas 
democracy entails liberal rights only to a minimal extent.” (p. 5) Most importantly, even 
though he argues that liberal peace rests on the fact that most people value preservation 
and commercial prosperity more highly that glory and domination and consider the 
reduction of human beings to mere means to be morally wrong, he acknowledges that 
contemporary Western culture takes these attitudes for granted, “but they really a  
historically contingent.” (p. 20) It is precisely this contingent characte of history that 
opens a different perspective that allows an understanding of the new scenario beyond the 
strictures of the modern age to admit the “growing disenchantment with modernity in 
Western societies suggests that there are aspects of the human soul that liberalism fails to 
reach.” (p. 27) 
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The Original Uncertainty 
 
Like any other citizen, you and I are already expected to create a life, consciously 
or not, with the materials that history gives us as the American experience. According to 
Appiah (2005), to create a life is fundamentally a hermeneutical process that ends up 
configuring what he calls a person’s ethical self: 
 
Your character, your circumstances, your psychological constitution, including 
the beliefs and preferences generated by the interaction of your innate 
endowments and your experience: all these need to be taken into account in 
shaping a life. They are not constraints on that shaping; they are its materials. As 
we come to maturity, the identities we make, our individualities, are interpretive 
responses to our talents and disabilities, and the changing social, semantic, and 
material contexts we enter at birth; and we develop our identities dialecticly 
with our capacities and circumstances, because the latter are in part the product of 
what our identities lead us to do. (p. 163) 
 
 But how are we supposed to create a life tied to the preconfiguration of a desired 
future? Notice that the subject has been surreptitiously changed: it would not be just lik  
asking Joseph Patrick Dwyer to look at the picture, but to ask him to continue to look like 
the picture regardless of his circumstances. Signifier and signified have, let’s say, 
switched roles. What kind of personal identities could this kind of blueprint generate? 
What kind of impact will this social engineering experiment have on our experience as 
autonomous individuals? Will there be any possibility of unhinging questioning or 
dialogical space? Is this the kind of uncertainty with which Matina Dwyer was struggling, 
and, thus, her powerfully sublime existential appeal to look at the context? I really don’t 
know. But an awareness of this radical and original uncertainty looks like a new 
beginning and a promise to me. Deborah Britzman (2006) puts it this way: “The capacity 
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to think well about injustice and justice belongs to beginnings and now to education, 
which, after all, is the ego’s second chance” (p. 58). So, looking for a second chance, one 
could revisit the marketplace of ideas and once there, it could be reasonably argued that if 
the famous picture of the soldier holding a boy conveyed the idea of power and mercy, 
then, Matina Dwyer’s quotation conveys the idea of agency and grace, argument which 
could potentially lead to a healthy, necessary, and insightful gender consideration, bu  the 
bottom line would remain the same: the unquestionable need to understand the power 
dynamic between autonomy and collective identities. I follow Appiah (2005) for this 
analysis: 
 
Autonomy, we know, is conventionally described as an ideal of self-authorship. 
But the metaphor should remind us that we write in a language we did not 
ourselves made. If we are authors of ourselves, it is the state and society that 
provide us with the tools and the contexts of our authorship; we may shape our 
selves, but others shape our shaping. And so, if the state cannot but affect our 
souls, we can fairly ask both how it does and how it should do so [the emphasis is 
his]. (p. 157) 
 
Figuring out how things work as opposed to how they should work is, in this case, 
an important digression that comes from what Appiah himself calls his rooted liberal
cosmopolitanism. But it is also a Critical Pedagogy interest, which Slattery (2006) 
synthesizes as rooted in the premises that oppression is based in the reproduction of 
privileged knowledge codes and practices; that facts and values are inseparabl  and 
inscribed by ideology; that language is a key element in the formation of subjectivities, 
and, thus, critical literacy --the ability to negotiate passages throug social systems and 
structures- is more important than functional literacy --the ability to decde and compute- 
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(p. 193). Within this framework one could legitimately ask, for example, what kind of 
risks the U.S. National Security doctrine could pose to critical pedagogy. Peter McLa en 
(2007) in Pedagogy and Praxis in the Age of Empire responds in this way: “proponents 
and practitioners of critical pedagogy have long feared being cast into the pit of academic 
hell for being perceived not only as dangerously irrelevant (sic) [irreverent] to United 
States democracy but also as politically treasonous,” (p. 33) mainly because critical 
pedagogy earned an early reputation as a fierce critic of U.S. imperialism and capitalist 
exploitation. But according to McLaren (2007) himself, things have changed. Today 
critical educators have become “so absorbed by the cosmopolitanized liberalism of the 
post-modernized left” that critical pedagogy “no longer serves as a trenchant c allenge to 
capital and U.S. economic and military hegemony.” (p. 33) He insists, in a militant tone, 
that “what is needed as a major step towards social justice is a transformation of the 
social relations of production. Perhaps it is the militant lens he uses what prevents him 
from fully assaying the power of re-description. I believe that the pedagogical exposure 
of the contradictions of the free market system continues to be a valid alternative and a 
valid response that summons us to return to the radical and original uncertainty and 
promise that Education offers and that, as Britzman (2006) reminds us, is constitutive of 
its very possibility. 
Nevertheless, McLaren (2007) is absolutely right when he asserts that tolerance 
must become a liberating rather than a repressive force. As such, “pure tolerance of ‘free’ 
speech must be challenged when it impedes the chances of creating a context in which 
people can live free of fear and violence” (p. 52). So it is not just a matter of being 
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tolerant, but a matter of creating an alternative frame of counter hegemonic eaning. 
Persisting in a language that scorns the other does not advance this kind of creativity. 
Consequently, understanding education as the ego’s second chance, and trying to 
understand the blue print embedded in the U.S. National Security Strategy, it is only fare 
to ask to what extent the state should be allowed, as state, to intervene in the process of 
interpretation through which each of us is supposed to build an identity. In this sense, one 
thing is clear for McLaren (2007): “critical educators need to consider citizenship outside 
of a narrowly nationalist sense in a manner that situates them in a larger practice of global 
citizenship and solidarity” (p. 86). In a resembling way, Gaddis (2004) gives us an 
important lead, which is to acknowledge the moral ambiguity of our history: “we got to 
where we are by means that we cannot today, in their entirety, comfortably endorse” (p. 
33). I argue that Appiah’s (2005) rooted cosmopolitanism and Slattery’s (2006) critical 
theory offer a useful framework to understand education as part of a very complex 
mechanism to secure a generational transfer of ideology. Here I join them to understa  
education as part of a complex mechanism to secure global ideological transfer and to 
redescribe warfare as pedagogy. 
 
Warfare as Pedagogy 
 As an educator, I have always been interested in understanding the effects of war 
on children who survive it.  Because of its horrendous effects there is no greater human 
disaster. The physical, mental, moral, and spiritual marks that it produces have no 
comparison because they not only affect concrete individuals, they affect generations. 
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Consequently, the drama is not only each suffering child. That would be, in fact, just the 
tip of the iceberg, an atrocious starting point. The challenge comes with the 
understanding of the pedagogical process it triggers and especially with the efforts to 
comprehend its effects in its multiple levels of complexity. My interest in the effects of 
war on children who survive it is not limited though to those who are targeted in acts of 
war. It is about children in general, including those who suffer the effects of war from the 
winner’s side, if there is such a thing. I believe everyone looses in a war. I am interested 
in knowing how warfare is used as pedagogy in the American experience.  
Back in the seventies, in the midst of an ongoing ideological warfare -whose 
victorious end was claimed by former President George W. Bush in the presentation of 
his National Security Strategy-, Ivan Illich (1970), properly so, argued that in a schooled 
society, just like ours, war making always finds an educational rationale. I believe that his 
is still a valid assertion because, regardless of its content, an educational rati le has the 
potential to acquire a life in itself and soon, if not systematically challenged, may acquire 
a symbolic value that has the potential to profusely permeate the collective memory of 
any given historical community. The U.S. National Security Strategy’s educational 
rationale was clearly stated by President Bush: “Today our enemies hav  een the results 
of what civilized nations can, and will, do against regimes that harbor, support, and use 
terrorism to achieve their political goals.” (p. 8). I borrow Illich’s expression pedagogical 
warfare to establish a connection between the language of war and the language of 
education.  
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War, as an annihilating phenomenon, is an expression of cultural and social 
disconnectedness. As educators we know that dissonance inevitably precedes the 
emergence of a new cognitive paradigm. But when we deal with war what emerg s from 
that dissonance is not a new cognitive paradigm, but a commodified version of 
knowledge dressed up as a ritual. I use the word ritual in the same sense Peter McLar n 
(1999) defines it in Schooling as a Ritual Performance: “they form the warp on which the 
tapestry of culture is woven, thereby, creating the world for the social actor. They grow 
conjuncturally out of the cultural and political mediations that shape the contours of 
groups and institutions, serving as agencies of socialization” (p.38). Illich (1970) reminds 
us that rituals can hide the discrepancies and conflicts between social principles and 
social organizations, and “as long as an individual is not explicitly conscious of the ritual 
character of the process through which he was initiated to the forces which shape his 
cosmos, he cannot break the spell and shape a new cosmos.” (p. 51).  I define 
pedagogical warfare as a critical scenario to produce systematic pedagogical dissonance. 
Rituals frequently serve normative functions. Such is the case of, amongst many 
others, the notions of patriotism and national pride. They are governed by beliefs rooted 
in psychic structures established through a continuous process of socialization. As part of 
a strategically increasing military presence in all high school campuses, I have found a 
very interesting example of recruitment propaganda contained in a brochure that is made 
available to all students: “MARINES. THE FEW. THE PROUD”. Its direct text and 
distinct imagery mutually reinforce each other in an unambiguous message: war can be 
embedded in education, and education can be embedded in war. Making use of powerful 
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marketing techniques, it effectively conveys the core of a philosophy of life making it 
sound attractive:  
 
“Time and time again, the Marines have been called into service to protect our 
nation’s interests. We operate around the world as America’s quick strike 
expeditionary force, ready at the moment’s notice to effectively insert our 
warriors into any situation that calls for it. We are proud to be America’s shining 
tip of the spear, and we are ready for the next victory. Maybe you can be one of 
us.” 
 
But depending on how you look at it, the brochure could also be disconcerting 
and appalling. Its downright language unabashedly describes both the curriculum and the
philosophy of education that supports it: 
 
“No one simply joins the Marines, because the title must be earned. Marine Corps 
Recruit Training is where the separation begins: the weak from the strong, the 
child from the adult, the civilian from the Marine. The 13 weeks will break away 
all the things that bind you to the excesses of the past. And in the end, you will 
become a confident member of the finest warrior force in the world. You’ll be a 
United States Marine.” 
 
I argue that this is not just a marketing product. It represents a philosophy that 
abruptly assumes that we are all enmeshed in a sacred commonality of interests and that 
those interests need to be protected. It assumes that those interests admit no limits and 
that its protection does not recognize any sovereign barrier in the world. It assumes that 
warfare has its own logicality and that it can be imposed anywhere at the moment needed. 
It assumes war as a cultural trait and that only warriors express the fullness of its human 
condition. Finally, it assumes military supremacy as the lead and structuring value and 
that education is just a natural selection process.  
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H. E.Goemans (2000) in War & Punishment has developed an interesting theory 
about war and war termination that is widely accepted amongst and used by both public 
policy makers and political science academic circles.  I find it extremely interesting 
because it is coincidently a very sophisticated version of the brochure. Goemans 
redescribes war and war termination as learning processes: “War makes agre ment 
possible because war provides information” (p. 27). “Once a war starts, and the 
belligerents spend some time fighting each other, they acquire new information about 
their own as well as their adversaries’ capabilities and the costs of war. They also begin 
to learn more about both side’s resolve. Specifically, continuous combat will tell both 
sides all sorts of things about the final outcome on the battlefield that they can never 
know before the war” (p. 28). As war progresses, he explains, at least one side must 
discover that its original estimate was wrong. The resolve to go to war expressed by 
former President Bush (2002) may be better understood in the light of this strategic 
learning theory. But it also sheds light over its limitations and contradictions, since the 
U.S. is no longer dealing with traditional warfare but with something different. As he 
explains, “we will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by defending the Unit d 
States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and 
destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. (…) we will not hesitate to act alone, 
if necessary, to exercise our right to self defense by acting preemptiv ly against such 
terrorists” (p. 6). In this pedagogical warfare, what are the pedagogical practices that will 
enable us to unlearn bad lessons well learned in the past? What are the questions that will 
bring the discussion back to the educational field and reconnect it to democracy as “site
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of struggle” in Henry Giroux’s (2005) words? Ivan Illich (2002) says that our modern 
time is characterized by an extreme disjunction between cultural and social structures, 
“the one being devoted to apocalyptic attitudes, the other to technocratic decision-
making.”  This is certainly true, he asserts, for many educational reformers who feel 
impelled to condemn almost everything which characterizes modern schools and at the 
same time propose new schools. He continues: 
 
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn argues that such 
dissonance inevitably precedes the emergence of a new cognitive paradigm. The 
facts reported by those who observed free fall, by those who returned from the 
other side of the earth, and by those who used the new telescope did not fit the 
Ptolemaic world view. Quite suddenly, the Newtonian paradigm was accepted. 
The dissonance which characterizes many of the young today is not so much 
cognitive as a matter of attitudes –a feeling about what a tolerable society cannot 
be like. What is surprising about this dissonance is the ability of a very large 
number of people to tolerate it.” (p. 51) 
 
From the perspective of Education I argue with Illich (2002) that dissonance 
generates new knowledge. From the perspective of Political Science I argue that war is a 
negative sum game. From the intersection of both, hereon, I argue that a sense of 
criticality for the open examination of culture and society, is essential to democratic 
citizenry.  
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CHAPTER III 
IN SEARCH OF SECURITY 
 
The recent financial crisis in the U.S. has reminded us in a rather dramatic way 
that in our contemporary world, if you are not in control, it is prudent –if not wise- not to 
make long term plans. Just look at the bubble of the mortgage and housing markets. The 
distant future is not profitable.  Not only that, either the unemployment rates or your 
plans to keep climbing the consumer ladder suggest that you better not get tied down to
any particular place or neighbor. Uncertainty plays an important role when it comes to 
today’s choices. If you can’t control the future, you should not mortgage it either. To 
commit or avoid commitment seems to be the ethos. The consequences in terms of moral 
choices are enormous because it denies the moral significance of any human interrelation. 
We become insensible to the pain and suffering of others and engage in deceiving rituals. 
It adiaphorizes the part of our humanity that adiaphorizing mechanisms of bureaucracy 
could not reach. And yet we long for security, or maybe we are made to think we do.  
 
A Site for Pedagogical Struggle 
Francis Ford Coppola’s (2007) visual rendition of Mircea Eliade’s (1988) novel 
“Youth Without Youth” is a significant event in postmodern Western filmography.  Its 
gist and validity, of course, cannot -and should not- be assessed through the lenses with 
which more commercial films would normally be scrutinized to evaluate their qual ty and 
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estimate their profitability. This film introduces an alternative and compelling set of 
criteria which allows for the generation of a very sophisticated combination of elements 
which, at its own time, urgently calls for the projection of our deepest and most 
archetypal imagination. Masterfully enhanced by a sort of chiasmus of the poetic mind 
and a dialectical exposure of the political consciousness, the texture of the film carries its 
own meaning and creates a paradoxical scenario where the act of carefully watching 
dramatically overlaps with the condition of being observed. Coppola’s proposal not only 
deals with the contemporary issues of awareness and surveillance, but with a more 
fundamental and problematic challenge: how is historical memory created? I strongly 
believe that this film not only represents a radical reassessment of aesthetics and a 
departure from the egotism and self-centeredness of modern North American culture b t, 
in fact, conveys a complex musing of otherness. It is a thoughtful consideration of the 
moral choice between good and evil and, in this sense, represents the configuration of a 
meaningful site for criticality and pedagogical struggle with hopeful implications for 
popular culture. 
Coppola’s (2007) film narrates the story of Dominic Matei, a bright professor of 
linguistics in Romania who, having devoted his entire life to understanding the origin of 
consciousness and to discern how language shapes the notions of time and space, at 70, 
depressed, aware of the impending catastrophe in Europe in 1939, has not been able to 
arrive to a conclusion and write he final work which would round up his unique findings 
and make him unquestionably known. Resolved to commit suicide, away from home, and 
stripped from everything that, once dead, would reveal his identity, he is unexpectedly 
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struck by a lightning. From that point on, in a rather psychoanalytical fashion, and with 
intense alter-ego dialogues embellished with oneiric reminiscences, Dominic’s existence 
intriguingly roams and provocatively transgresses the boundaries between the sacred and 
the profane: 
 
Double: [Assertive] Good, you’re behaving as you should in order to create 
the necessary confusion. 
Dominic: [Resigned] The double. He always answers the questions I’m ready 
to ask. Like a true guardian angel. 
Double: [Socratic] Now, that’s a correct and useful formula! 
Dominic: [Puzzled] Are there others? 
Double: [Resolved] Many. 
Dominic: [Curious] For example? 
Double: [Paused] Along with angels, and guardian angels, there are 
powers: archangel, seraphim, cherubim. Intermediary beings par 
excellence… 
Dominic: [Interrupting anxiously] Intermediary beings between 
consciousness and unconsciousness? 
Double: [In as a matter of fact tone] Well, of course! But also between 
nature and man, man and the divine, reason and Eros. Feminine 
and masculine, darkness and light, matter and spirit. [Italics are 
mine.] 
 
But it is the film in itself, gracefully pregnant with visual metaphors in its 
portrayal of Dominic, the post-historic man, as the embodiment of a search and as the 
embeddedness of a paradox, what has called my attention. If Dominic Matei is, let’s ay, 
in search of an objective manifestation of a truth with which he could identify to give 
meaning and closure to his life, the film mirrors the process in its multiple and much 
more complex levels exposing his witty dark side, revealing his sublimated fear of loss, 
and confessing the ambiguity of his very human condition: “I live in fear, dreading what 
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awaits in the alleyways (…) Nothing is as it seems. I am the proof of that. Irust no 
more.”  
In the film Matei’s mirrors are not in sync with what they mirror. It is as if they 
lacked the force to force competing processes to arrive to a state which would be 
considered safe if the system for which they were designed were to crash. They are, 
rather, burst centers where the forces that make things look different are exposd, where 
their pretensions of being always one step ahead of reality inevitably lay bare:  
 
Dominic: [Assertive] But I can’t believe in the objectivity of the person with 
whom I am conversing. I can only think of him as my double. 
Double: [Compelling] Well, in a sense, that’s what he is, but… that doesn’t 
mean that he doesn’t exist in an objective way, independently. 
Dominic: [Intrigued] Oh… I’d like to be convinced! 
Double: [Philosophically] In metaphysical controversies, empirical proofs 
loose its value, but… wouldn’t you enjoy receiving a few fresh 
roses picked from the garden? 
Dominic: [Emotionally touched] I’ve always liked roses. 
Double: [Devilishly mischievous] Well, where would you like me to put 
them? 
Dominic: [Yielding] Not in the vase. One right here [xtends hand], in my 
hand [almost whispering], as I am holding it now [red rose 
appears, Dominic smiles astonished.] And another one on my 
knee? [Rose appears.]  
Double: [Urging] The third rose. Where do you want me to put the third 
rose? [Italics are mine.] 
 
In a rather subliminal way, the film challenges not only the objectivity of Matei’s 
search, but objectivity in itself as it visually portrays what Zygmunt Bauman (1995) has 
poignantly described as “our modern ambivalence about might, force, and coercion” (p. 
139). This is precisely the postmodern gist of the film: one person’s enabling and 
spawning process is another person’s cogent hindrance. Clearly, a great deal of power is 
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absolutely essential to crease and disjoint things in Coppola’s (2007) mirrors so that what 
they reflect may be perceived as expected or desired, or even as right or better, if you 
will. Coppola’s version of Dominic Matei is Bauman’s version of modernity: “a frontier 
civilization, which re-creates itself and rejuvenates through a constant supply of lands to 
conquer and ever new invitations to, or pretexts for, transgression” (p. 140).  Jürgen 
Habermas (2006) has ascertained with solid authority, I believe, that the only image that a 
pretend unipolar world can accurately mirror is that of an existing asymmetrical 
distribution of political power:  
 
However, it is misleading because the complexity of a world society that is not 
just economically decentered can no longer be mastered from a center. Conflict 
between cultures and major religions con no more be controlled exclusively by 
military means than crises on world markets can be by political means.” (p. 148) 
 
I find Coppola’s visual language fascinating and profoundly relevant in an era of 
insecurity such as ours, where unrealistic images are blatantly used for ideological 
management.  Ushering a time of fear, not too long ago, former President GeorgeW. 
Bush (2002) strongly argued in the aftermath of  unprecedented terrorist attacks in North 
American soil, that “our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of 
mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination” (p. 
4). Up to this day, more than eight years later, even though that evidence has been proved 
wrong, and even fabricated, and as President Obama switches the American berserker 
focus of his administration back to Al Qaeda and Afghanistan in the Middle East, the 
rationale seems to be the same. Notwithstanding the increasingly negative perception of 
war by the public opinion, it continues to inform the debate and determine threat 
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inflation, as it besets the continued failure of the marketplace of ideas through the power 
of redescription. 
 
From the War on Poverty to the War on Terror 
During the 1960s, when civil rights and poverty were national concerns, the 
federal government made education part of a national campaign against poverty. Joel 
Spring (2005) identified and clearly described a permanently increasing interest of the 
corporate liberal state in the cultivation and management of human resources “for the 
benefit of the industrial and corporate leaders” (p. 376) as the main characteristic of that 
period in the history of education. The shortcomings of such a policy, in his view, were 
that schools failed to prepare students to exercise and protect their political, social, and 
economic rights: 
 
Within the theoretical framework of the War on Poverty, the social and economic 
system that had created poverty and allowed it to continue was not considered the 
problem; the problem was the culture of the poor. Indeed, the overall strategy was 
to integrate the poor into the existing social and economic system. Very simply, 
this can be called blaming the victim –placing full responsibility for poverty on 
the shoulders of the poor. They –not the economic system that had produced 
poverty- were expected to change. (p. 394) 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, national security has acquired urgent and 
exceptional relevance. The U.S. National Security Strategy inscribes education within the 
frame of national security doctrine and has strategically situated its domestic effects 
under the umbrella of homeland security policy. Education, in no uncertain terms, 
became one of nine general foreign policy strategies designed to expand what former 
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President George W.  Bush (2002) so intriguingly called a “circle of development”, 
process which was, hole-and-corner, engrained within another one, more powerful, 
identified as War on Terror.  
In a promising vision, delivered to the world almost one year after the terrorist 
attacks in New York and Washington D.C. in 2001, President Bush considered literacy 
and learning as the “foundation of democracy” (p.23). Obviously, no one could ever 
disagree with an assertion of the sort. But a careful reading and analysis of the official 
documentation that defined national security and regulated its policy making, 
nevertheless, reveals not only that literacy and learning had been obstreperously 
foreshorten to unpretentious functions played within an innocuous structure, but confirms 
that this notion of education was seamlessly articulated to a larger political agenda: “to 
open societies” (p. 21). The implications and challenges that this vision continues to carry 
have not been sufficiently discussed in pedagogical terms. What does it mean to ope 
societies? What does it mean to open societies in a context of terror? I argue that the 
political project contained in the U.S. National Security Strategy, read as curriculum, 
models coercion in service of individual self-assertion.  
Both political project and curriculum have ostensibly anchored its fundamental 
belief in a particular interpretation of history at the end of the cold war:  “The militant 
visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been 
defeated and discredited,” said President Bush (2002) and he stoutly ascertained that 
there is only one “sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy and free 
enterprise” (p. 1). I strongly believe in democracy and adhere to democratic princples 
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but, precisely, because of that, I think it is neither possible nor plausible to pretend to 
conflate those three concepts and make them work as if they were one. Benesetto Fontana 
(2002) explains: 
 
The notion of the state as ‘educator’ and the formation of a socio-cultural 
‘personality’ bring us back to the notion of hegemony, in this case specifically 
construed as the movement from feeling to knowledge, from desire/appetite to 
reason, and from the economic to the political. In other words, hegemony is 
precisely described by the movement from a particular (or pre-political) to  
universal (or political) consciousness. (p. 161) 
 
I follow Jeffrey Weeks as cited by Bauman (1995) to frame an alternative rgument: 
“humanity is not an essence to be realized, but a pragmatic construction, a perspectiv , to 
be developed through the articulation of a variety of individual projects, of differenc s, 
which constitute our humanity in the broadest sense” (p. 162).  Habermas (2006) speaks 
to the same possibility but from a different perspective: 
 
The sanctioning of states whose governments provide a haven for, or actively 
support, the new international terror requires neither the erosion of the narrowly 
defined right of self-defense nor the suspension of key provisions of the Geneva 
Convention. Nor does effectively combating the new terror at the domestic level 
call for restrictions on basic rights that amount virtually to their destruction. Of 
course, this specter could vanish with a change in administration in the United 
States. Nevertheless, the image of a superpower that uses its military, 
technological, and economic superiority to create a global order in accordance 
with its own religiously colored notions of good and evil and its geostrategic 
goals suggests a heuristically useful alternative, namely, one between a 
progressive constitutionalization of international law and its substitution by the 
liberal ethics of a superpower. (p. 128) 
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A Threat to Democracy 
As I have been reflecting on those two National Security documents made 
available online by The Bush White House and discerning the way the notions of 
democracy, freedom, and security are described and inscribed in it, many complex 
questions have come to my mind constituting altogether a multidimensional imaginary 
puzzle. What constitutes a threat to democracy? What constitutes a threat to a democratic 
state? What is the repertoire of legal responses to a threat against a democratic state? Is 
there any difference between a legal and a legitimate response? Does the subjectivity 
involved in the perception of a threat play any role in the legitimacy and or the legality of 
the response of a democratic state? Do responses to perceived threats challenge, dispute 
or contest the concepts and institutions of democracy and of a democratic state as we 
understand them now? I have even been wondering whether we actually share such n 
understanding. Beyond academic definitions, how is democracy experienced under real 
life exceptional circumstances? In short, putting forward definitions of threa  to 
democracy or security for the consideration of academics and policy practitioners, r 
assessing discourses of security and democracy on the basis of their implementation, 
appears divorced from the operation of security in the everyday of political practice. It is, 
for the most part, classified secret. This does not mean that those in academia intrested 
in questions of threats and security should avoid seeking policy prescription or the 
application of their ideas to political processes. Rather, they should acknowledge that 
elaborating alternative conceptions of threat or security, or defending existing 
conceptions and practices, is a profoundly political project. As Matt McDonald (2010) 
 60
explains, it is political in the sense of serving to affect (for better or worse) the context in 
which actors find themselves, which is the central determinant of actors’ use of security 
or how they feel threatened. And it is political in serving to address the core reason of 
state, whose legitimacy is, as we know, derived primarily through its claim to provide 
security” (p. 278). But after careful consideration, I must say, there is still one idea 
against which I have not yet been persuaded: a liberal democracy may roll back during a 
period of perceived threat. Just listen again to President Obama (2009) inaugural speech: 
 
As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and 
our ideals. Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils we can scarcely imagine, 
drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter 
expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we 
will not give them up for expedience's sake. (p. 4) 
 
For expedience sake… Such a unique phenomenon may not only be interesting 
because of its political implications, but it certainly acquires dramatic philosophical tones 
because it operates through a sequence of sublime mechanisms where language and 
images play a main role. Let’s just look at the mainstream media or, better yet, a simple 
school textbook. The expressions force, violence, extremism, terror, and terrorist violence 
are used in a sort of exchangeable way to describe an undesirable situation, essentially in 
contrast to the notions of law enforcement and order, bolstering the modern conceit that 
they belong to two different categories. Bauman (1995) points out that what this verbal 
distinction hides is that, in fact, the former --condemned as illegitimate, gratuitous, and 
harmful-, is also about certain ordering, “but not the one which the makers of the 
distinction had in mind” (p.141). This means that the distinction is, in point of fact, being 
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made between the desired order and all the rest. Consequently, aware of the power of 
language, it would be a significant pedagogical experience just to ask for the rle that 
coercion plays in this language puzzle.  
Jennifer Holmes (2001), for example, in an interesting essay on Terrorism and 
Democratic Stability affirms, correctly, -I believe-,  that “to understand the consequences 
of violence on democratic stability, violence coming from terrorist groups and violence 
emanating from the state must be studied together” (p. 10). Which coincides with what I 
am trying to explain from the beginning: each concept calls for its excluded oth r. What 
she implies is that, instead of just asking what unleashes violence one should also ask for 
the consequences of violent responses. Normally, she explains, democracies combine 
repression and reform, depending on the nature of the threat. For example, Western 
European democracies confronting terrorism saw a growth in power of state security 
institutions. West German and Italian governments also upgraded intelligence-athering 
and surveillance functions, bringing the government into a more intrusive role in society. 
In West Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom, anti-terrorist legislation 
restricted civil liberties. Within a more comprehensive perspective, she aserts, “violence 
can be observed as cause of further instability, instead of merely a manifestation of  
preexisting conflict”. Her inclusive approach helps us to avoid a traditional assessment of 
the state in terms of law and order and encourages us to look at the larger, more complex, 
and dynamic picture drawn by its fundamental constitutional role. 
Terror as a phenomenon of political violence and the way we understand it from a 
democratic perspective, depends heavily on the historical, political, social, and economi  
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context in which we inscribe it, as well as on how the groups and individuals who 
participate in or respond to the actions we call terror relate to the world in which they act. 
I grew up and lived my young adult life in the midst of a situation like that and -not 
without fear- survived the bloody crossfire. Seventy thousand people didn’t, and I am still
troubled by that. The violent scenario comes back to my mind but now in global 
dimensions.  
An important lesson learned from the past about warfare as pedagogy is that the 
context for terrorism does not consist entirely of objective historical factors. Equally 
important to understanding terrorism is its symbolic context. Patricio Silva (1999) in 
Collective Memories, Fears, and Consensus warns us that “how it is perceived 
determines its subjective conditions” (p. 178). The power of using the term, he argues, 
resides in its symbolic appeal and, most importantly, in its capacity to outlast short-term 
strategic failures. If you agree with him, as I happen to do, it is easy to understand why it 
persists, almost ineluctably, despite negative outcomes: “T rrorism projects images, 
communicates messages, and creates myths that transcend historical circumstances and 
can motivate future generations” [Emphasis is mine] (p. 179). Another important lesson
learned from the past is that the understanding of terror and its complexity is contingent 
upon our understanding of terrorism as a conflict of political nature. Obviously, there is 
always a self presentation of those who use terror and a construction that governments 
and publics place on it. But, in fact, when people choose to call the actions of others 
terror or to label others as terrorists, then, this choice often has a sort of prescriptive 
relevance and not only a moral connotation. Martha Crenshaw (1995) in Thoughts on 
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Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts explains that “political language affects the 
perceptions of audiences and their expectations about how the problem evoked in a 
particular way will be treated.” (p. 17). The vocabulary used to define or identify a 
problem, consequently, may also indicate a preferred solution. 
 
A Culture of Fear 
The overarching official document that originally contained and explained the 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America after September 11 was 
published by The White House in September of 2002, just a couple of months after the 
newly created Office of Homeland Security published The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security in July 2002.  Since then, both documents guided both homeland and 
national security public policy making. These documents were followed by The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, The White Hous, March 
2006, which is a more sophisticated version of the original one. It gives an official 
historical version of what was described as the successes and challenges of the context at 
that particular time, and most importantly, described the way ahead giving a sort of road 
map for a desired version of the future, which is also part of the document. Shortly 
thereafter, when the cost of the war and foreign policies in the Middle East started to be 
increasingly questioned, two other important documents were made public: The National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington, September 2006; and 9/11 Five Years 
Later: Successes and Challenges, Washington, September 2006. From a political and 
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pedagogical point of view, these documents are of the uttermost importance: they 
legitimized the War on Terror as a civilizing process: 
 
Today our enemies have seen the results of what civilized nations can, and will, 
do against regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism to achieve their political 
goals. Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda. But it is not only this battlefield on which we will engage 
terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North
America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia. (p. 5) 
 
It is easy to be overwhelmed by the realization that war makers have enormous 
power. But like any other legitimating strategy, this one hides as much as it reveals. 
Concerned by the deterioration of democratic powers in America, Cornell West (2004) 
has extensively talked and written about what he considers a sort of sedimentation of 
democratic values, and has made the case for a strong differentiation between democratic 
commitment and flag-waving patriotism. “Democratic commitment –he strongly ar ues- 
confronts American hypocrisy and mendacity in the name of public interest; flag-waving 
patriotism promotes American innocence and purity in the name of national glory”(p. 
103). The problem West (2004) sees here is by all odds engrained in the cultural make of 
the American society, which –in his own words- is “not knowing how to deal with our 
traditional fear of too many liberties, and our deep distrust of one another” (p. 6). This 
fear, in its turn, he concludes, manifests itself in a politics that is about winning a political 
game and not about producing better lives for all. Robert Jay Lifton (2003) has an 
interesting take on this issue as well. As a psychiatrist interested in the human condition 
in extreme situations, he describes the American experience as a superpower syndrome: 
“We have long had a national self-image that involves an ability to call forth reservoirs of 
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strength when we need it, and a sense of a protected existence peculiar to America in an 
otherwise precarious world.” (p. 125). As a consequence, he argues, this sort of 
exceptional condition makes us feel as if it were almost un-American to be vulnerable. 
Notice here that one condition is immediately implicated by the other. They are presented 
as irremediably inseparable. But in all reality, for an ordinary flag waving citizen, it is the 
equivalent to claiming a power that is unlimited just to compensate the intolerable idea of 
not being invulnerable, and to compensate the intolerable emotion of being vulnerable. 
So, “one solution, says Lifton (2003), is to maintain the illusion of invulnerability”, even 
when that means that the superpower “runs the danger of taking increasingly draconian 
actions to sustain that illusion” (p. 129).  
Michael Lerner (2007) describes this illusionary state of consciousness as cynical 
realism in the Left Hand of God. This state of consciousness is characterized by a 
heightened state of alert and a profound sense of fear. In this very human condition, he 
explains, there is a battle of all against all, where others will necessarily dominate you 
unless you dominate them first. For Lerner (2007), here, fear of the other is the mos 
common of the senses; and as such, the prism of our human diffraction and the cause of 
the fragmentation of our lives. Within this logic, “security for ourselves, our families, our 
communities, or our nation depends on our ability to get advantage over them before they 
get it over us” (p. 77). But Lerner (2007) gives a good dressing down and warns us that 
when fear dominates, what happens is that all our experiences are discerned through these 
lenses, prevailing over other parts of our cultural heritage precisely because they validate 
those fears. Consequently “people seek to maximize their own advantage”. Fear is not 
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only, then, and alienating force, but, also “the energy that summons us to the market” (p. 
80) I argue that it is also the straining force that motivates the need to open other 
societies. 
 
L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 
There is an intrinsic weakness in governments, though, says Howard Zinn (2007) 
in A Power Governments Cannot Suppress: “however massive their armies, however vast 
their wealth, however they control images and information, because their power depends 
on the obedience of citizens, of soldiers, of civil servants, of journalists and writers and 
teachers and artists” (p.13).  And any government’s power –he concludes- may become 
futile when critically confronted by an educated citizenry.  
In an effort to do away with the debris produced after so much official neatness 
during the Bush administration, a sworn-twice President Barack Obama turned his 
undivided attention to national security matters during his second day in office, and 
continued to untwine the arras of policies woven by his predecessor over the previous 
eight years. He signed executive orders designed to close Guantanamo Bay prison within 
a year, prohibit extreme interrogation practices, and revisit military tribunals for 
suspected terrorists. “Shuttering the detention facility is intended to show that U.S. 
foreign policy is in metamorphosis,” President Obama said during a press conference. 
“The message that we are sending around the world is that the Unites States intends to 
prosecute the ongoing struggle against violence and terrorism” but will do so “in a 
manner consistent with our values and our ideals”. ”We are not, as I said at our 
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inauguration, going to continue with a false choice between our safety and our ideals,” he 
concluded as highlighted by National Public Radio on January 22, 2009. 
There is indeed an enthrallment in the narrative of national security documents 
and of national security issues. It pretends to be about dislodging violence, but in fact it 
just redescribes its redistribution. I argue that they continue to be powerful artifacts that 
very efficiently perform what Bauman (1995) so interestingly describes as an ordering 
activity: 
 
Ordering makes protruding the difference previously unnoticed and creates a 
difference where there was none; it splits the set of objects within the field about 
to be ordered into such as fit the order and such as do not. The latter must be 
coerced to change themselves or to change their places. (p. 140) 
 
The fact that the executive orders to close Guantanamo Bay prison within a year, 
prohibit extreme interrogation practices, and revisit military tribunals for uspected 
terrorists have certainly been hard to execute and have not been completed reveals not 
only that these are complicated issues but that, in fact, they are just the tip of 
underpinning structures that cannot be easily removed. With the President, I think that the 
choice is not between safety and ideals, as he has digressed, but, rather, a mattr of 
consistency. The real choice will be where he decides to re-inscribe his digre sion. 
The disruption created by such fit impetus reminds me of the powerful script 
written by Sidonie-Gabrielle Collette (1917) for Maurice Ravel’s (1925) opera "L'Enfant 
et les Sortileges." In this story a boy conflicted by time and mathematical problems, tears 
off the wall paper of his room, knocks over his clock, and rips apart his favorite book, 
just to see that the characters that inhabited his little world -and with whom he had safely 
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grown for years-, are free, have a life of their own, and heartedly struggle and riot to 
continue to make the same sense even without their context. This is the story of a stange 
place in time where a boy comes face-to-face with the very objects he just broke and has 
no other option but to negotiate with them a new space. This is also, coincidently, the 
story of our modern day so early and well captured by Collette (1936), in Mes 
Apprentisages: "by means of an image we are often able to hold on to our lost 
belongings. But it is the desperateness of losing which picks the flowers of memory, 
binds the bouquet" (p.67). The desperateness of loosing, in this case, brings us back to 
Matina Dwyer’s dilemma and fragile human condition, to the picture of the boy holding 
the photo of a soldier holding that same boy, to the warps in which culture and memory 
are woven, to rituals, and to mirrors that lack the force to force. 
 
A New Era of Responsibility 
Back in 1999, an FBI report on Counterterrorism Threat Assessment to the U.S. 
Department of Justice indicated way before the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington DC that Osama Bin Laden’s objectives –“driving U.S. and Western forces 
from the Arabian Peninsula, removing Saudi Arabia’s ruling family from power, 
‘liberating’ Palestine, and overthrowing ‘Western-oriented’ governments in 
predominantly Muslim countries”- had established himself as a leading figure among 
extremists who shared a similar ideological orientation. But the most alarming 
assessment contained in this little known document came in one of its conclusions: 
“While Bin Laden is one of the most recognized proponents and key financier of this 
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broad movement; he does not control or direct all such extremism. Should either he or Al-
Qaeda cease to exist, this international movement would, in all likelihood, continue” 
(p.55).  
The Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 ushered in a time of fear which is 
now almost nine years old. Some scholars are beginning to refer to it as the “perpetual 
war”, since there seems to be no obvious conclusion in the horizon. But most 
importantly, a disturbing pattern emerges just from a purely academic examination, a 
pattern of disrespect for the law. The response of the state to politically subver ive 
violence has repeatedly weakened the fluidness of the constitutional order. 
“We’ve been fighting the wrong battle” has unflinchingly said Frank Cillufo, a 
former White House Homeland Security official, to Time Magazine’s Amanda Ripley 
(2008). “The real center of gravity of the enemy is their narrative. It is ideologically 
bankrupt.” (p.47) I think he is absolutely right. Howard Caygill (1993) has managed to 
articulate a clear image to illustrate the current world scenario: 
 
With the limits for territorial expansion themselves reaching the limit […] 
reasoned civility and sovereign violence threaten to collapse into each other […]. 
The potential for violence displaced to the periphery returns to the centre with 
increasing speed. The border between civility and violence is no longer to be 
found at the limit of a sovereign, territorial space, but now traverses that space. 
(p.52) 
 
For the same reason, I am afraid, shouldn’t an ideology that cynically infuses fear 
and its narrative of creative destruction be included in the same theoretical category? 
President Barack Obama (2009), in his inaugural speech, made an eloquent appeal to an 
uncompromising “recognition, on part of every American, that we have duties to 
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ourselves, our nation, and the world.” [The emphasis is mine.] Alluring the promise of 
citizenship, he ceremoniously ushered in what he called a “new era of responsibility.” A 
few days before, in spite of it all, he had already approved his first act of war, this time in 
Pakistani territory. “Last Friday [January 13, 2009], unmanned U.S. Predator drones fied 
missiles at houses in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA, killing as 
many as twenty-two people, including at least three children” reported Amy Goodman 
(2009) on her radio show Democracy Now on January 30, 2009. The Pakistani Prime 
Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani told an audience at the World Economic Forum in Davos 
the day before of her report that “U.S. drone attacks were ‘counterproductive’ and ended 
up uniting local communities with militants.” On the other end, Goodman (2009) 
reported that U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, a remnant component of the 
former Bush administration, indicated at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on 
Tuesday, January 28, that “such strikes will continue and that Pakistani officials are 
aware of U.S. policy on this matter.”  
How can one make sense of the sense of duty to which President Obama made 
reference in his inaugural speech if it is embedded in a renewed war scenario without
undergoing gibelike feelings? To provide a sense in advance of what that might be, a few 
weeks later, U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano revealed to D r Spiegel 
some elements of what could be interestingly identified as a formal strategy of 
deradicalization. When asked for the specific reason why she did not mention the word 
“terrorism” during her first testimony to the U.S. Congress, she said:  
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In my speech, although I did not use the word "terrorism," I referred to "man-
caused" disasters. That is perhaps only a nuance, but it demonstrates that we wan
to move away from the politics of fear toward a policy of being prepared for all
risks that can occur. (www.spiegel.de/international/world 3/26/2009) 
 
The admitted sophistication of Secretary Napolitano suggests, though, that the 
appeal to a new era of responsibility is nothing more but nothing less than an appeal to 
procedural correctness, and that the sense of duty that it entails is no other but the 
ritualized belief that organizations are moved only by an impersonal logic of self-
propelling principles, where individuals that act within the realm of bureaucratic action 
are actually divested of their moral autonomy and educated both to distrust their own 
moral judgment and not to exercise it.  What does this contradiction mean in pedagogical 
terms? Does it mean that metacognition and critical thinking can only go so far?  
 
Depersonalizing War 
The provision of security has long been recognized as one of the most important 
functions of a democratic government. It took centuries for the modern state to evolve 
and gain exclusive control of the means of violence. But history is evolving in a way Max 
Weber did not foresee. Peter Singer (2003) in Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the 
Privatized Military Industry, has identified and started to describe an overall global 
pattern, “one of growing reliance by individuals, corporations, states, and international 
organizations on military services supplied not just by public institutions but also by the 
non-sovereign private market”. The privatized military industry, for him, may ver  well 
represent the new face of warfare. The birth and growth of this kind of industry, he 
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asserts, and I agree, does not only mean that the monopoly of force from the state is 
broken, but that “the state’s role in security sphere has now become deprivileged” (p. 18). 
One can only wonder what kind of effect this change will produce in the process of 
shaping an identity. The unknown territory brings us back, once again, to the opposition 
between order keeping and violence; law enforcement and order disruption; insurgency 
and counterinsurgency. I think this scenario is not as simple as former President George
W. Bush assumed in his promising view of the world. The end of the Cold War has 
allowed internal conflicts to implode states, and international conflicts have caus d wars 
between neighboring states. Simultaneously, globalization has created immense ar as 
where people starve and live under disparaging human conditions of insecurity, and has 
facilitated the emergence and re-emergence of conflict groups not bound to any one state. 
As Singer (2003) has very well pointed out, there was a vacuum in the market of security 
that was exacerbated, I believe, by a context where global threats and their au ors too 
easily acquired notoriety, and traditional responses to insecurity came to the fore as weak 
and inappropriate, to say the least. Slattery (1995) explains this is why political studies 
have become central to curriculum studies.  
 
Postmodern curriculum development recognizes the necessity of incorporating a 
new consciousness that transcends the modern categories of metaphysics, 
epistemology, and axiology. A reconceptualization of this classical philosophical 
trinity must emerge that understands existence, knowledge, and ethics in the 
context of postmodern political, cultural, and social upheaval. (p. 25) 
 
But if the privatized military industry represents the new face of warfare, the 
increased use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) over the Federally Administered 
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Tribal Areas in Pakistan, for example, represents both a renewed attempt to depersonalize 
war and a sophisticated remake of the old deleterious voice of self-deception. It is not 
casual that such a territory has gained narrow focus in the war against terror. The region 
is nominally controlled by the central and Federal government of Pakistan. But the 
Constitution of Pakistan governs FATA only through the same rules which were left by
the British in 1901. The President of Pakistan has an authority weakened by the remains 
of colonial tradition. This has created, in Western terms, a political vacuum which serves, 
like in the story of the boy and the spell, the interests of insurgents that have found refuge 
in an ingovernable territory and the interests of a superpower syndrome that seeks to 
improve its multibillion conventional war means over its much needed and less costly 
capabilities of counterinsurgency. Robert M. Gates (2009) made such an interesting 
digression in “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,”an 
article written shortly before his confirmation as U.S. Secretary of Defens  by newly 
elected President Barack Obama and that eventually cleared his reappointment  office. 
He said: 
 
We should be modest about what military force can accomplish and what 
technology can accomplish. The advances in precision, sensor, information, and 
satellite technologies have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can 
do. The Taliban were dispatched within three months; Saddam’s regime was 
toppled in three weeks. A button can be pushed in Nevada, and seconds later a 
pickup truck will explode in Mosul. […] But no one should ever neglect the 
psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare. War is 
inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain, and it is important to be skeptical of 
systems analyses, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest 
otherwise” (p. 39).  
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But such an expression of unconventional thinking unfortunately does not find its 
reflection in reality. U.S. drone bombings have reportedly killed 687 Pakistani civilians 
since 2006, according to peace organizations Voices for Creative Nonviolence and 
Nevada Desert Experience. During that time, U.S. Predator drones allegedly carried out 
sixty strikes inside Pakistan, but hit just ten of their actual targets. In early April 2009, a 
group of fourteen peace activists were arrested for protesting outside Creech Air Force 
Base in Nevada, where Air Force personnel pilot the unmanned drones used in Pakistan 
and which Gates (2009) mentions in his Foreign Affairs article. Peace activist Father 
Louis Vitale, Franciscan Friar, explained it this way to Amy Goodman (2009):  
 
Well, you know, it works out rather nicely. They [the pilots and sensor operators] 
live with their families in Las Vegas. They drive out and drop the kids off at 
school, drive out in the morning, fly their missions, drop their bombs. They can 
go home and have dinner with their family in the evening. (www.democracy 
now.org/2009/4/14) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the corporate media did not report on the event. After all, how to 
seriously report what some of the soldiers have described as an intriguing arcade
experience? How to explain the way they embody a sense of duty that has no sense of 
moral accountability? How to illustrate a scenario where the act of carefully watching 
dramatically overlaps with the condition of being observed and, yet, the overlap does not 
enhance a sense of consciousness but creates a black hole of disenfranchisement that 
allows for a sort of intermediary beings to roam and transgress the boundaries betwen 
the sacred and the profane? What stories are in-sync-mirrors telling and how are they 
becoming history?  Peter Singer (2009) tells us: 
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The experience for drone pilots is a bit different. They work the same hours as if 
they were in war zone, usually seven days a week, twelve hours a day, with the 
unit split into two shifts. But, says, Colonel Charlie Lyon, commander of the 57th 
Operation Group at Nellis, ‘At the end of the duty day, you walk out of the 
deployment and walk back into the rest of life in America. 
 
A 1940 army pamphlet given to new recruits in World War II explained what it 
was like to experience war: ‘YOU’LL BE SCARED. You’ll be frightened at the 
uncertainty, at the thought of being killed.’ By contrast, described one Predator 
pilot, “Most of the time, I get to fight the war, and go home and see the wife and 
kids at night.’ Another talked about flying missions in Afghanistan, and then 
getting home in time to watch reruns of the TV sitcom Friends. (p. 330) 
 
 
Unfortunately, a mostly rural population estimated to be about 3,341,070 people 
in 2000, according to official Pakistani sources, remains at large in a deadly crossfire, 
trying to find refuge in the midst of a situation that may very well exemplify what 
Secretary Janet Napolitano has redescribed as man-caused disasters. Slat y (1995) 
reminds us what Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic said: 
 
The fall of Communism can be regarded as a sign that modern thought –based on 
the premise that the world is objectively knowable, and that knowledge so 
obtained can be absolutely generated- has come to a final crisis… It is a signal 
that the era of arrogant, absolutist reason is drawing to a close… and that we have 
to see the pluralism of the world, and not bind it by seeking common 
denominators or reducing everything to a single common equation… Sooner or 
later, politics will be faced with the task of finding a new postmodern face. (p. 24) 
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CHAPTER IV 
IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY 
 
 It is often difficult to figure out just what the future will look like. Science fiction 
has embedded in our contemporary society both wild expectations and early acceptance 
of technologies that are not fully developed. It is widely known, for example, how helpful 
Star Trek was for Bill Gates in selling his small and easy to use computers to the public. 
The same is happening with robots from movies like Star Wars and I, Robot. But the 
commercial success of a movie like Avatar, for example, suggests that despite all the 
technological development some things, like identity, though googable, remain an 
underground mystery.   
 
Undoing Obliviousness 
Depending upon the way you want to look at it, Guillermo Del Toro’s (2006) 
Pan's Labyrinth is the study of a rationale for Western politics in conventional terms or a 
spirited effort to redescribe it. The lashing of its text aesthetically unfolds its moral 
marrow through a sophisticated wealth of visual detail, heightened by the hospitable 
possibility of multiple meaning that its script engenders. Del Toro’s poetic texture 
graphically flirts and tinkers with power. It describes how allegiances ar  acquired and 
graphically depicts how they are exercised. Simultaneously, but in a rather subliminal 
way, it also sways an incisive notion of social hope that is quaintly connected to a sense
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of redemptive transgression. The intricateness of these two elements, the searc  of 
identity and the search of otherness, is precisely what constitutes, I believe, th  greatest 
philosophical appeal of the film. I use Guillermo Del Toro’s movie as a structuring text 
for a semiotic journey though the issues of suffering, cruelty, and responsibility to 
otherness as seen through the eyes of popular culture. 
I must explain first that the selection of this film and the previous one as well, is 
not a random event. Kristin Herzog (1993) raises and interesting philosophical and 
curricular question in Finding Their Voice, Peruvian Women’s Testimonies of War: 
“How does the portrayal of war, peace, and survival relate to what we tradition lly call 
literature?” I follow her appeal to understand the term in its widest sense and inscribe it in 
the larger frame of what Richard Rorty (1989) calls solidarity. The process of coming to 
see other human beings as “one of us” rather than as “them,” asserts Rorty (1989), and I 
agree, is basically a matter of detailed description of what “unfamiliar people” are like 
and of redescription of how we ourselves are like. Oddly enough, though, this is not a 
task for philosophy, political philosophy, or for any other theory –he says- but for genres 
such as ethnography, the journalist’s report, the comic book, the docudrama, the novel, 
the movie, and the TV program. “They have gradually, but steadily, replaced the sermon 
and the treatise as the principal vehicles of moral change and progress” (p. xvi). I explore 
his postmodern assertion here: 
 
The right way to take the slogan ‘We have obligations to human beings simply as 
such’ is a means of reminding ourselves to keep trying to expand our sense of ‘us’ 
as far as we can. That slogan urges us to extrapolate further in the direction s t by 
certain events in the past –the inclusion among ‘us’ of the family in the next cave, 
then of the tribe across the river, then of the tribal confederation beyond the 
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mountains, then of the unbelievers beyond the seas (and, perhaps, last of all, of 
the menials who, all this time, have been doing our dirty work). This is a process 
which we should try to keep going. We should stay on the lookout for 
marginalized people- people whom we still instinctively think of as ‘they’ rather 
than ‘us’ (p. 196). 
 
 
Consequently, I situate myself in a site that is temporary, contingent, ambiguous, 
and densely populated by binary oppositions. I call it a site of hermeneutical conflict. At 
the same time, I situate myself in front of one of Coppola’s mirrors and I let language 
flow with curiosity towards displacement, defenses, and affect. Just like Matina Dwyer 
did. Paying attention, as Deborah Britzman (2006) suggests, “to guarded statemen s, 
utterances that mislead, misrecognize and abject, and taking note of the little procedures 
of resistance to interpretation that service desire” (p. 6).  What actually differentiates this 
position in learning -she says-, what dissociates and confuses, is when one position 
forecloses the capacity to think of its other, to reflect upon one’s representations, even if 
it requires wild speculation that exceeds conscious experience. 
Del Toro’s formal argument takes us to an era of tyranny and bloodshed –the rural 
1944 Spain in the still violent aftermath of the 1936-1939 Spanish civil war- but also, in a 
rather unannounced detour, carries us further and deeper to a sort of parallel realm of
existence, where we are urged to associate, perhaps again, unexpectedly, with meanings 
of things which, in the best case, we might have thought we had already forgotten. I have 
used the film and its sublime invitation to undo obliviousness as a pretext for creative 
writing in my work as a Spanish Teacher. Pretty much like a Rorschach test, the caliber 
of the emotional responses it provoked in my students informed more about the viewers 
and the writers than about the characters portrayed in the movie. When hosting an open 
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ended site like this, the fictional and mythological components of the movie become 
provocative representations of excess of desire, volatility of affect, and playful meaning. 
But, mainly, the film works both as a collective mirror and as a gateway to more flexible 
understandings of what we take as reality.  
In that sense, when the formal argument alludes to politics and we decode the 
language in modern Western political science categories, we are confronted with a basic 
dynamic that revolves around two opposing poles: the search for community and 
harmony and the pursuit of power. Benesetto Fontana (2002) explains in Gramsci on 
Politics and State, that politics is the activity that searches the common ground or space 
within which the common good or public end may be pursued, but, concurrently, it is also 
a competitive struggle for interest and advantage:  
 
Coercion and persuasion, force and consent, domination and leadership, together 
describe and constitute the defining and essential character of the political such 
that the in Gramsci is characterized by two analytically separate, but historically 
and mutually penetrating, spheres: civil society, on the one hand, and the 
bureaucratic/military/administrative apparatus, on the other. Liberals, whether 
classical or contemporary, see the former as the sphere of private action and 
private initiative and the latter as the sphere of public/political interest. (p. 160) 
 
From a psychoanalytical perspective, though, as Britzman (2006) so interestingly 
explains in Novel Education (2006), contrary feelings and opposite poles like the ones 
explained above are grouped under the experience of the sublime. This is a site, she 
observes, “where thought encounters its limits and becomes groundlessness, thereby 
alienating its perception.” When thought becomes sublime -she continues-, there isa sort 
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of madness, “we are unable to turn away from our fascination of being, at least 
momentarily, without our own nature to comprehend ourselves” (p. 7).  
In the movie, Ofelia, an eleven year old girl, is trapped in a violent crossfire 
between the marauding guerillas of Spanish anarchism and the fascist soldiers of th  
world under General Franco. Her mother, Carmen, has married a brutal outpost 
commander, Capitán Vidal, who is portrayed as the embodiment of evil. Capitán Vidal 
rules absolutely unchallenged over a domain where whatever he says is done. Everyone is 
a subject and anyone can be tortured or shot at a moment's notice. Against him, 
outmanned, are the guerillas hiding in the surrounding mountains and their secret 
sympathizers within Vidal's own household, near the old mill, including a quietly 
troubled housekeeper, Mercedes, and an equally troubled but outspoken Dr. Ferreiro. 
The notions of politics in general and fascism in particular are presented as an 
appealing and sophisticated design. Capitán Vidal is not the typical villain. He is always 
well-dressed, well-groomed, and well-spoken. He sends an elegant limousine to trasp rt 
Carmen, his new wife and takes his glove off to greet her as he acknowledges her 
pregnancy. He gets up from his chair when a lady enters the room, dislikes burned coffe , 
indicates how he prefers his supper, delights in fine tobacco, rides a magnificent Arabian 
horse, enjoys music, and hosts an elegant dinner. Through all these carefully crafted 
detail, Del Toro seems to suggest that one of the dangers of politics and power when they 
flirt with evil in our world is, precisely, that it is very attractive. It is attr ctive to such an 
extent that most people, unable to undo the oblivion, will simply deny it. In that respect, 
Britzman (2006) explains very poignantly, and I agree, that “what brings language, 
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interpretation, and reflection its purpose is that these intrigues of meaning both address 
the Other and invite our own Otherness” (p. 5).  
But if fascism is portrayed as an attractive evil, on the other hand, anarchism does 
not have a happy ending. It is portrayed as a lottery ticket, a gamble, as someone blinded 
by the sun, as someone who used to believe in fairy tales, as someone with urgent reasons 
to leave, as someone with urgent reasons to stay, with occasional victories, but 
irremediably sad as a lullaby hummed to a murdered child because the lyrics have been 
forgotten. In this case, says Britzman (2006), and very pertinently so, “it is the p yche 
that suffers, that suffers the passion of a missing object,” reminding us that “ublimation 
cannot prevent unhappiness even if its productions leave us happy” (p. 7).  
Del Toro’s redescription of political philosophy considers politics, and the 
allegiances it generates, from the other side of the mirror. They are a so t of intuition, a 
felt absence. He urges us to place our imagination in the gap produced precisely wher  
our representation was not able to capture the object. It is in this way that politics l osens 
up, looses its modern essence, and becomes instrumental, hopefully, in service of a more 
democratic understanding. An interesting dialogue about choices takes place around 
Capitán Vidal’s abundant dinner table as he informs his guests about his strategy to 
defeat the guerrillas through strict control of access to resources with a ra ion card: 
 
Guest:   We know you are not here by choice. 
Capitan:   You are wrong! I chose to be here because I want my son to be 
born in a new clean Spain. Because these people hold the mistaken 
belief that we are all equal. But there is a great difference: the war 
is over and we won. And if we need to kill every one of these 
vermin to settle it, then we will kill them all, and that’s it. We are 
all here by choice! 
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Guests: By Choice! [Toasting] 
 
I argue that the message in Del Toro’s imagery is that the modern sense of 
responsibility to act from a particular point of view, whatever it may be, should be 
subordinated to something more important portrayed as a restraining mood that can be 
described as a sense of responsibility to otherness. Clearly, choices are emphasized and 
vested in deontological resolve, but the reason or the idea behind them are not what 
matters, but the choice itself. One may choose to be destructive or one may choose to be 
love-giving. Each choice defines, each time, who we are and what politics is.  
 
Moral Progress 
The traditional philosophical way of describing what we mean as “human 
solidarity”, says Rorty (1989), is that there is “something within each of us that resonates 
to the presence of this same thing in other human beings” (p. 189). He argues, though, 
from a point of view that coincides with Del Toro’s restraining mood, that we better “try 
not to want something which stands beyond history and institutions” (p. 189). His 
warning is rooted in the historical evidence that suggests that the force of “us” is, 
typically, in contrast with the force of a “they”, which also happens to be made up of 
human beings, who in a contrastive logic, happen to be the “wrong” kind of human 
beings and, unfortunately, too often and too easily wiped off.   Rorty considers, for 
example, the attitude of contemporary American liberals to the unending hopelessness 
and misery of the lives of the young blacks in American cities –just like those drowning 
for TV after Hurricane Katrina-, as typical.  “Do we say that these people must be helped 
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because they are our fellow human beings? –he asks.- We may, but it is more persuasive, 
morally as well as politically , to describe them as our fellow Americans –to insist that it 
is outrageous that an American should live without hope.” The important point he makes 
is that “our sense of solidarity is at its strongest when those with whom solidarity s 
expressed are thought of as ‘one of us,’ where ‘us’ means something smaller and more 
local than the human race.” (p. 191) 
It is for that reason that Rorty (1989) argues for an understanding of solidarity as 
“the ability to see more and more traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race customs, 
and the like) as unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and 
humiliation” (p. 192). This is precisely what happens when Ofelia brings the other, her 
baby brother, and her own otherness to the labyrinth upon the Faun’s request: 
 
Faun: Quick, Your Highness… Give him to me. The full moon is high in the 
sky. We can open the portal.  
Ofelia: Why is that in your hand? [The faun holds the dagger that Ofelia retrieved 
from the toad’s stomach.] 
Faun: The portal will open only if we offer the blood of an innocent. Just a drop 
of blood. A pinprick, that’s all… It’s the final task… hurry! 
Ofelia: [Ofelia nods negatively.] [Faun gets upset.] 
Faun: You promised to obey me without questioning! Give me the boy! 
Ofelia: No! My brother stays with me! 
Faun:  You would give up your sacred rights for this brat you barely know? 
Ofelia: Yes, I would! 
Faun:  You would give up your throne for him? He who has caused you such 
misery!? Such humiliation!? 
Ofelia: Yes, I would! [Camera opens up and allows viewer to see Capitan Vidal 
walking towards Ofelia holding a gun.] 
Faun: As you wish… Your Highness… [Faun makes a reverence.] 
 
Before Ofelia re-embodies Princess Moana, before she is metaphorically admitted 
to the parallel realm of existence, the Faun had already explained to her that “We have to 
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make sure that your essence is intact, that you have not become a mortal.” But in her 
attempt to become Moana, the daughter of the moon, Ofelia, the mortal, arrives to th  
conclusion that humanity is flawed, imperfect, and should be loved because of that, not in 
spite of that.  It is in her search for Moana, in her search of identity, that Ofelia found her 
own otherness. She made herself another. The wording of the Faun is as deceitful as the 
tasks he gives her; it seems to suggest the existence of a human core self. Ofelia is not 
concerned about that, and neither is Del Toro. Notice that she doesn’t have any 
recollection of previous knowledge or experience. She questions everything that doesn’
seem right to her. She breaks rules as she moves forward. Finally the last test pu s her at a 
crossroads: to kill or to affirm someone else’s life putting her own life at risk. She 
chooses the latter. Was her essence intact? Had she become a mortal? Trying to make you 
respond to these questions is a playful diversion. He wants us to talk about moral 
progress. I argue that the key is the w  expressly implicated in the Fauns warning. That is 
what needs to be discerned. It is the expansion of her sense of “us”, as Rorty (1989) 
would say, what is sublimated here; not the “recognition” of something previously 
recorded, but an “expansion of her sense of solidarity” (p. 197). That is what keeps her 
choice, as well as ours, as the focus. 
 
Redeeming Transgressions 
Visually, Pan's Labyrinth starts with a plain text which is automatically assumed 
as a preface of historical information. Emphasized white fonts that make contrast wi h a 
black background, immediately anchor our mind not only to a particular time and 
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historical context, but to a mood set by oppositional dichotomies. A sound of wind that 
can hardly be perceived, played as we are directed to read the text, though, starts telling, 
at the same time, what seems to be a different story which is immediately picked up, with 
the singular language of fairy tales, by the voice of an omniscient narrator. The film then 
unfolds as a flashback, and, apparently, switches back and forth between the worlds of 
fantasy and reality, just to navigate the interstices of our mind and heart in search of 
portals to reconnect with alternative meanings.  
What we are led to perceive as a magical realm is, though, always present. We are
led to think about it as a separate space through the appearance of a dragonfly -which to 
start the climax of the story and reinforce the dichotomy, transforms itself into a Disney 
like fairy-, and through Ofelia’s exploration of a labyrinth that physically leads to a space 
that was long ago carved under ground, and is described by Mercedes as “just a pile of
old rocks that have always been there… even before the mill;” and into which, she 
recommends Ofelia, not to get because “you may get lost.” It is in this language of 
dichotomy where hermeneutical possibility is inscribed. The director, though, continues 
to play with us. There are several elements along the visual text that belong to both 
worlds, the real and magical, suggesting that it is not just an overlap, but, in fact, a false 
dichotomy. The possibilities of going up to the mountain and down to the labyrinth are 
not but a direct challenge to the establishment. The dying tree exists and continues to 
live, die, and resurrect through a blooming flower behind the mill. The fact that there is 
no way other than the chalk door for Ofelia to get from her room to Capitán Vidal's office 
to rescue her brother, as well as the fact that there is no way for him other the hedge that 
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opens in the labyrinth to get to the portal and seize him back, are just a few of them. The 
insistence of such a separation is so powerful that Mercedes cries for Ofelia and we feel 
for her.  
Human history, according to Howard Zinn (2007), is not only about competition 
and cruelty, it is also about “compassion, sacrifice, courage, and kindness” (p. 270). Del 
Toro’s experiment with the absurd is just that, a note to self, a reminder to make the 
decision to listen to the voice of otherness, and not to conform to the expectations of 
others apparently more powerful, as a way to set a higher moral standard for our lives. 
His production is creativity symbolically used to prevent evil from winning. I that sense, 
it is both an act of resistance and a site for redeeming prospective projection.  
Hope for social justice cannot be explained in a linear way and, of course, it does 
not happen in the vacuum. In Del Toro’s account it is portrayed as a labyrinth where the 
outcome of one’s decisions is indelibly marked by the morality of one’s choices. “The 
world is a cruel place; and you’ll learn that even if it hurts”, says Carmen, Of lia’s 
mother, as she refuses to listen to her daughter’s plea, which she considers absurd and a 
distorted perception of reality. “Magic does not exist! Not for you, me, or anyone else!” 
she continues, as she starts dying together with a mandrake root which, squirming in the 
midst of fire, becomes as human as Carmen allowed herself to be in a patriarchal society 
that commodified and terrified women who were unable to perceive the line between 
needing help and being submissive in order to get it. 
“Why is the psychical so incredible?” asks Britzman (2006). Why is it such an 
incredible endeavor? Not few of my students described Ofelia as schizophrenic. That is 
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very symptomatic. Going back to those creative writing exercises in order to undo 
obliviousness, the conflictive issue always seemed to be judging the worthiness of 
feelings as ideas. Del Toro summons our unconsciousness and invites its meanings for 
the dogmatic part of us to loose its grip. “The psychical spans ideas, perceptions, affect, 
consciousness, the unconscious, and the drives. Reality, too, will loose its transparency 
because perception will be a question of passion…” explains Britzman (2006). Del 
Toro’s movie is an interesting postmodern expression of politics that creates the 
possibility of a visual understanding of a complex intersubjective dialogue about
contingency and solidarity.  
 
 Contingency and Solidarity 
 
We have to start from where we are –this is part of the force of Sellar’s claim that 
we are under no obligations other than the ‘we-intentions’ of the communities 
with which we identify. What takes the curse off this ethnocentrism is not that the 
largest such group is ‘humanity’ or ‘all rational beings’ –no one, I  have been 
claiming, can make that identification- but rather, that it is the ethnocentrism of a 
‘we’ (we liberals’) which is dedicated to enlarging itself, to creating a  ever larger 
and more variegated ethnos. It is the ‘we’ of the people who have been brought up 
to distrust ethnocentrism (P. 198)  
 
This is what Rorty (1989) says about cruelty and solidarity. Is it possible, then, to 
imagine a world without politics?  Del Toro answers this question through the voice of 
the omniscient narrator, at the beginning of the film: “A long time ago, in the 
Underground Realm, where there are no lies or pain, there lived a princess who dreamt of 
the human world…” He chooses a dichotomy to start unfolding his story, and, then, a 
dichotomy within a dichotomy to continue, just to finish it imploding the whole construct 
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with a paradox. People think that when they talk about politics, they are making referenc 
to something intrinsically negative. I don’t think it is. In suggesting extrapolations, 
though, Ofelia refers to her mother’s pregnancy as “she is sick with baby”, the 
imprisoned and tortured anarchist begs Dr. Ferreiro to kill him “please” –without us 
knowing whether he doesn’t want to suffer any longer or if he is punishing himself for 
having “talked,” and Ofelia tells her still unborn brother the story of a magic rose that 
blossoms every night just to die with the morning light “unable to bequeath its magic gift 
of immortal life to anyone who plucked it.”  Del Toro’s text presents politics as a 
contingency, as something fragile, sublime, and constructed as memory. When Capitá  
Vidal knows his life is coming to a violent and abrupt end, he holds his father’s watch in 
his hand, and asks Mercedes, who has received his son in symbolic adoption, to pass it on 
to him and to tell him, just as his own father did, “at what time his father died”. Holding 
the symbol of his contradictions in his right hand, horrified, Capitán Vidal dies the 
loneliest death of all when Mercedes denies him the privilege of history: “No, -she says 
with determination- he won’t even know your name.” Del Toro reminds us, 
extraordinarily, that the unconscious may eliminate reality but cannot be eliminated by it 
so easily. Which reminds me of Appiah’s (2005) questions to approach history from the 
ethical self: whose story are we going to tell? And, where are we goingto embed it?  
Finally, after this metaphorical preamble, how do security, identity, and education 
fit together in this discussion? As a lawyer, for example, I can understand murder for 
passion. I not only understand it, but I suggest that all of us condone it through a legal 
system that punishes it less severely as opposed to a more rational crime (given that a 
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crime could be considered rational); through a system that treats it as something that 
happens when we are out of our minds. Another sort of madness. But as a lawyer and an 
educator, I also know that law has nothing to do with morality. In this sense, I agree with 
Del Toro, who neither understands nor condones murder for an idea. In his eyes, to kill 
for the "right" idea, be it patriotism, nationalism, liberty, or, even democracy, is perverse. 
Capitán Vidal is the embodiment of that perversity, but most importantly, an appeal and 
invitation to our collective unconsciousness: his resistance to rationality, his loyalty to 
pleasure, and cancellation of time is like being ruled by unruly laws. For Britzman (2006) 
“this incontinent law is itself an aesthetic undertaking, for there the world is transformed, 
conviction is made, affect is given free reign, and new realities are creatd” (p. 9).  
Something similar happens with the notion of war on terror. The preface to the 
movie is, curiously, a contradictory statement: “the civil war is over…” but, as we 
continue to read, it is really not over… “Hidden in the mountains, armed groups are still 
fighting the new Fascist regime that fights to exterminate them…” So the questions that 
Del Toro seems to pose here would be: what keeps wars going and what is it that, finally, 
will make them stop? He seems to suggest to give a look to the minimum terms of 
settlement of those who are in combat. Capitán Vidal laid his terms in an absolute tone, 
and the anarchists refused to consider exile because they had nothing else to loose other 
than their own alienated lives. The conflict scenario seems to be endless. But Del Toro 
does not leave us without another clue. Once Mercedes is captured, an interesting 
dialogue takes place between a hands-tied Mercedes and an all-powerful Capitán Vidal: 
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Capitán Vidal: [talking to Garcés, his lieutenant, who has expressed 
doubts about leaving him alone with Mercedes in the 
torture room.] For God’s sake, she’s just a woman! 
Mercedes: That’s what you’ve always thought! That is why I was able 
to get away with it. I was invisible to you! 
Capitán Vidal: Damn… You’ve found my weakness: Pride. But it’s your 
weak points we’re interested in… 
 
 
Del Toro reminds us that those weak points, in other words, the possibility of 
suffering and pain, are the ultimate reference which we, as humans, share as relity. In 
Del Toro’s portrayal of the human condition, war is sublime. It expresses a fear of loss. 
 
Something Cultural 
In his essay The Optimism of Uncertainty, Howard Zinn (2007) reflects on how a 
person, in the midst of war and injustice, can manage “to stay socially engaged, 
committed to the struggle, and remain healthy without burning out or becoming resigned 
or cynical” (p. 267). His response is like anything simple: “if we do act, in however small 
a way, we don’t have to wait for some grand utopian future...to live now as we think 
human beings should live, in defiance of all that is bad around us, is itself a marvelous 
victory” (p. 270). This simplicity, though, encompasses a uniquely radical perspective; 
one that breeds a dynamic of passion that is not exhausted by rational calculation, but 
reflects and diffracts the very complex process of learning into its unerring meaning. Zinn 
shows a particular interest in the underlying phenomenology of what is considered 
historically relevant, and places his focus on the person herself rather than on the events. 
He is not only critical and keen to the ease with which historical explanations can easily 
be turned into self-serving justifications, but through his historiography, Zinn speaks to 
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possibility. Just like Copolla’s mirrors and Del Toro’s underground world. Each issue he 
depicts, each dilemma he unfolds, each voice he echoes, opens up and refers to a 
particular kind of being-in-the-world. And the most inspiring treat of his writing is that in 
each case, the person described is not a stranger, but someone we ourselves, at one time 
or another, could have been, or even better, could become. 
Zinn’s greatest treat as a historian, I believe, is that he openly acknowledges that 
his writing is not neutral and that through it he wants to bring into the light those 
marvelous victories mentioned above. Further more, as he explains in If History Is to Be 
Creative (2007), he feels the need to feature those many “unreported acts of resistance 
against the power of the Establishment” (p. 11) because, for him, at the end of the day, 
the standard scholarly practice of history minimizes our present freedom by privileging 
Truth at the expense of truthfulness. As a result, the historical material with which he 
deals as an intellectual is not just a matter of objectivity, balance, and methodological 
distance, but from a philosophical perspective, the only truth that may interest him, if any 
at all, is rather problematical, unfinished, unpretending, and most of all, alive.  As an 
activist, there is no doubt; he walks the talk seeking to inspire others as he highlights t e 
creative power of ordinary people struggling for a better world. And, as a socially 
engaged human being himself, he certainly believes that even though our future is 
unpredictable, change can certainly be induced; that speaking truthfully is a far more 
fitting ambition than speaking the Truth; and that “rebellion often starts as something 
cultural” (p. 16). It is precisely in that something cultural where Zinn, Copolla and Del 
Toro coincide.  I describe it as the pedagogical site where dissent is expresed and 
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consciousness and unconsciousness shaped. I propose to see it also as the site where th  
concept of history can be demystified and where the notion of self becomes more fluid.  
 
The Self as a Stream of Symbols 
From his unique and transformative point of view,  Zinn believes that “to 
anticipate a possible future without denying the past, it [History] should… emphasize 
new possibilities by disclosing those hidden episodes of the past when, even if in brief 
flashes, people showed their ability to resist, to join together, and occasionally t  win” 
(p.11). His systematic effort to highlight the morality of the choices of those particul  
individuals to speak out, and the description of those acts as an expression of dissonance 
of intrinsic historical value is an important contribution to a postmodern historical 
analysis. Of the sort, but from a philosophical perspective, Bauman (1995) highlights the 
“endemic and incurable ambivalence of the moral primal scene –the scene of moral 
choices and the scene of discovery of the morality of choices—in which any 
consequences are begotten, by design or by default” (p. 9). His unorthodox cut to 
understand the “ambivalent appurtenances of postmodern life”, those of which “we do 
not yet know whether they are hurdles or springboards; and which, for all we know, may 
yet become either” (p. 9) is also an important contribution to a postmodern philosophical 
analysis.  
I situate my reflection about curriculum and education, the process of shaping 
personal identity, and how the concepts of  threat and security affect them within this 
postmodern reasoning framework; one where the human mind is, by definition, always 
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transforming itself and operating within a moral space. In this sense, the stream of 
symbolism that can be generated as I share my reflection on the issues portrayed in these 
films, for example, reveal that you and I can be seen as selves moving in a certain space 
of questions. I feel that there is an intriguing sort of need to symbolize and an equally
strong and puzzling further need to symbolize our own symbolizations as a way to 
understand them. What I have learned is that, because of --and even despite of- our 
capacity to see and understand ourselves as observers and observed, our boundaries as 
objects of learning and subjects who learn may completely become blurred. When that 
happens, there is no room for dichotomies. We are selves on the make as we address the 
other and, inadvertedly, in the mega-process, we are completely unable to avoid inviting 
our own unconscious otherness. In the symbolization of symbolization, neither I nor you 
can avoid informing the objects in hand of our love, hate, curiosity, aggression and earlier 
conflicts and, as Britzman (2006) says, in that way, we end up as a surplus, as a 
difference in the equation that, through this experience, returns to the work of learning s 
we read each other between the lines, loosening meaning “from our intentions as 
interpreters, and interpreting those gaps as expressing our unconscious meaning.” (p. 25)  
 
Damnosa Hereditas 
Navigating through strangely sublimated texts and freely diving to explore the 
interstices where moral choice and the morality of choices are sedimented, without the 
linearity of a traditional academic approach, should generate a serene and yt vivid sense 
of humanity as an emotional contend, as an intriguing but compelling undertake of affect, 
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and should allow a flowing sense of persona, encumbered, embedded, and yet open to 
change, able to negotiate among risks, and, most of all, able to indulge in uncertainty.  As 
human beings, we are frail. This is why cultivating our individuality is, as it should, the 
most social endeavor. That is what a learning site is all about. We are formed, insists 
Appiah (2005) “it is our nature to shape our nature” (p.211).  And this is how each of our 
selves may become a site of convergence, a time to depotentiate our inertia, a place to be 
diacritical, an exception to what it was sensed as our duty or considered de igueur; an 
opportunity to become deffrangible, a challenge to give away our burdensome 
inheritance, and a need to affirm a mayor purpose in life. What Appiah says is true: we, 
as individuals, are a constant “interpretive response” (p. 163) to the changing social, 
semantic, and material contexts in which we live.  
This is where what I understand as Curriculum, in particular, and Education, in 
general, plays a significant role. Copolla, Del Toro, Appiah, and Zinn not only raise a 
pertinent curricular question: whose story shall we tell? But they also coincide  a 
sensible and legitimate pedagogical one: Where will we embed that narrative? This 
questioning allows criticality as an abluent mechanism. It generates a d mocratic moment 
and a democratic space to nurture a self of that kind, let’s say, an abluent self. A self that 
refuses to be reduced to the role of an adiaphoretic amanuensis, secluded in a scriptorium, 
and condemned to a lack telic resolve. Contrariwise, our abluent self, exudes sensibility, 
thrives in the public space, and through this renewed aesthesia, tells about a tell. Once 
beyond her alcazar, outside his citadel, the transumptive self talks about the mound of 
accumulated debris over the site of an ancient settlement.  Charles Guignon (2004) 
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captures it well: “we are not just tellers of a story, nor are we something told. We are a 
telling” (p. 127); and this means that we are something we do, that our embedding in a 
social context is what prompts our creativity, and that we should experience the past as a 
set of resources carried forward to achieving what we hope to accomplish. In that sense, I 
believe, education is an expressive project and not just a merely descriptive endeavor. In 
this project we educate each other in an encounter where every ascribed meaning is 
haunted by its excluded other. Instead of trusting say-so and dictum, it is practical and 
tries with dialogue, negotiation, and democracy. It can be seen as a movement outward, a 
migration, and an e-motion, but also as mystical in the sense Don Cupitt (1998) explains, 
in “the way the strange magical world of symbolic meanings holds the common world,
the world of human life, in the hollow of its hand.” (p. 10).  In the end, Education is a 
perspective to be developed at a crossroads, an unhinging critical point, and a juncture 
with a possible future. For Slattery (1995) the challenge of postmodernism is to move to 
post-formal thinking as a new zone of cognition.  “Postmodernism challenges educators 
to explore a worldview that envisions schooling through a different lens of 
indeterminacy, aesthetics, autobiography, intuition, eclecticism, and mystery.” (p. 23)
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CHAPTER V 
A STATE OF EMERGENCY 
   
 Writing, here, following Vivian Gornick (2001) is like a conversation… verbal 
skills do not suffice if the conversationalist does not understand the difference betwen a 
conversation and two monologues. Listening, reciprocity, and turn taking reside at the 
heart of the activity. Like conversing, writing also calls for a double perspective. Only as 
a teacher of writing in a foreign language did I learn that to know who is speaking, what 
is being said, and what is the relation between the two had become not only a way of 
making thoughtful sense of our own experience, but mainly a way of being, and of 
becoming. 
 
A Time of Fear 
I remember it perfectly. It was one of those moments when the sullen Andean 
temperature, after an intensely bright and rather warm day of spring, abruptly drops for 
an uncompromising freezing cold to fill the air probing both the hardness of the rocks and 
the inveteracy of human bones. It was October 17, 1986, at dusk. I was walking back 
home, after work, trying to get through the crowd, as I usually did. When, all of a sudden, 
out of nowhere, that voice and those words hit me like a bolt of lightning: “¡Sabemos 
quién eres!” It was a fierce and lurid moment. “We know who you are!” That was what it 
was saying… I cautiously turned towards the voice in a naïve attempt to see frm where 
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it was coming and, perhaps, deeply hopeful, recognize one of those who so boisterously 
arrogated such a knowledge. I saw him very briefly, pointing at me. I could not tell apart. 
And, yet, there he was, deliberately bespeaking to me. For an eternal second, he stared at 
me and said absolutely nothing else, but managed to push me to the profound abyss of an 
existential black hole. His physical attributes out cried his Andean ancestry, hi  height 
revealed his Western tangencies, his tone carried a distinctive militant feature, his 
surreptitious appearance exposed a disquiet intention, and his whole body language laid 
bare scourge. The freezing cold that filled up the air cut its way, unrestrain d, through the 
meanders and interstices of my human condition, a frail and assailable condition; and 
while I searched for my soul, after another eternal second, he went back to the place from 
where he came, dusk became night, and I found myself submerged in a quarry of fear and 
densely populated by urgent reasons.  
In 1980 a newfangled relationship between violence and state power was 
established in Peru, my home country. The horror I witnessed as a citizen escaped every 
single possibility of description at that time. It was not just because simple language 
could not give an accurate account of what was happening, but because it was dangerous 
to describe. Murder, disappearing, and massive torture were matched by the aloofn ss, 
ineptitude, and loafing of those who could have prevented a humanitarian catastrophe and 
did not. As an ethically concerned law student I struggled not only to fully grasp the 
complex dynamic between justice and security in a country that could not exhibit long 
and deep democratic traditions, but just to comprehend the striking morbid battle to 
describe every single space of reality. The point of departure for that new relationship has 
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been located exactly in May of 1980, when a then little-known-left-wing party, the 
Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso, carried out its first acción armada by 
burning ballot boxes in Chuschis, Ayacucho, a small and remote Andean town, during the 
first general elections after twelve years of military government and hundreds of neglect. 
During the twelve years that followed, Sendero Luminoso unraveled its theater of 
operations from the rural Andean highlands to the capital city of Lima. Its increasing 
reliance on targeted killings of local government officials, exemplary punishments, 
destruction of state infrastructure, and random bombings was described by the 
shortsighted media based in Lima with overwhelming disdain for the detail concerni g 
those who suffered violence and their scenarios, and contributed to create and maintain a 
deceitful and overly simplified sense of domestic violence far from the real tragedy 
brought forth by human beings against other human beings. In an attempt to unsettle that 
process and affect memory Piedad Pareja Pflücker and I (1989) documented in 
Municipios y Terrorismo, Impacto de la Violencia Política en el Gobierno Local, the 
circumstances, places, and names of those who adhered the democratic possibilities of the 
country and dramatically embodied their responsibility to others in the context of political 
violence.  Naming them and drawing their human face was an act of resistance to those 
who from both sides of the spectrum demonstrated a deep contempt and disregard for the 
most dispossessed.  
The political violence of Sendero Luminoso was indeed met with equal force by 
the Peruvian armed forces. They unabashedly displayed the skills and adopted the 
strategies of counterinsurgency very well learned at the School of the Americas, in 
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Panama. According to the Final Report of the Peruvian Comisión Nacional de La Verdad 
y Reconciliación (2003), around 898 Peruvian high officers were trained by the CIA 
between 1980 and 1996. Political pressure of human rights organizations forced the 
Pentagon to declassify between 1996 and 1997 seven manuals produced in Spanish by 
the intelligence agency that were used to disseminate the doctrine of national security 
amongst a selected group of Peruvian military officers as well as other Latin American 
high ranks from Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, El Salvador, and Venezuela. In the context of the war on 
terror, it is important to know that, according to this source, the content of those manuals 
directly comes from what was known as “Project X” (Foreign Intelligence Assistance 
Program, U.S. Army Intelligence School) designed for intelligence training directed to 
U.S. allies around the world. Of particular interest is the fact that this project, housed in 
Fort Huachuca, Arizona, nurtured itself from the experience of the war in Vietnam, and 
was the site where all the resources generated for that conflict were not only preserved 
but eventually recycled to become the concept of “low intensity warfare.” (p. 314) The 
arbitrary detentions, occasional killings in confrontations with demonstrators, cruel 
mistreatment, exile and deportation with which the state had previously confronted the 
opposition and popular movement, gave way to more drastic modes of exemplary 
violence aimed against the civilian population, popular leaders, and grassroots and left-
wing organizations.  Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique (2002) accurately described the 
scenario in War and the Privatized State. A Peruvian Parable: 
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In rural areas, paramilitary and military death caravans carried out tortre, ape, 
and executions; college professors and students disappeared from dormitories; 
entire peasant villages were relocated into strategic places; thousands of people 
suffered systematic police harassment and arbitrary detention; journalists, 
lawyers, and relatives of alleged subversives were executed, arrested, or 
disappeared. Although international human rights monitors amply documented all 
of these abuses, state proclamations concerning a “just war” against terrorism met 
their objections (p. 153). 
 
 
But Sendero Luminoso also exceeded the mostly ceremonial embrace of 
revolutionary violence that had characterized the Peruvian left. In a dramatic reversal 
from this tradition of class-based unrelenting violence, Sendero Luminoso turned its 
fierceness toward those who occupied any sort of middle ground between its own 
fundamentalist positions and those of the state. It executed leaders of many unions, 
peasant federations, women’s groups, neighborhood organizations, and student 
federations who had not pledged allegiance to them. Activists, public office candidates, 
nuns, priests, evangelical preachers, nongovernmental organization workers, and local 
government functionaries were also intimidated, threatened, or targeted, often in public 
executions. Sendero Luminoso’s cells in the rural areas also used exemplary punishment 
to retain control over peasant communities. In the cities, S ndero Luminoso carried out 
random bombings and shootings of passers-by and bus and cab drivers to enforce the 
organization’s armed strikes. For the Andean peasants and people living in the highland 
cities and towns caught between the crossfire of so-called terrorists and antiterrorists –to 
paraphrase an influential early report on the Peruvian war by Amnesty International—
Sendero Luminoso’s armed struggle ushered in a new moment in history, called manchay 
tiempo, which in the Pan Andean native language means “time of fear”. In contrast, for 
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most people in the cities, war meant to certain extent a cynical adjustment of our daily 
lives to constant bombings, blackouts, selective surveillance, police roundups and 
military search and checkpoints, until a loud, deadly, and indiscriminate car bombing in 
an upper-middle class residential neighborhood in Lima announced that the war scenario 
had finally arrived to the city in 1992. Through all these acts of violence that started in 
1980, as Poole and Rénique (2002) very well assert, a new form of violence known as 
terrorismo was introduced into the lexicon of Peruvian political life. But, nevertheless, 
the lexicon neither grasped the suffering of the almost seventy thousand persons who 
were murdered or disappeared in those extremely violent circumstances, nor sympathized 
with the agony and loss of dignity of those around them. 
Evicted from a position of urban privilege, without the sense of security with 
which it is usually vested, my first reaction was paranoid: I needed to go to a safe place. I 
rushed to the corner. “There must be a store in the corner”, I thought. I did not know the 
town’s configuration very well yet. But almost always, in small towns of countries like 
my country, there is a little store at the corner. Any corner. I had just arrived a few weeks 
before to Cusco, filled with good intentions and many more assumptions, to work in a 
highly regarded non-government development project. And there it was, the little store, 
as it should. Once there, I felt like a refugee in its refuge. Safe in that particular moment 
and in that particular place, but, nonetheless, feeling very uncomfortable, less than a 
person. I greeted as I went in. Crossroads are always a meeting place. I w s greeted back 
by the people meeting there, maybe other refugees... I will never know. I did not share 
my fear.  
 102
An Ironic Reversal 
The thought of that event has never been gone. I realized sometime later that, in a 
subtle way, it had managed to make its way into a deeper and more complex mood. It 
became part of a collective mindset that supposedly mirrored what was happening in our 
daily lives, as I recall it now, twenty three years later. We used to call it estado de 
emergencia. But this state of emergency was not about an unforeseen combination of 
circumstances –I am afraid- or the resulting state that called for urgent action, as the 
official language pretended. There was nothing unforeseen at that point. It was, rather, 
about a sort of pragmatic acquiescence to war dressed up in stately manner; about the 
scripted collapse of the public space; and, sadly, about the abuse of a carefully crafted 
nuance to conceal our social negation as possibility. In an ironic reversal generated by 
zinnoptics, though, today, as I summon memory to affect me in order to gather 
spontaneous sensations generated by reminisce, embodying Zinn’s (2007) optic to deal 
with history, I see myself as a spectator of an act without ceasing to be part of it, and I 
realize that my narrative is unfinished. So I invite you, following Britzman (2005), to 
read it with expectant regard for what is unsaid as well as for what is said –for its open-
endedness, silences, negative spaces, inexplicable disturbances, and omissions as well as 
for its plain statement. If nothing else you may get a firmer grip of the notion of human 
will and understand how, when conjoined to other faculties like intelligence, judgment, 
hope, or imagination, and, basically due to the weakening produced by this proximity, 
which I want to call the viscosity of the sublime, it may transport you to particula stage 
settings where, in a rather unpretending way, it will prompt the flow your life seem  to 
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bear naturally. In its unbecoming fashion, though, like the picture and its soldier, will 
dissociates itself from these other faculties, and becomes distended, oppressive, as it tries 
to cancel everything else and dominate all aspects of experience.  
I am calling ironic reversal to an odd circumstance when and where something 
acquires an unexpected and unsuspected meaning usually at odds with the original one. I 
another ironic reversal,  I discover my self inhabiting the realm of the aesthetic in order to 
redescribe what happened and I realize that fear is not gone after all. But this makes me 
wonder, though, given the current context of institutionalized fear, if aesthetic 
deliberation practices have the potential to open up and preserve public spaces for 
pedagogical dissonance. I think they can. I think they are. But for that to happen it is 
crucial to consider the democratic possibilities of aesthetics as historically embedded, and 
see them as constant alerts of significant concurrence or convergence of events, and as an 
ironic survey and wry register of important junctures and crossroads.  
Today, for example, while the United States is enmeshed in two wars abroad, the 
minimalism of the attempted terrorist attack on Christmas Day in an airliner bounded to 
Detroit, dramatically reminds us that we still have homework to do in our historical 
understanding of power and meaning introduced by terrorism and on how it is mimicked 
and inscribed in our own interpretive responses to them. It is ironic, for example, that the 
only response to militants in Iraq and Afghanistan that, according to The Wall Street
Journal’s Siobhan Gorman, et. al (2009), have used $26.00 off-the-shelf software to 
intercept live video feeds from U.S. Predator drones, potentially providing them with 
information they need to evade or monitor U.S. military operations, has only been further 
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encryption procedures. It is also ironic that the most sophisticated expression of the 
domestication of war, the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles instead of troops in 
geographical areas where it would be considered politically untenable or too risky has 
introduced now the possibility to redescribe war as a battle that can be fought not only 
without public support but also without soldiers in the front. The pedagogical dissonance 
generated by these events has been so modest that a public, more concerned about their 
own financial crisis, ironically, retains little or no sense of the irony.  
One of the greatest challenges for the immediate future lies in the pedagogical 
experience of redescribing security and reinscribing threats in an alternative framework 
that does not urge to decode everyday life situations as sites for counterintellige c  action 
or enthrones security drills that pretend to fully discipline subjects. Understanding 
curriculum as a process of negotiation of meaning in the midst of uncertainty provides a 
framework for a candid embrace of tension between inheritance and innovation, and to be 
truly open to the movements at the margins of institutional life, viewing them not as 
threats but as opportunities to learn, understand, and make critical comments to our 
ability to self represent. Britzman (2006) says: 
 
Our concern with (…) understanding obstacles to learning as intrinsic to obstacles 
to narrating learning. Here is where the line between that which resists tlling his 
novel story of learning and that which urges one to become a narrator is blurred, 
obscuring the boundary between the object of learning and the subject who learns. 
What kind of testimony to learning reaches into the conditions, values, and effects 
of its own production, including there what escapes and resists its grasp? (p. 1) 
 
Aesthetic deliberation, inevitably, will situate us at challenging junctures and 
crossroads, exactly the kind which, ironically, we can no longer pretend to consume 
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knowing ahead of time whether they are social solvent or social glue, but which, 
precisely for all we do not know, may all the same become both. 
 
A Chronicle of Surprise 
What do ironic reversals have to do with education? As a classroom teacher, when 
my students were ready for the pedagogical experience of expressing the fullness or the 
ambiguity of their ideas and needed to learn how to navigate the more complex and 
sophisticated linguistic structures that the subjunctive mood offers in the Spanish 
language, I usually took a serious departure from the materials that the school district 
offered. They focused in what is called command form. Those pre-elaborated lessons 
rushed the uncritical teacher and unquestioning student to activities that prompted to 
express ideas, doubts, feelings, and emotions in an impersonal, generic and, for that 
reason, meaningless way. My students developed the skill to use command forms as a 
byproduct. Our learning activities were mainly designed for them to become awar of the 
semantics of power. They not only learned how to give –or for that matter, receive- a 
command, which seemed to be the goal of the textbook; they, instead, developed 
linguistic structures conducive to open up spaces for them to think about and experience 
negotiation, persuasion, empathetic understanding, collaboration, and cooperation as 
possibilities for their own lives and that of others with whom they related. I frequently 
asked my students to share their feelings and beliefs, and encouraged them to think 
hypothetically about the relationship between their feelings and beliefs with the real 
world. These exquisite moments of vision were my favorite activities, not only becaus  
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there was great anticipation for the time to share their thoughts, but because of the 
surprises this time of the year usually brought for me. As an educator, I approached that 
time with the same anticipation. It was a time to learn as well, but to learn how to allow 
surprise to challenge my expectations. When I asked my students to share their feelings 
and beliefs, I was (not only) providing an autobiographical opportunity to practice their 
Spanish grammar, I was (mainly) inviting them to think about their lives, the life of 
others, and engage in conversation with each other about them. During our circle time, 
which was a corollary to the thinking and writing processes, we sat on the floor to listen 
to each other read from our writing, and had candid conversations where, time and time 
again, they refused to treat anything as irrelevant. It was a time wherethe boundaries of 
knowers and known became unintelligible while a sort of instinct of wide reading and 
wide listening was gently unfolded. My surprise, though, did not come from unexpected 
isomorphism or adventitious accuracy of linguistic structures in this textual event, but 
from the utter reality of young persons giving voice to their sense of possibility, 
individuals giving voice to imagination and hope as they used linguistic structures –
linguistic structures that were foreign to them- to critically push the limits of their 
thoughts exploring the frontiers of knowledge to articulate their own heart and mind. As I 
return critically to this previous experience I cannot but chronicle it as an announced 
surprise. I particularly recall one black female student making a thoughtful remark with a 
smile: “the Spanish was not the problem… you made me think.”  This confirmed the 
validity of my curricular deviance. I didn’t want them to feel that they had to say 
something; I just wanted them to know that they had something to say.  
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Texts, all kinds of text, are partly created in the writing and partly created in the 
reading. We as embeds, embedding and embedded, express and receive meaning through 
our interactions. That is why there is open-endedness and yet understanding. That is why 
there is meaning and the possibility of multiple meanings. That is the kind of surprise in 
which my students and I often found ourselves dwelling, learning together; not pursuing 
but surrendered. In a sense, some of the dynamic of that reading and listening is 
described in Lerner’s (2007) secular parable where our world is described as a site of 
continual struggle between the forces of hope and fear. “We hold elements of both 
paradigms in our minds, both the Right Hand and the Left Hand of God, both fear and 
hope, and in every encounter we hear both voices, which together shape how we 
experience the world and one another” (p. 84). Lerner’s (2007) metaphorical approach 
provides another framework of understanding within which it is possible to discern the 
political meaning of the culture, intellectual life, religion, and mass psychology that 
surround us. But the sense of wide of reading and wide listening that I have describe 
above has more of a Freirean marrow and refers to a habit of the mind and the disposition 
to act accordingly that it implies that dwell in his concept of concientização and flow 
from his sense of history. For Freire (1921) one of the most important points in 
conscientization was to provoke recognition of the world, not as a given world but as a 
world dynamically “in the making” (p. 106).  I think this is still accurate and the main 
reason why we must take our presence in the world as the focus of our critical analysis. 
For it is inconsequent to separate belief and action. But the world since then has changed 
dramatically and continues to change at a rapid pace. Our ability to be present and be a 
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presence in the world, now enhanced by a technology that has no attachment, has altered 
the sense of immediacy and evolved into an uncritical and paradoxical way where distant 
and near conflate. Modern discourses and methods of analysis simply can neither 
understand nor even name these changes. An important challenge for transformative 
education, like in aesthetic deliberation, is to provide a dynamic space for the creative 
interaction of the rational and the affective as means for critical reflection. 
 
An Unhinging Question 
Facebook is the epitome of a virtual marketplace, and Mark Zuckerberg, its 
founder, a 25 year old Harvard drop-out, the personification of the quintessence of a 
capitalist entrepreneur. He started it not too long ago as an Internet social network. Many 
of my current and former students have their personal pages in it. I have seen my image 
posted in a couple of them, as well as still shots of some of our planned class activities 
and the more spontaneous happenings somehow fun or significant to them. The sheer 
possibility to generate a privatized dimension of meaning, selective and exclusive by 
definition, and, yet, open to the public sounded fascinating to me; but, at the same time, 
worrisome. Who would want or need such an exposure? I certainly would not. But, 
regardless of what I think or how I feel about it, it is still there so, perhaps, I should 
reconsider the issue and reformulate the question to who would want or need to be that 
vulnerable? Listening to my students I learned that it was a sophisticated version of a 
journal with some little extra components that allow users to share information and track 
each other. The fact that it is open to all your friends has helped it to become a popular, 
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potent, and effective communications tool. But there is a catch: the expression friend in 
Facebook, like everything else, is devoid of meaning. Facebook, like any other platform 
of the sort with a hyperlinked database, allures you and me to wander through an 
unbounded network of information, all of which is equally accessible and none of which 
is privileged. Hubert Dreyfus (2001) describes very well this leveling down process. In 
the Internet, he says, where everything is organized as a syntactic structure, no hing is 
relevant and, most importantly, “meaning plays no role” (p. 11). That is, Facebook is a 
platform where people you do not even know may claim to be your friend but in an 
unpoliced and uncommitted fashion, at face value. Like in a market. Let’s say, a volatile 
market of whim wham friendships. 
Facebook’s story, though, is interesting not because its young owner, reportedly, 
turned down a 15 billion dollars purchase offer from Google, but because, almost two 
years ago, Mark Zuckerberg started what it is now considered a movement. According to 
Josh Quittner from Time Magazine, he told a gathering of about 800 software developers 
in San Francisco that the problem with social networks at that particular moment was that 
they were closed platforms, and, in a rather celebrity tone, he added: “but today we’re 
going to change all that” (p. 48). In the same act, he invited anyone who knew how to 
write applications to jump in and do it for Facebook, offering free distribution and a 
proportionate share of income from advertisement per user download. According to 
Facebook’s website there are more than 800,000 programmers developing applications 
for Facebook Platform. Not all of them very helpful, indeed, but strategically embedded 
and invisible mechanisms immediately were set to help spread the most useful --while 
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quelling the ones that were not- showing to be an effective self-regulating system. Just 
like any other market. The unhinging move, in this case, was that Facebook gave out its 
Application Programming Interface (API) keys, the code that developers ne ded to access 
Facebook’s platform. For Zuckerberg it was not just that closed networks restrain d the 
innovational frame of mind. His entrepreneurial flair was that Facebook could avail from 
a certainly inventive but, nevertheless, potentially disruptive influx that could eventually 
take place in an unrestrained and unreclaimed virtual community, that of friendships 
devoid of meaning. His move generated an increasing mass of users attracting a multitude 
of developers who wanted to build fun or useful stuff, which in turn pulled in even more 
users. A real market. A marketplace of ideas. One with weed out mechanisms, but 
without debate or public scrutiny. 
What was at stake, then, in his unhinging move? Was it the possibility of 
improving the quality of social networking? Was it an interest in democratizing 
opportunities for communication and outreach? Or, perhaps, the sublime satisfaction of a 
basic need for self assertion? Well, your perception is probably going to privilege the 
response to one or more of these questions. But all of them are going to generate the 
wrong answer. Not because there is a problem with your perception, but simply because 
they are the wrong kind of questions. They will not lift any hinges. So, let’s reformulate it 
to what was unhinging in the move? Very simple, just imagine the shock and awe that 
Zuckerberg created when he announced that he would give his API keys to whoever 
wanted them. I guess it was like putting a sign at your home’s front door saying that the 
keys are under the doormat. Or maybe like spamming your social security number all 
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over the net. Just imagine the surprise, uncertainty, and fear of the competitors on the 
verge of an imminent and generalized security breach in their carefully crafted virtual 
towers. What was unhinging was the collapse of assumptions as to how to do business. 
His subversive re-positioning in the market. It was not a romanticist and visionary 
transformation of Zuckerberg’s Weltanschauung. It was, actually, its confirmation.  He 
enabled the creativity of people to whom he did not have to pay and benefited from ideas 
he did not need to process. He just maximized his profit. In the nature of surprise dwell 
unhinging possibilities. But it is how and why we use them, and where we embed the 
results what matters. Sometimes, though, the matter that matters is not as obvious. It is 
sedimented and often covered by the debris produced, let’s say, surprise after surprise.  
Have you ever been driving on a highway for a while, lost in your thoughts, just 
to, all of a sudden, realize that you are far away from the point where you had your last 
moment of self consciousness?  I have. And if you are like me you might have also 
wondered where you were and how did you manage to get there safely. Or have you ever 
had a conversation in which you get so involved in the topic that you seem to become 
totally absorbed in an intense discussion where the focus is defined by the ongoing flow 
of ideas as they carry the matter at hand forward, like you in your car; or, literally, like 
you and your car?  I have. And if you are like me you might have also wondered where 
you were and how did you manage not to be there safely. Curiously, both situations have 
something in common, and that is that we, as individuals, were not the focus of the 
picture. They differ, though, and differ dramatically, in that, in the former, you and I were 
like sleepwalkers in a tell, cruising through the mound of accumulated debris over a site 
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of ancient settlement. But in the latter, you and I were part of a larger flow; we were 
removing debris and settling.  
Charles Guignon (2004) refers to situations like the latter as a sort of releasement, 
where we are “no longer letting our egos get in the way in every situation,” but rather, “it 
points to a way of getting into the swim of what is going on around us without asking 
where we stand in it all” (p. 165). I originally thought that F cebook was a means of 
releasement in the sense that, through a sort of virtual disembodiment, any one could 
introduce an element of flexibility to the self and start loosening it up. But now I think 
that, without the possibility of any significant commitment, it is just a place for private 
fantasies; a sort of virtual crack for spiritual vacancy; another subtle way to become 
numb to the social misery in our midst. The fight for control of the electronic mediation 
that holds it clearly indicates that Facebook is just the virtual concretion of a larger
phenomenon, the market, where fear and profit are connate, and the confirmation that 
they connive in an expedient fashion. The reverie with the control of media of the sort, 
warns Guignon, “means the imposition of human will onto everything in the world, even 
onto our relations and our selves” (p. 166). So let me ask again, who would want or need 
to be that vulnerable? Zuckerberg created a lucrative paradox. By giving up security he 
allowed free flow of ideas and, at the same time, secured his profitable control of that
particular marketplace. Control of signs, symbols, and images seemed to be his ultimate 
goal. That is one of the reasons why Facebook revealed itself as an appealing metaphor. 
Not because I have Facebook friends, but because it just happens that some of them are, 
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also, friends of mine, friends for whom I deeply care, and with whom I share an 
educational project.  For me, if you have not noticed it yet, the personal is also political. 
 
What a Thought Cannot Think 
Power plays an inordinate role in shaping our consciousness. For knowledge and 
consciousness continue to be socially constructed, power to create meaning becomes the 
greatest of all. As a foreign citizen myself, but established and living long enough in this 
country to call it home, I must admit that I am still trying to discern the meaning of the 
American Ideal –the possibility to separate the domestic life from the external world-, 
and the contradiction that holds it together -why so many people have been and still are 
willing to risk so much to become an American, and why so many people have been and 
still are willing to risk so much to prevent it from others-. I can only guess that that is 
possible only because, normally, the personal and the historical do not intersect; like in 
Facebook. But I wonder what would happen if they did. Like in what holds Facebook 
together, a marketplace fueled by insecurity, where the separation of the personal from 
the historical can no longer be assumed. So when I ask, who would want or need to be 
that vulnerable?  It is not a mundane question. I am actually wondering whether there is 
any viable alternative to a worldview that prioritizes domestication of others as the best 
way to achieve freedom and security.  
During months past I have been engaged in understanding from an ethical 
perspective what is understood when we talk about curriculum. A concern sublimely 
weaved by words which must be un-weaved by meaning, also weaved by words. A 
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concern that, for that reason, calls for an exploration of the limits of our own language 
and the honest examination of what remains unsaid or one dismisses because one chooses 
not to say or may not bear to know. Oddly enough, it just happens that the times I have 
mentioned to my colleagues, upon their casual interest about my current academic work, 
that I was looking at discourses of patriotism, nationalism, violence, terror, and terrorism 
trying to establish a connection between education, identity, and national security, their 
polite and very brief acknowledgement was never followed by a question. The eloquence 
of their silence confirmed the pertinence of my curiosity. After all, the curricula  issue at 
hand is how to chronicle what a thought cannot think. Why is it so unthinkable to work 
through such concepts when one thinks about curriculum, literacy, and pedagogy when, 
in fact, national security doctrine is unquestionably and uncritically assumed as grounds 
for pedagogical action? Here I am following Britzman (1999) in what she calls her “queer 
pedagogy” as it: 
 
offers education techniques to make sense of and remark upon what it dismisses 
or cannot bear to know. This theory insists, using psychoanalytic method, that the 
relationship between knowledge and ignorance is neither oppositional nor binary. 
Rather they mutually implicate each other, structuring and enforcing particul  
forms of knowledge and forms of ignorance. In this way ignorance is analyzed as 
an effect of knowledge, indeed, as its limit, and not as an originary or innocent 
state. Perhaps the most curious insistence is the study of what hegemonic 
discourses of normalcy cannot bear to know. (p. 214) 
 
But I look especially to what she calls the study reading practices: 
 
These reading practices point to the fact that there are no innocent, normal, or 
unmediated readings and that the representations drawn upon to maintain a 
narrative or a self as normal, as deviant, as thinkable are social effects of how
discourses of normalization are lived and refused. Reading practices might well 
 115
read all categories as unstable, all experiences as constructed, all reality as having 
to be imagined, all knowledge as provoking uncertainties, misrecognitions, 
ignorance, and silences. Then the problem becomes one of thinking through how 
readings might open the questions of ethical relations. So given this queer 
theories, identities and the self knowledge that render them inintelligible and 
unintelligible suggest more about the social effects of the political than they do 
about essential selves. (p. 226) 
 
This is an example of how it works. Look at the cultural logic that structures the 
Military Commissions to trial certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism endorsed 
by President Obama in October of 2009. Critics say that the 2009 act is an improvement 
over the 2006 version of military-commissions regime passed during the Bush 
administration. But Warren Ritchie (2009) from The Christian Science Monitor 
documents those same critics saying that “it is still substandard, offering a second-class 
system of justice designed to obtain quick convictions.”  A comparison of the texts from 
2006 and 2009 cannot but lead you to that conclusion. Ironically, it was but fourteen 
years ago that the United States roundly condemned the conviction by a military 
commission in Peru of New York native Lori Berenson on charges of terrorism. Through 
official channels and great media coverage it was demanded that she be retried in a 
civilian court because of the lack of due process afforded in the commission. The cries of
unfairness were echoed by United Nations officials who openly criticized Peru’s anti-
terrorism military courts. To me there seems to be little difference in the measure of due 
process afforded to Berenson in Peru and what is called for under the current 
circumstances. Something is not in-sync, but pretends.  Notice though that what may be 
considered by some as political inconsequence is not really the issue here, but th  irony 
of those military commissions moving in the opposite direction for which they were 
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intended, confirming an inveterate urge to remit everything back into the safe quart rs of 
preferred, predefined boundaries and identities. The Obama administration has 
committed to closing the prison at Guantánamo, but the already overdue closure will be 
devoid of meaning if the administration leaves in place the policy that the prison has 
come to represent. This is the kind of disconnect between signifier and signified that an
educated citizenry should be able to identify, morally challenge, and democratically 
quell. I do not pretend here to do an exhaustive comparative analysis of polities, politics
or policies. But despite the differences in the scope and magnitude of the violent affairs 
and the level of democratic development between Peru and the U.S., the grounds for 
legality and legitimacy of the outcomes of the war against terrorism in both countries are 
common and should be subject to the same standard. Nevertheless, it must be admitted, 
the notion of war on terror has rendered ineffectual the categories and routines that 
education traditionally offers. So gathering and mulling over such a notion is not only an 
open invitation to the pedagogical experience of thinking ethically about what discourses 
of patriotism, nationalism, violence, terror, and terrorism mean in the classroom, but an 
example of venues to think critically through ideological structures that like, for example, 
the National Security Strategy, use coercion in service of individual self assrtion. There, 
I argue, no one is safe because the very construct of security, in its paranoid quest for 
certainty, prescribes normalizing identities, tells you who you are, and ascribes undesired 
meanings to any expression of dissonance which, like in a symbolic metastasis, might 
generate an uncontrollable growth of meaning.  So security, I propose, is not to be 
understood only as a conceptual framework that regulates a cold operating procedure to 
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situate a particular issue, considered a threat, in the security agenda in order to respond 
with emergency measures; it is basically a powerful political meaning positioning system 
where a particular issue may trigger protected deviance behavior from the state.   
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CHAPTER VI 
SECURITY AS A CONSTRUCT 
 
The undeniably acute danger on international terrorism cannot be combated 
effectively with the classical instruments of war between states nor, consequently, by the 
military superiority of a unilaterally acting superpower. Jürgen Habermas (2006) in The 
Divided West, has already said some of what President Obama (2009) indicated only a 
few weeks ago, in the aftermath of the failed terrorist attack on Christmas Day: that only 
the effective coordination of intelligence services, police forces, and criminal justice 
procedures will strike at the logistics of the adversary. What he did not say was that “only 
the combination of social modernization with self-critical dialogue between cultures will 
reach the roots of terrorism.” (p. 184) Self-critical dialogue does not match self-as ertive 
coercion. Here is Habermas (2006) a call for transformative education: “Citizens of a 
democratic political community sooner or later become aware of cognitive dissonances if 
universalistic claims cannot be squared with the particularistic character of the obvious 
driving interests” (p. 185). 
 
Breaking the Spell 
In a response to McLaren (2007), who strongly argues that “critical educators 
need to consider citizenship outside of a narrowly nationalist sense in a manner that 
situates them in a larger practice of global citizenship and solidarity” (p. 86); I have 
 119
engaged myself in a pedagogical reflection that encompasses a modest but honest effort 
to contribute to an alternative frame of counterbalance hegemonic meaning. In particular, 
making reference to the involvement of the state in the construction of what Appiah 
(2007) calls an ethical self, and to the fashion in which the bulk of the population is 
socially integrated and riveted into what Bauman (1995) calls the process of systemic 
reproduction. These social issues are important not only because they affect our pers nal 
projects, but mainly because they determine their nature and bear upon our dignity as 
individuals. But my pursue has been less universal and, perhaps, a little more pragmatic: 
in the light of threat inflation and under heightened national security alerts, I havemoved 
critically through the marketplace of ideas to specifically inquire how much in fact the 
state intervenes in the pedagogical process of interpretation through which each of us is 
supposed to build an identity. Unsurprisingly, I have found that the concept of national 
security plays an important role in this formative process. Like a prism designed to 
protect the State in conflictive scenarios, it not only uses but models coercion in service
of self assertion. The analysis displayed to verify this claim has been, though, rather 
unconventional. I have used biographical and autobiographical reflection, narrative 
inquiry, literary analysis, aesthetic deliberation, and contextual understanding as a way to 
avoid the classic dichotomies of modern political examination. In a traditional approach 
language would have been, for the most part, irrelevant to study of this concept. Material 
practices like recruitment techniques, troop deployments, or missile strikes launched from 
drones; and material realities like weapon stockpiles, surveillance satellites, and non-
combatant detainees are the frame and fabric of security. But analytically, his meager 
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framework, dominant since last century’s Cold War, ignores other important source  of 
meaning and forms of security representation and intervention.  
At West Point, last December, though, President Obama (2009) spoke security in 
a different tone.  As he announced the end of the war in Iraq and the deployment of an 
additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan -which, he made clear, will begin to return 
after 18 months, once the transition of responsibilities to Afghan authorities has started-; 
he actually changed the official mood and, drawing from a pragmatic reading of President 
Eisenhower’s doctrine, said that National Security policy must be weighted in the light of 
a broader context: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs: 
 
Over the past several years, we have lost that balance. We’ve failed to appreciate 
the connection between our national security and our economy. In the wake of an 
economic crisis, too many of our neighbors and friends are out of work and 
struggle to pay bills. Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our 
children. Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown more 
fierce. So we can’t simply afford to ignore the price of these wars.  (p. 6) 
 
This retreat, then,  is not as much a strategic move in search of security as it is a 
strategic move in search of identity, at least a more legitimate one in a growin ly 
contesting international scenario; a sort of American gl snost. To combat our “diffuse 
enemies,” he said, “It is necessary to improve and better coordinate intelligece efforts, 
so that we stay one step ahead of shadowy networks.”  But most importantly, as he 
sprinted in impeccable style to close his speech, summoning the images and stirring the 
emotions that September 11 still generates, he sealed it with a commitment to forge an 
America that is safer, not secure. I did not repair in the ironic detail until I read the 
transcript provided online by the White House (2009) the following day. I say ironic
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because despite his Nobel Peace Price remarks in Oslo on December 11, reminding the 
world of his ambivalence about the use of force and his “right makes might” adiaphoretic 
philosophy, a 24 year old, highly educated, affluent, and radicalized Nigerian Muslim, 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, managed to make the headlines in the entire globe for a 
very serious and potentially deadly security breach on Christmas Day, helping, 
unexpectedly, to put national security system under scrutiny and to generate a certain 
space for a different perspective to settle. Habermas (2006) had already shared his views: 
 
The sanctioning of states whose governments provide a haven for, or actively 
support, the new international terror requires neither the erosion of the narrowly 
defined right of self-defense nor the suspension of key provisions of the Geneva 
Convention. Nor does effectively combating the new terror at the domestic level 
call for restrictions on basic rights that amount virtually to their destruction. Of 
course, this specter could vanish with a change in administration in the United 
States. Nevertheless, the image of a superpower that uses its military, 
technological, and economic superiority to create a global order in accordance 
with its own religiously colored notions of good and evil and its geostrategic 
goals suggest a heuristically useful alternative, namely, one between a progressive 
constitutionalization of international law and its substitution by the liberal ethics 
of a superpower. (p. 148) 
 
Coincidently, in this alternative line of thought is, amongst others, Matt 
McDonald (2007) who in The Copenhagen School and the Construction of Security had 
already lined up against the traditional understanding of security and in favor of the 
consideration of other discourses such as: 
 
 (…) the role of audiences and the inter-subjective dynamic of security 
negotiation; the often incremental processes through which the referent object and 
threats are positioned as such over time; the role of non-elite and non-institutional 
voices in the construction of security (…). (p.294) 
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Concurring with him, I have ventured myself in a sustained, broader, and non 
linear understanding of the process itself to try to describe what kind of personal 
identities a traditional frame of national security actually generates. In the process of 
getting a firmer grip of the circumstances of the other, I have confirmed otherness as an 
important source of entropy. Many questions, which I think are valid questions, have 
come to the fore. How do issues become security issues? How do they become threats? 
How do some junctures between security and threat come to resonate more than others? 
How do we know when they do? Further more, I have also wondered if meaning plays 
any significant role in the formula. And if so, what are the processes in virtue of which
some actors are empowered to predicate security? How is the other described in security 
discourses? Who plays the role of the oracle? What are the alternative perceptions and 
articulations of security?  And finally, are these voices legitimate? Of course I do not 
pretend to give a response to all these questions here.  They point a future course for 
further research. But you can certainly see these questions as a warp that can make more 
intelligible the life responses given to them by the individuals portrayed in this writing. If 
any, their unhinging goal is to break Illich’s (2002) spell in order to build a new cosmos. 
So as I finish putting this collage together, I cannot but honor the uniqueness of their
voices still trying to make sense even out of their own contexts. 
 
Blueprint Identities 
Allen G. Breed and Kevin Maurer (2008) staff writers from Associated Press 
followed up on Joseph Patrick Dwyer’s story and recorded more details about his ordeal, 
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like his aspirations to become a police officer upon discharge and his fear that a PTSD 
record would prevent him from further professional development. They also informed of 
a letter to post Commander Maj. Gen. Robert Lennox, by Dionne Knapp, a former 
comrade and friend of the Dwyers, expressing anger that “Army officials who were proud 
to display him as a hero” had now turned their back on him. "Joseph Dwyer, who had left 
to Iraq one of the nicest, kindest, caring, self-sacrificing and patriotic people I have ever 
known," she wrote, "was forced to witness and commit acts completely contrary to his 
nature and returned a tormented, confused disillusioned shadow of his former self that 
was not being given the help he needed."  Joseph Patrick Dwyer had been attached to the 
3rd Infantry's 7th Cavalry Regiment. He was at "the tip of the tip of the spear," during the 
push into Baghdad, in one of his officer's phrasing, quoted by the Associated Press. He 
was in the front line for 91 days only, but for most of the six years that followed he 
acutely suffered in a private hell the condition of not existing, “shooting at imaginary 
enemies and dodging roadside bombs,” embodying the contradictions between security
and identity. “I'm a soldier," he would say. "I suck it up. That's our job." This is, I 
believe, a guarded statement, a misleading utterance, and a procedure of resistanc  to 
interpretation. His experience was sublime indeed, but in an ironic reversal, sadly, he 
seemed to be unable to turn away from the horror of being able to comprehend himself.  
Pretty much like Dominic Matei, the post historic man, who lived in fear, “dreading what 
awaits in the alleyways.” A virtual collapse of all frames of understanding. A madness. 
There are many soldiers suffering in silence the effects of a blueprint identity that 
domesticates their human condition. 
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Matina Dwyer, on the other end, experienced turmoil and coped with her own 
circumstances with the powerful ability to redescribe. She remains a private citizen but, 
indeed, lived her own state of emergency. Matina Dwyer reminds me of Del Toro’s 
(2006) Mercedes not only because of their shared sense of responsiveness despite 
negative circumstances, but because they both had the ability to acknowledge their 
multiple allegiances and seemed to understand even their own identity, in the way 
Britzman (1999) understands identity, as a state of emergency:  
 
The new questions that must be addressed concern what education, knowledge, 
and identity have to do with the fashioning of structures of thinkability and the 
limits of its thought, with what education has to do with the possibilities of 
proliferating identifications and critiques that exceed identity yet still hold onto 
the understanding of identity as a state of emergency. (p. 227) 
 
Ultimately, Matina Dwyer also reminds me of Coppola’s (2007) Ofelia. None of 
the three really knew what would happen next, but they kept moving forward, imagining, 
perhaps, a gild unhinged from the dominant order. Their social intervention was certainly 
a challenge to a set of traditional responses and to security as a construct. 
Ewan Macdougall was born in New York as well. He currently attends the 
Kennedy School of Government as a Belfer IGA Fellow. The highly prestigious Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs is housed at Harvard University. He attended 
Yale as an undergraduate where he studied Grand Strategy and gained notoriety thanks to 
John Lewis Gaddis’s (2004) book. He spent his summers, like he said he would, 
completing Officer Candidate School for the United States Marine Corps and interning as 
a research assistant at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He graduated 
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with a BA in History in 2003, and was immediately commissioned as an officer in the 
United States Marine Corps. One year before graduation Macdougall (2002) shared his 
mixed emotions when it came to figure out who he was for the Yale Daily News: 
 
On this anniversary of Sept. 11, I find myself pondering with renewed intensity 
the three-way conflict that has plagued me for the past year: how to reconcile my 
background as a New Yorker, with my education at Yale that challenges me to 
seek universal truths, with my training in an institution that demands decisions, 
that by definition must take sides, and that then requires unflinching commitment 
to its cause -- the United States Marine Corps. (…)  
 
I concluded that, despite some flaws, I love America. I found great comfort in my
affiliation with the Marine Corps. Rather than lament Sept. 11, the Marines took 
action. There is simply no higher calling, because without institutions like the 
Marine Corps, there can be none of the other high callings that are open to us as 
Americans, and especially to us as Yalies. This remains true to this day, a year 
later, with al Qaeda fairly well debilitated, for the question raised by Sept. 11 
lingers on: can we Americans be fully Americans, and we Yalies be fully Yalies -
- with the implied high standards of living, freedom, and equality and with the 
definitional degree of economic, educational, and career opportunity -- if we still 
live in fear? Franklin Delano Roosevelt thought not, and it is the job of all of us 
and especially, I am proud to say, of the Marines, to be increasingly vigilant and 
press on in the war on terror. 
 
Macdougall served as an infantry officer for five years, deploying three times 
with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. According to the Belfer Center (2010), his assignments 
included platoon commander in Ramadi, Iraq; officer of the guard at the Government 
Center in al-Anbar; training Filipino Marines; a friendship building exercise w th the 
Chinese; and setting up medical, dental, security training in the Maldives. Aftr a tour as 
an executive officer, he was promoted to captain and then left the service to attend 
graduate school. Macdougall, according to the same source, spent the summer of 2009 in 
Afghanistan embedded with the Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), in the 
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north-east of the country, and the 1st Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB), 
researching the relationship between development and security in a counterinsurgent 
environment and the structure and functioning of the provincial reconstruction team 
model. According to Peter Jakobsen (2005) a PRT is a unit originally introduced by the 
U.S. government consisting of military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction subject 
matter experts, working to support reconstruction efforts in unstable states. The overall 
PRT-idea in Afghanistan was, and is, according to Robert Perito (2005) to use relativ ly 
small joint civil-military units to achieve three objectives. These PRT-objectives are to 
improve security, to extend the authority of the Afghan central government, and finally to 
facilitate reconstruction. The 1st MEB website declares that its mission is to conduct 
“mobility, protection, and stability or civil support operations in an assigned area of 
responsibility to preserve freedom of action of the supported force. 
Warren Zinn, a 1998 graduate of the University of Michigan, interned as a 
photographer with The Michigan Daily, the Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, and the Miami
Herald. After college, he became a photographer with Army Times Publishing Co. While 
employed at Army Times, Zinn covered events all over the world, from uncovering 
stories about trafficked sex slaves in South Korea to being one of the few people who was 
at both the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on Sept. 11. He then completed two 
trips to Afghanistan spending more than 100 days with the troops on the front lines along 
with the 3rd Infantry. He had already left photojournalism and war behind for four and a 
half years when Joseph Patrick Dwyer died. He admits that war had taken its toll on his 
family, his friends, and on him. “I couldn't find it in me to go back to Iraq and risk my 
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life again. That's the difference between me and soldiers like Joseph Dwyer: I had the 
privilege of calling it quits whenever I wanted to. The men and women of the Armed 
Forces don't have that luxury.” Zinn became a student and was struggling with Contract 
Law, according to his own account, at The University of Miami, School of Law, Florida 
when he received the news. In an article published by The Washington Post, Warren Zinn 
(2008) tells that, as soon as he heard about Joseph Dwyer’s death, “I drove home in a 
daze and walked into my apartment. And there was Joseph, on the wall, looking at me.” 
He explains that for years he had proudly displayed the front page of USA Today 
featuring his photo. “It was a tremendous accomplishment for me; I was only 25 when I
took it.” But, he also says that, as he continued to stare at this image on the wall, he 
couldn't dodge the question:  
 
“Did this photo have anything to do with his death? News reports said he hated 
the celebrity that came with the picture. How much, I wondered, did that moment 
-- just 1/250th of a second when three lives intersected on a river bank in Iraq -- 
contributed to the burdens he'd brought home with him? If I'd never taken his 
picture, would he have ended up as he did? Would he still have been a casualty of 
war?” 
 
In this second recollection for the media he remembers thinking, "I hope this is in 
focus, I hope the exposure is right, God, Warren, don't mess this one up." I thought “this 
was a moment that the world needed to see -- a moment of American heroism, of 
American commitment to saving a people and to saving lives.” (2008) continues telling:
 
“The last message Joseph sent me was on Dec. 1, 2004.”When I first got back I 
didn't really want to talk about being over there to anyone," he wrote. "Now 
looking back on it, it's one of the greatest things I've ever done. I hope you feel 
the same about what you have done. I truly believe you played an important role 
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in this war. You told everyone's story." 
 
To which Zinn (2008) responded with two important questions: “What happened 
to him after he wrote that? And did I do what he said?” He concludes his story saying: 
“Had I never captured that image of Joseph, it's likely that very few people would have 
paid any attention to this one soldier's death.” And then, he shared his philosophical take: 
 
Photographers like to say that when they place the camera to their eye, it acts as 
both a physical and mental barrier to what's going on around them -- that 
somehow the camera can be a shield between you and the awful scenes taking 
place in front of you. The fatal flaw in that thinking is that the shield has a hole in 
it right where your eye goes; nor does the camera block smells and sounds, which 
are rampant on the battlefield. So although it may be easy to say that you're just a 
fly on the wall, not a participant, the truth is that journalists are participants, in 
their own way. I've never struggled to the degree that Joseph and Ali did, but 
there are small things that affect me every once in a while. Certain sounds will get 
to me. Fireworks, for instance, make me jump. Don't know that the photograph of 
Joseph was the best one I ever took, or my favorite, but I think it represented 
something important. At the time, it represented hope. Hope that what we were 
doing as a nation in Iraq was the right thing. Hope that our soldiers were helping 
people. Hope that soldiers such as Joseph cared more about human life than 
anything else. But now when I look at the picture, it doesn't feel hopeful. It makes 
me realize that so many soldiers are physically torn and in such mental anguish 
that for some of them, hope has turned to hopelessness. That, I have to believe, is 
what happened to Joseph Dwyer, who was haunted by the ghosts of what he'd 
seen in Iraq, by fears he had lived with for too long. He could never leave the 
battlefield behind. 
 
Adiaphorization 
Howard Zinn (2007) highlights a historical juncture when, during Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the New York Times gave its readers miniature 
portraits of the human beings known to have died on September 11, 2001. Their names, 
photos, glimpses of their personalities and idiosyncrasies became vignettes that 
documented what at that moment was still unthinkable.  Zinn (2007) describes how he 
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was deeply moved reading those very intimate sketches and wondered whether those who 
celebrated the symbolism of this horrendous act would have second thoughts if they 
could see the faces and read the foreshorten stories of those who lost their lives. Then it 
occurred to him: 
 
What if all those Americans who declare their support for the U.S. ‘war on terror’ 
could see, instead of those elusive symbols –Sheikh Mullah Mohammed Omar, 
Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda—the real human beings who are being killed by our 
bombs? I do believe they would have second thoughts. (…) Often these are 
children, victims of unexploded land mines, or cluster bombs. But the American 
people are not told these stories; we are kept ignorant of what the ‘war on terror’ 
means in human terms. (p.78) 
 
Discourses about “collateral damage” which is a euphemism originated during the 
Vietnam War and other recent nuances like “unmanned aerial vehicles”, “corporate 
warriors”, “non-combatant detainees”, and “man-caused disasters” contribute o quicken 
and thicken, I believe, Bauman’s (1995) pervasive notion of adiaphorization 
magnificently captured by The Washington Post on July 30, 2006: 
 
The truth is, it wasn’t all I thought it was cracked up to be. I mean, I thought 
killing somebody would be this life-changing experience. And then I did it, and I 
was like, ‘All right, whatever’… "I shot a guy who wouldn't stop when we were 
out at a traffic checkpoint and it was like nothing," he went on. "Over here, killing 
people is like squashing an ant. I mean, you kill somebody and it's like 'All right, 
let's go get some pizza.' (p. B1) 
 
This is 21-year-old school-drop-out Private Steven Dale Green from Texas, 
deployed with the 101st Airborne Division talking to Andrew Tilghman (2006) embedded 
reporter in Iraq for The Washington Post. At that time, he said, “the soldier's matter-of-
fact manner struck me chiefly as a rare example of honesty.” Tilghman had been on a 
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nine-month assignment spending much of his time with soldiers like him -- mostly yung 
and immature “who sign up for a job as killers, lured by some gut-level desire for 
excitement and adventure.”  Dark sense of humor was common, he found. “They were 
clearly desensitized to death,” was his final assertion. He thought Green was just one of 
the exceptions who wasn’t afraid to say what he really thought. But the next tim he saw 
him, it was in a front-page newspaper photograph five months later; he was standing 
outside a federal courthouse in North Carolina, where he had pled not guilty to charges of 
premeditated rape and murder. The brutal killing of the 14-year-old Iraqi girl, Abeer 
Qassim Hamza, and her family in Mahmudiyah, of which he was accused, had taken 
place just three weeks after they talked. He was trying to cover it up as an oper tion that 
went wrong. Even though he was found guilty on 16 counts by Federal Court in 
Kentucky, eight of them carrying death penalty, he was sentenced to life in prison 
without possibility of parole in September of 2009.  Four other soldiers involved in this 
gang-type crime received similar sentences. But the description that Green offered and 
Tilghman recorded of his daily duties will not only remain as a monument to reckless 
disregard for human life, but as a symbol of the lethality of enthroning procedural 
discipline as the all-overriding criterion of moral performance. 
Peter Singer (2009) in Wired for War interestingly describes but from a different 
perspective, how the robotic revolution is changing war and warriors, and challenging 
traditional concepts that do not find a referent in the way conflicts tend to be handled in 
the 21st century, creating a wider gap between signifiers and signified. There is a clear 
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tone of nostalgia in his writing, though, but he is right in his core analysis as he narrows it 
down to the unmanned aerial vehicles: 
 
By removing warriors completely from the risk and fear, unmanned systems 
create the first complete break in the ancient connection that defines warriors nd 
their soldierly values. If you are sitting at a computer’s controls, with no real 
danger other than carpal tunnel syndrome, your experience of war is not merely 
distanced from risk, as with previous technologies, but now fully disconnected 
from it. And thus, these new warriors are disconnected from the old meaning of 
courage as well. As one described his experience in the Iraq war, fought from a
cubicle in Qatar, “it’s like a video game. It can get a little bloodthirsty. But it’s 
fucking cool.” (p. 332) 
 
What is prominent in Singer (2009) is that he establishes an accurate paralllism 
between modern industry and modern war. The former went from fields to factory floors 
to cubicles; the latter has gone from the battle space to the office space. “For a new 
generation going to war doesn’t mean shipping off to some dank foxhole in a foreign land 
to dodge bullets. Instead, it is a daily commute in your Toyota Camry to sit behind a 
computer screen and drag a mouse.” (p. 329) But the gap between signifiers and signifie 
had already been there for a while. Bauman (1995) described it as “covering up the link 
between partial action and the ultimate effect of coordinated moves.” Singer (2009)
seems to be more concerned with a “virtueless war.” My concern is war and how those 
sensor operators are so easily excluded from the realm of moral subjects. Britzman’s 
(2006) appeal to understand our acts beyond our own consciousness and even in 
contradiction with it, and Rorty’s (1989) call for the expansion of our sense of solidarity 
through the closer description of the other are, I believe, necessary pedagogical and moral 
endeavors to both get rid of assumptions, those long-standing but unexamined habits of 
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thought that either keep us prisoners of our naïveté or grant our complicity with immoral 
situations, and outdated and dangerous ways of seeing the world. 
 
Multiple Allegiances 
Finally, my writing is a proposal to go through the pedagogical experience of 
seeing the study of security as the study of the designation of threat. It is prec sely from 
this point of view that McDonald (2007) explains that an issue becomes a security isse 
precisely when it is positioned as a threat to a particular political community. What is 
interesting in this particular study of threat is that it is based in the idea that security is 
traditionally constituted in oppositional terms: by designating that which it s not or that 
from which it needs preservation or protection. That is, who we are would be basically 
determined by the designation of a threatening other. The designation of an issue as a 
threat, then, justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle the other. Sinc  the 
invocation of security is the key to legitimizing the use of force, I have been trying o 
visualize like in a sequence of frames precisely how is it that the interpretive sponses 
that constitute our identities are affected. Here, the importance of contextual factors -from 
traditional geopolitical ones to dominant narratives of history and culture- are prominent. 
These factors, McDougal (2007) insists, and I agree, should be viewed as central to a 
broader construction of security.  “The discourses of security and threat emerge out of an 
inter-subjective process that involves both speakers and audiences,” even (or especially) 
when such interactions are profoundly shaped by existing power relations.  
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Amin Maaluf (2000) has a particularly interesting perspective that I want to invite 
because it could very well contribute to a deeper understanding of threat and because it 
broadly resonates with the concepts of solidarity in Rorty (1989) and adiaphorization in 
Bauman (1995). In his book In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong, 
Maaluf makes an emphatic and empathetic effort to press on our collective conscious ess 
and redescribe “why so many people commit crimes nowadays in the name of religi us, 
ethnic, national, or some other kind of identity,” and to understand how what he calls 
“identities that kill” are made and sustained.  Murderous identities are born of 
humiliation, he says. Consequently, if we want to address the problem of ethnically or 
religiously motivated violence, for example, we must work to counter the conditions 
under which people are humiliated or denigrated for being part of some ethnic or 
religious national group. But the same principle can be applied to all kinds of identities. 
For Maaluf (2000), the key condition that makes it possible for some to humiliate others 
is a failure to understand the true nature of identity. Identity, he reminds us, is neither 
monolithic nor static, “it is built up and changes throughout a person’s lifetime.” As such, 
he explains, it is a shifting composite of a greater number of different, often conflicting, 
allegiances and attachments, including one’s allegiances to one’s family, neighborhood, 
village, and country, to one’s religious, ethnic, linguistic, and racial group, to one’s
profession, favorite soccer team, or political movement. 
These constitutive allegiances are what Maaluf (2000) calls “genes of the sul” 
but he hurries to make sure that we understand that they are not innate and reiterates that 
“we are not born but made in relation to the world in which we live and the choices that it 
 134
presents to us.” The greatest appeal and contribution of his book comes as a warning, 
though. He says that the failure to recognize the fluidity, multiplicity, and malleability of 
identity is not only misguiding but also dangerous. He explains, dramatically, that the 
danger is twofold. First, a failure to recognize the complexity, the multi-dimensionality of 
the Other makes their dehumanization easier. Second, imposing on the Other a rigid, 
singular (and usually inferior) identity will provoke them, in anger and defiance, to pick 
up arms to “assert their identity.” In view of Maaluf’s (2000) idea of multiple allegiances, 
McLaren’s (2007) appeal to practice global citizenship and solidarity acquires now a 
powerful contrastive sense to the war on terror but keeps its sense of urgency, and the 
inseam of Education as part of a complex mechanism to secure global ideological transfer 
becomes the opposite, an urgent reason to unlearn collective prejudices and create 
pedagogical dissonance around dominant state-based narratives of security. 
Consequently, if we wanted, we could learn a lot more about the construction of 
security through studying the issues that are represented as existential threats. That is, 
representations of threat can be seen as representations of security and representations of 
identity as well, but most importantly, as constitutive of security and identity. For the 
predicate of that from which we need to be protected is critical in telling us who we are, 
what we value, and what we are prepared to invest and warrant protecting our self-
preferred identities, there is little room for understanding how difference or otherness can 
ever be negotiated in non-threatening terms. This is a very challenging peda ogical 
experience. In this alternative frame of understanding, then, what would it mean wh n 
someone, in one way or another, tells you Sabemos quién eres? Well, first of all, it would 
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be a wicked assault on your dignity, an upright hypostatization; the unbearable reduction 
of your humanity to an object that is bereft of your personal qualities and your 
individuality, the picture of a picture taken out of context. Second, it would be the 
creation of a fallacy, a fallacy of misplaced concreteness; a mirror that pretends to be one 
step ahead of reality.  And finally, it would be a shivery effort to annotate a complex set 
of phenomena as if it were a single, simple entity; a labyrinth without its Faun. I can 
share now that I cannot tell who spoke to me nor can I attest from what side of the 
spectrum. That is not the matter that matters. It will always be the memory of a fearful 
and lurid moment, because for all I know, it could have been either. 
 
Moments of Vision 
When I started writing this dissertation I looked upon this theme as a real 
challenge not only because I thought it was relevant to the present juncture but beca se it 
is crucial to do it critically. My critical perspective, in itself, presupposes an intimate 
connection with the theme in the sense that it implicates memory and, at the same time, a 
deep sense of hope. This dissertation, then, responds to the challenge by becoming yet 
another challenge for whoever reads it. Fred once told me that “the reach of your hand is 
always beyond your grasp.” Herzog the theologian explains it this way: 
 
The mystery of God-walk is not the final consummation of all things beyond 
history. The mystery is the presence of God-walk in history. It is the presence of 
the coming God, appropriated as liberation from sin and all the powers of evil, 
and the prevailing of our life over death. The gospel is not just pie in the sky –the 
offer of something in the distant future. It is history reshaped. (p. 195) 
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My critical position, which is a pedagogical position, has led me through an act of 
knowing. You may agree or not with what I wrote, but in order to do one or the other, 
you must join the process as a knowing subject as well. Knowledge is not something 
done and finished and, I believe, consciousness is rather an aim. Whether critics like it or 
not, Slattery (1995) strongly argues that: 
 
Society has become a global plurality of competing subcultures and movements 
where no one ideology and episteme (understanding of knowledge) dominates. 
There is no cultural consensus, and –cultural literacy programs notwithstanding- 
there is no curriculum development consensus either. Even if the fragmentation of 
culture and education into many subcultures has been exaggerated, the shift to a 
postmodern worldview is evident. (p. 17) 
 
We know that the language of education has been co-opted by managers and 
strategists, and Education is being redescribed in ways unimagined that foreclose the 
creation of dynamic spaces for creative interaction of the rational and the affective as 
means of critical reflection without challenge by educators. In this sense, this is an effort 
to counterbalance a discourse that manipulates the marketplace of ideas an  counts on 
our uncritical view to keep going. Schools of Education seem to be committed to 
functional literacy only and show more concern with the sophistication of measuring 
procedures disguised as accountability, than with the realities they pretend to measure. 
There is an abdication of possibility in service of selfish agendas. I think Schools of 
Education ought to be much more than that. They should be unhinging sites ready to 
create dissonance; be understood as sites of struggle to stir the sedimentation of 
democratic values, be assumed as hermeneutical crossroads ready collapse frame  and 
unveil the expressions of a surrounding culture of fear, and be undertaken as gener tors 
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of ironic reversal that enable a pedagogical cope with the challenges of the time. Three 
words are of utmost importance for that endeavor: hope, memory and, above all, critica  
sense. In the same way the Department of Homeland Security is the institutional zation of 
fear; our Schools of Education should be the institutionalization of solidarity, understood 
as the ability to see more and more traditional differences as unimportant when compared 
with similarities generated by our shared vulnerability to pain and suffering. Like the 
vignettes of life that we theologically read, they should allow the fluid navigation through 
the interstices of our minds and souls in search of portals and mirrors to connect with 
alternative meanings.  
On our end, Educators should not be, by any means, seduced by power or official 
approval. Kincheloe (1993) and Slattery (1995) remind us that 
 
Post-formal thinking about thinking draws upon the boundary trespasses of 
Hermes and the playful parody of postmodernism to transgress the official 
constraints of our consciousness construction, to transcend modern convention by 
exposing its ironic contradictions.” 
 
We should embody the ability of wide listening and wide reading so the other can 
become more familiar, keeping focus in the underlying phenomenology of what is 
considered historically relevant. We should trust the worthiness of aesthetic deliberation 
and feelings as ideas, keeping empathy as an important source of knowledge speaking to 
possibility. We should embody moments of vision and embed visionary possibilities in 
our lessons. Let’s not take peace lightly, let’s rather be lighthearted about it. 
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